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This study investigates the emergence of Malaysia-India Maritime Security Cooperation 
(MIMSC) in response to traditional threats and non-traditional security threats at the Eastern 
Indian Ocean Region (EIOR). 
 
This thesis argues that although both Malaysia and India have identified the maritime 
significance of the EIOR to them, the common threat faced by them in that region, and have 
recognised the need for cooperation in maritime security, it appears at present that MIMSC 
in EIOR projects a lack of robustness in its engagement. This is despite both an appreciation 
of the relations between the two countries, and a substantial ability to address the challenges 
of the EIOR. The positive relations that are challenged by these maritime threats show that 
there is a pressing need for both countries to draw up effective maritime policies. But it is as 
yet unclear why these countries have failed to do so. The paucity of scientific investigation 
into the question of why the two states have failed to draw up an effective maritime policy 
cooperation despite their potential to do so, and the lack of availability of substantive 
arguments, turn this question into a significant field of academic inquiry. 
 
In order to address this issue, this thesis will ask three sub-questions, relating to: a) the 
drivers of MIMSC in EIOR, b) the emerging areas of maritime cooperation in mitigating 
traditional and non-traditional threats in EIOR, and c) the critical factors that would 
contribute towards a successful MIMSC in EIOR. It will cover the dynamics of MIMSC 
from the post-Cold War era in EIOR, and draw more substantial answers to how MIMSC in 
post-Cold War period is a ‘missed opportunity’ but projects a ‘promising opportunity’ to 
address issues of maritime security threats in the EIOR. 
 
Qualitative research design is employed in this research inquiry. This research has used two 
primary data collection method: a) in-depth personal interviews and b) focus group 
interviews. Informants were selected through purposeful sampling, focusing on high-ranked 
retired and serving officials from the Navy, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, maritime security agencies, and think tanks. This research used the NVIVO 10 
software program to conduct a Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) to analyse data obtained 
through interviews. 
 
Several emerging areas of maritime collaboration are shaping MIMSC in the EIOR such as: 
a) partnership in search and rescue operation, b) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
b) increasing interoperability of constabulary role, c) partnership in defence industry, and d) 
partnership in maritime resources and competence. These areas of maritime collaboration 
are highly dependent on major critical success factors such as: a) shaping both formal and 
informal bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation, b) overcoming bureaucracy and 
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The problem of maritime security is increasingly being recognised by most countries 
worldwide. This is because it comprises extensive issues that pertain to the 
management of resources, both living and non-living, that have a critical bearing on 
the security of many countries. The issue of security has dominated international 
policy-making agendas, and as a result, most countries have started to prioritise 
maritime security in their own developmental agendas and policies. 
In the Asia–Pacific region, the issue of maritime security is gaining momentum, 
and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has become an area of major significance not 
only to the Asian maritime powers but worldwide. One of the most telling 
statements, made by a great American naval strategist, Alfred Thayar Mahan, was 
perhaps fundamental in shaping the current focus on the IOR. He wrote: 
Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. The ocean is 
the key to the seven seas. In the twenty first century, the destiny 
of the world will be decided on its waters (Mahan 1987). 
 
The IOR has been a major focus because it contributes a major component to: 
a) the safety and freedom of navigation, b) the economic wellbeing, and c) the 
political stability of almost any country. Safety and freedom of navigation can be 
understood by exploring the geographical outlook of IOR, which is an open sea 
located between the trade routes of east and west. It thus lies at centre-stage of the 
communication between those regions; it has the most important sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. It contains the 
major transportation route for maritime countries for economic purposes throughout 
the world, and for military purposes as well. But at its boundaries are major maritime 
choke points such as: a) the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb (SOBM), b) the Strait of 
Hormuz (SOH), and c) the Strait of Malacca (SOM). These conditions prompt 











From an economic viewpoint, the IOR provides a large amount of marine 
resources to the world: 1) Around 90 per cent of world trade and two thirds of all 
petroleum supplies travel by sea, and across the IOR runs half of the entire world’s 
container traffic (Kaplan 2010: 7): 2) Approximately 40 per cent of crude oil is 
transported by sea through the SOH, and 50 per cent of the world’s merchant fleet 
capacity through the SOM (Kaplan 2010: 7): 3) The IOR is a transit route for 70 per 
cent of all oil trade, and 50 per cent of all international shipping (Ghosh 2012: 1):     
The IOR is home to 40 per cent of the world’s oil and gas reserves, 60 per cent of its 
uranium, 40 per cent of gold and 80 per cent of its diamonds (Ghosh,  Desai and 
Mavani 2012: 1). However, only one fifth of its total trade is conducted between its 
littoral states, and the remaining 80 per cent is extra-regional, projecting global interest 
in the IOR. The economic importance of the vulnerable eastern and western ends of the 
major SLOCs through the IOR motivates many countries to build a strong toehold in 
the IOR, for their economic survival.  
From the strategic viewpoint, a number of issues have been pointed out in the IOR; 
for example, a study in 2008 showed that the IOR harboured 146 of the world’s total of 




wars and a considerable proportion of high-intensity conflicts.
1 
The IOR plays an 
important role in today's world as it is home to more than 2 billion people. It forms an 
important part of global sea-lines and the economy, including important choke points 
where these resources can be found. (Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict 
Research 2014). The IOR is host to many unwinnable traditional maritime issues, 
broadly categorised as: a) rivalry between the United States of America (USA) and 
China, b) competition between China and India, c) extra-regional power involvement, 
and d) maritime disputes. It is also host to non-traditional maritime issues, including: 
a) piracy, b) terrorism at sea, c) drug trafficking, d) arms and weapon smuggling e) 
human smuggling, f) natural disasters, and g) environment issues. With its littoral 
states facing many different forms of maritime challenges, the IOR is a centre of 
attention for many countries seeking stability. 
The scenario has led many Asian countries to focus on maritime security in the 
IOR. In Southeast Asia (SEA), the major maritime countries such as Indonesia, 
Singapore and Malaysia rate maritime security in the IOR highly. Malaysia is of 
immense strategic importance (Roche 2013); it is situated at the head of SOM (named 
after Malacca or Melaka, one of the smallest states of Malaysia), and is the shortest 
sea route between the Gulf and the important Asian markets and between India, the 
South China Sea (SCS) and the Pacific Ocean (Roche 2013). At the same time, the 
SOM suffers from being a major haunt of pirates, terrorists and drug traffickers. 
The end of the Cold War witnessed a high level of priorities relating to maritime 
security issues in the region. For example in 1992, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nation (ASEAN)’s first communiqué on security issues highlighted the 
necessity of resolving all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the SCS 
by peaceful means, and urged all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the 
view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes (Song 
and Tonnesson 2013). This resolution refers in particular to the territorial claims 
over the Spratly Islands. Other examples include the Indonesian South China Sea 
(SCS) Workshops, which sought to reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict in the 
SCS, while the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Maritime 
Cooperation   Working   Group   (CSCAP-MCWG), the   Asia–Pacific Economic 
 
1 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2008. Conflict Barometer 2008. Department of Political 
Science, University of Heidelberg. Retrieved from 





Cooperation (APEC) Working Group on Maritime Security, and the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium (WPNS) all tackled Southeast Asian issues within the broader 
Asia–Pacific maritime context (Bradford 2005). 
In 2003, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) issued a Statement on Cooperation 
against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security, and in 2004 the Work 
Program to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime 
was established (Bradford 2005). In 2004, Singapore acceded to the Rome 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against    the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation.
2 
After the 9/11 terrorists attack in New York, Singapore, Indonesia and 
Malaysia focused on counterterrorism measures, cooperating by means of an 
Information Sharing Centre (ISC). Arrangements were made to patrol the SOM for 
piracy attacks, the ISC issuing the Singapore Statement on Enhancement of Safety, 
Security, and Environment Protection in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore, and 
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
(ReCAAP) against Ships in Asia (Bradford 2005). Specifically after the General 
Assembly in 2008, ASEAN countries set up a meeting on maritime safety, which 
will provide an annual platform to discuss the issues of maritime security.
3
 
Similar maritime cooperation can be seen in South Asia. India is the largest 
country situated on the IOR, and indeed is at the head of it, so maritime security is a 
major concern for India. The only ocean named after a country, the IOR is viewed as 
its own backyard. For other countries, the IOR is no more than an important oceanic 
area, but to India it is a vital sea because its lifelines are concentrated throughout its 
surface (Pannikar 1945: 45). India’s central point at the IOR, connecting the South 
East Asian (SEA) nations and the Islamic world, makes India a crucial actor in this 
sphere. This leverage, however, entails a concern over competition with other major 
maritime countries, increasing India’s security problems in the IOR. This leads India 
to set a high priority on building a resilient maritime security system in the IOR. 
The establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) in the 1980s facilitated a set of directions for the security of the South 
Asia Region, and this included maritime security. In 2006, India offered a patrol boat 
 
2 The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA). (2004). Singapore Accedes to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(Rome Convention). Retrieved from www.mpa.gov.sg. (10th August 2015). 
3 ASEAN Regional Forum Chairman’s Statement, 5th Meeting. (2008, July 24). Retrieved from 





as a gift to the Maldivian Navy, and since 2009, the two navies have conducted joint 
manoeuvres and patrols. In 2011, for instance, New Delhi and Colombo agreed on 
an annual defence dialogue, holding regular talks and conducting joint military 
exercises in Sri Lankan waters for the first time (Radhakrishnan 2014). In 2013, 
India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives signed an agreement to combat piracy, terrorist 
networks and other illicit activities. This was again the outcome from the 2008 
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which was established after the UNGA 
2008. The IONS is a regional platform built to gather both navies and other maritime 
agencies around the world to discuss maritime issues in IOR. It is a forum shaped to 
build a common understanding and view of regional maritime security, in order to  
         mitigate maritime security threats in the region.
4
 
A recent arrangement has been the trilateral cooperation between the Maldives, 
India and Sri Lanka, with meetings held in 2011 in the Maldivian capital of Malé, 
then in 2013 in Colombo and in 2014 in New Delhi. The trilateral cooperation 
discussed various issues covering enhanced maritime cooperation between the two 
countries, including the expanding of bilateral ‘dosti’ (friendship) exercises through 
the holding of table top exercises; further enhancing the sharing of the information 
on illegal maritime activities through existing points of contact; and the forming of a 
trilateral sub-group focused on policy and legal issues related to piracy.
5 
At an inter- 
regional level, in 2004, ASEAN members plus  China,  South  Korea, Japan, 
Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka participated in a ReCAAP exercise, and more of 
such cooperation is expected to take shape. 
At a global level, a legal framework with regard to maritime security can also be 
observed. The United Nations (UN) plays a major part, in this case shaping the 
necessary measures for management of the high seas; in 1982, the UNCLOS was 
established, defining the responsibilities of nations in their use of the world’s oceans 
and defining correct behaviour at sea. 
There are also international conventions that focus on specific issues, such as the 
UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, intended to curb transnational organised crimes. Dealing with terrorism, 
the transport of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other such unlawful acts, 
 
4 Retrieved from http://indiannavy.nic.in/ion.htm. (12th July 2015). 
5 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2013, July 9).Outcome Document of the Second NSA-Level 
Meeting on Trilateral Cooperation on Maritime Security between India, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Retrieved 





is the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). There is also the 
1988 Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention), the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, the 
various UN conventions against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances. 
Many other frameworks under the implementation of UNGA 2008, reflecting 
the different dimensions of maritime security, include early warning systems for 
mitigating natural disasters, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami and other coastal 
hazards warning system. There are also structures for the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment and for sustainable development, such as pollution from 
land-based activities, from ships, ocean noise, waste management, ship breaking, 
dismantling, recycling and scrapping. Others relate to climate change, including 
greenhouse gas emission from ships, ocean fertilization and carbon sequestration. 
The wide range of maritime security arrangements shows that maritime security is a 
challenging task and major IOR countries are taking the necessary steps to curb 
maritime threats, both traditional and non-traditional. 
The IOR attracts maritime business from nations in all parts of the world and it 
is also a place where maritime security issues are expected to gain momentum. The 
IOR is concurrently facing a whole host of diverse issues, as discussed above, 
challenging its coordination and management. These issues are too complex to be 
resolved unilaterally. A healthy ocean environment requires a cooperative approach 
between the affected countries in mitigating the growing maritime challenges, both 
traditional and non-traditional; in other words, maritime security cooperation must 
be a collective measure in order to overcome uncertainty and reinforce good order at 
sea. 
Malaysia is facing challenges in developing its internal economic status. It is 
one of the largest trading partners within ASEAN, but more effort and time is 
required before it can project a stronger maritime power in SEA. Similarly, the need 
for India to develop the country's economy will remain a major concern; this 
situation indirectly limits its move to rise as a major maritime power and / or in the 
IOR. As Walter Ladwig III puts it, while India has the capability to conduct 





considerable distance from its targets; it is not possible to achieve the ambitious mid- 
2020 goals (Ladwig III 2009: 93). This is because India needs to focus on its internal 
development. 
Harsh Pant, on the other hand, has argued that India’s material capabilities do 
not match its maritime ambitions, and that therefore India will remain among the 
medium powers, a country of great economic capabilities but of limited cultural and 
military influence (Pant 2009: 296). Therefore, as Malaysia and India are trying to 
respond to changing paradigm shifts in the IOR maritime security, internal 
weaknesses encourage both to adopt persuasive strategies such as diplomacy and/or 
cooperation in IOR. Consequently, these strategies have resulted in the 
development/formation/emergence of MIMSC. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The thesis investigates the emergence of Malaysia-India Maritime Security 
Cooperation (MIMSC) in response to traditional and non-traditional security threats 
in the EIOR. 
The thesis seeks to argues that although both Malaysia and India have identified 
the maritime significance that the EIOR hold for them, and also the common threat 
they face in that region that demands their cooperation, it appears at present that 
MIMSC in EIOR bears a lack of robustness in its engagement. This is despite both 
an appreciation of the historical relations between the two countries, and a 
substantial ability to address the challenges of the EIOR. The positive relations that 
are challenged by these maritime threats show that there is need to identify the 
potential drivers that may determine the existence, extent and depth of the maritime 
cooperation between both oceanic neighbours. Though there is pressing need for 
both countries to draw up effective maritime policies it is, however, unclear why 
these countries have failed to do so. 
The paucity of scientific investigation into the question of what are the drivers, 
which may influence the decision of the two, states to draw up effective maritime 
policy cooperation despite their historical and current potential to do so. There is 
further need to look into the common traditional and non-traditional maritime 
security threats that both nations face and may seek to mitigate through their 
maritime security cooperation. It is the absence of substantive explanatory 





In setting out the case for Malaysia and India to cooperate on maritime security 
in the IOR, their mutual needs and cooperative behaviour can be explored by 
considering domestic situations within each of those two countries and by looking at 
the historical background of naval and sociocultural relationships between both 
nations. 
In the field of IR, it is the motivation for two states to connect that often forms 
the fundamental approach to drawing a wider perspective of state relations. The 
socio-cultural proximity in addition to the oceanic neighbourhood between Malaysia 
and India speaks of the existence of their tacit understanding, which is the pre- 
requisite of any explicit agreement of maritime cooperation. The maritime 
interactions between South East Asian (SEA) nations and the Indian subcontinent 
represent a large component of the entire volume of maritime interception in IOR. 
This history of this interaction dates back to the beginning of first millennium CE, 
continuing steadily to the present day. Historian G. Coedes called SEA the 
‘Indianized states’, and other scholars such as C. Majumdar and H. B. Sarkar called 
SEA the Greater India or Further India (Prakash and Lombard 1999: 163-164). 
Given the strong maritime bonds resulting in a sociocultural diaspora between 
Malaysia and India make it necessary to study MIMSC from a historical perspective 
to set the contextual rationale of debate of the thesis. The historical maritime 
relations between Malaysia and India have been taking newer shapes during cold 
ward and post-cold war period. The cold war period has been an intermission period 
between the long spanned bilateral maritime relations. Yet, despite different foreign 
policy connotations of both nations during this period, their leadership kept 
expressing strong desire and advocacy favouring national maritime security, 
sovereignty and peace in East Asian Indian Ocean Region (EIOR). The exhaustive 
multilateral dialogues between Malaysia and India also continued kept their 
maritime relation alive if not active from the forums such as United Nation (UN) and 
the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). 
Thus a deeper understanding of the history of maritime relations between 
Malaysia and India is a pre-requisite to elaborate on the emergence and dimensions 
of bilateral maritime relations between these nations in EIOR. A more detailed 
discussion on the history of Malaysia-India maritime relations and cultural diaspora 
is required in order to contextualise the potential and challenges of Malaysia-India 




In addition to historical understanding of MIMSC, it is vital to examine the 
macro and micro level of maritime issues spanning across the IOR and its 
implication towards the bilateral relations between Malaysia and India. In other 
words, it is essential to understand the pull factors of MIMSC in the IOR to 
comprehend better their cooperative behaviour in the region. 
On this front, the thesis will examine the drivers involved in explaining the 
motivation of Malaysia and India in the IOR. This term ‘driver’ derived from  
Johnson, Whittington and Scholes, who have coined the term as a change to describe 
the forces, which are likely to affect macro environment and thereby influencing the 
strategic position of a country (Johnson, Scholes, and Whittington 2008). 
These scholars argues that although there will be a number of changes occurring 
in the macro environment, it will be the combined effect of just some of these 
separate factors (drivers) that will be so important, rather than all of the factors 
separately. Understanding the scenarios as detailed as possible and the plausible 
views of how the macro environment might develop in the future based on groupings 
of key environmental influences/drivers of change will shape a better understanding 
of an issue in rise. For the purpose of the current study, it is important to analyse the 
macro environment spanning across IOR and identify the key drivers of MIMSC. 
The thesis will also identify the potential traditional and non-traditional security 
(refer to Chapter 2 for definition of key terms) threats being faced commonly by 
both nations that provide the rational of MIMSC. The wide range of maritime 
security arrangements among various IOR nations in Asia reflect that maritime 
security is a challenging task and in elaborating and explaining the MIMSC in EIOR, 
it is vital to identify key security issues both traditional and non-traditional that 
drives the bilateral maritime security relations between Malaysia and India. 
Finally, the thesis will examine the critical success factors, in order to 
understand the factors deterring both countries for a stronger cooperation. Rockart 
and MIT Sloan Scholl of Management coined the term ‘critical success factor’ in 
1979 for the purpose of managing their organisation (Rockart 1979). This involves 
setting objectives, shaping strategies, making decisions, and measuring results 
against goals (Daniel 1961). Similarly, in managing the maritime cooperation in the 
IOR, identifying the threats are not sufficient enough, but it is also crucial to 





focus on such as setting realistic goals, short term strategies, and execution plans for 
a better and stronger cooperation. 
In sum, this thesis will ask three sub-questions, relating to: a) the drivers of 
MIMSC in EIOR, b) the emerging areas of maritime cooperation in mitigating 
traditional and non-traditional threats in EIOR, and c) the critical factors that would 
ideally contribute towards a successful MIMSC in EIOR. The dissertation will cover 
the dynamics of MIMSC from the post-Cold War era in EIOR, and draw more 
substantial answers to how MIMSC in the post-Cold War period is a ‘missed 
opportunity’ but presents a ‘promising opportunity’ to address issues of maritime 
security threats in the EIOR. 
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study is twofold. The first is to address a gap in the literature 
concerning IR. In the field of IR, maritime studies is an evolving and emerging 
subject; with growing maritime challenges, both traditional and non-traditional, the 
study of maritime security needs a perpetual re-evaluation between states. India is an 
emerging maritime power concerned with the IOR, just as is Malaysia in the SOM. 
The ever-expanding maritime challenges in the EIOR need to be continuously 
reassessed, as do the vital roles of these two countries in mitigating traditional and 
non-traditional threats and around it. 
Such continuous assessment would firstly assist in identifying new and 
emerging areas of maritime challenge, which require more attention or further 
research in the study of IR. As mentioned above, maritime cooperation is an 
evolving field, and constant review is required in order to shape a more 
comprehensive relationship between states. By conducting this study, new areas of 
cooperation that are under-studied or worth addressing in the study of MIMSC in 
EIOR can be identified. 
Secondly, this study will help reduce the gaps in the understanding of the 
different dimensions of maritime security. There is no single, accepted definition of 
the term and so a deeper understanding becomes possible by exploring its different 
facets. This study should help to provide more details relating to these facets, and 
indeed to the overall scope of maritime security specifically in context of MIMSC. 
The thesis focuses first on maritime power and the navy, in order to help understand 






The thirds aim of the study relates to the lack of awareness of maritime issues 
among policy makers and government ministries of both Malaysia and India. There 
is a pressing need for the further appreciation of maritime policies amongst policy 
makers. ‘Sea blindness’ was a serious problem for India in the past, as for Malaysia; 
the lack of political and vision has led to ineffective maritime policies. This study 
will reveal ways to appreciate maritime power and a better understanding of the navy 
as an important instrument in a foreign policy. It is hoped that this awareness will 
shape a better maritime strategic thinking amongst policy makers, and enable the 
preparation of better security management at the execution level. This study has 
targeted policy makers from various maritime departments and naval officers, to 
create more substantial links with academic think tanks and researchers. This process 
should be supported by the study’s critical analysis of MIMSC in EIOR. 
 
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
This research study comprises eight chapters. After describing the problem statement 
in this chapter, Chapter 2 reviews and synthesises the key literature in the area of 
MIMSC in the context of the Look East Policy (LEP). The chapter also describes key 
terms used throughout the thesis. Later sections of Chapter 2 discuss the methods and 
approaches adopted by this research study. The methodology sections describe in 
detail the qualitative research design, and data collection methods and settings 
associated with the qualitative design used in this study. 
Chapter 3 sets out the historical background of the evolution of MIMSC. The 
chapter covers three important timeframes: the pre-colonial period, the European 
colonisation period in Asia, and the Cold War. All these historical timeframes have a 
strong bearing on the foundation of MIMSC in the EIOR. Chapter 4 examines the 
drivers of MIMSC in the EIOR in the post-Cold War era. The chapter sets out the 
empirical data gathered from in-depth personal and group interviews of policy- 
related informants on both sides about the changing dynamics of geopolitics and the 
potential drivers of MIMSC in the EIOR. 
Chapter 5 discusses the MIMSC and the mitigation of traditional maritime 
security threats in the EIOR, and Chapter 6 deals with the non-traditional threats. 
Chapter 7 discusses the critical factors that will contribute to a successful MIMSC in 








LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part One focuses on the definitions of key 
terms and available body of literature on the MIMSC in the EIOR. The research 
evidence synthesised in this section provides the rationale for the research study 
undertaken for the doctoral thesis. In Part Two, the methodological detail of the 
research study are described. 
 
2.2 Part One: Definitions of Key terms 
This section will explain the different definition of maritime security that is often 
related to and later discuss the most relevant definition and approach in the study of 
maritime security in order to convey and justify the two dimensions (traditional and 
non-traditional maritime security) adopted by the thesis in Chapter 5 and 6. 
 
2.21 Maritime Security 
Maritime security is a comprehensive and multifaceted term with essentially 
pointing to peace and security at naval borders. However, similar to the concept of 
‘national security’, it may convey different meaning, depending on the context and 
the users (Buegar 2015). So perhaps maritime security can be better understood 
through an exploration of the different concepts it relates. The 2008 UNGA report on 
Ocean and Law of Sea has generally classified several specific threats that may 
relate to the concept of maritime security. 
For example, it is linked with the evolution of maritime safety relating to the 
activities of international maritime transport from the economic perspective. This 
includes improving maritime safety of vessels and ships carrying either the economic 
or the exercise of economic activities, transport of dangerous goods and the safety of 
routes used for international navigation.
6 
In linking with economic development, the 
concept of maritime security means providing a secure maritime environment, which 
is vital for the management of marine resources (Buegar 2015). This also  includes 
6 United Nations of General Assembly. (2008, March 10th). Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of 





embracing sustainable and ecological management strategies, which requires a 
practical implementation and constant inception of laws and order. 
Under this cluster, it also emphasized the role of human element as a critical part 
in creating a safe and secure marine environment for economic related 
development.
7 
This involves securing maritime professionals at sea and the right 
management of seafarers and fishers in terms of providing a safe living and working 
conditions at sea and adopting the right approach in handling marine casualties and 
marine incidents
8
. It can also be related to another human activity at sea, which is the 
safety of migration of people by sea from incidents of deaths and the safety of ships 
and maritime installations at sea. Maritime security can also be connected with the 
concept of the ‘good order of the sea’ whereby the sea as a resource, as a medium for 
trade and information exchange for continuous human development and survival 
faces threats and requires a good order. (Till 2009). 
Maritime security can also be linked to mitigating cross border activities which 
are threating a country such as: a) the act of terrorist against shipping and offshore 
installations, b) piracy and armed robbery against ships, c) illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances, d) illicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass 
destruction, e) smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea, f) illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing) and g) international and unlawful damage to 
the marine environment, as a particularly grave form of maritime pollution due to the 
potential to threaten the security of on or more states given the impact on social and 
economic interest of coastal states (Klein 2011:10) 
Nevertheless, to conclude the most precise and relevant definition of maritime 
security, we may refer it to two dimensions: a) traditional maritime security and b) 
non-traditional maritime security. The dichotomy of traditional and non-traditional 
security threats that has been used widely in the present study of security and 
international relations, and similarly the thesis has also utilised this dichotomy to 
group the maritime issues commonly faced by Malaysia and India in EIOR and 
recommend the need for a better cooperation in the future (Chapter 5 and 6). 
Traditional maritime threats covers elements such as I) freedom of navigation at 
territorial water and high sea, II) conducting naval activities, and III) protection from 
7 United Nations of General Assembly. (2008, March 10th). Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of 
the Secretary-General. (8th July 2015). 





direct threats to the territorial integrity of a country, such as an armed attack from a 
military vessel, intrusion and trespassing over territorial waters, and territorial water 
claims by other countries. In other words, a threat that is imposed by a state to 
another state causing danger and instability towards a particular nation and 
sovereignty is a traditional threat. 
Non-traditional maritime security on the other hand covers the elements such as 
I) piracy, II) armed robbery against ships and III) terrorist acts, and IV) other illicit 
activities at sea. The differences non-traditional maritime threats embeds is however 
noticed in terms of the danger it poses to the human security and the stability of a 
region a whole rather than to one state or nation as described earlier. The rise of 
globalisation and advance technology is one of the major drive, which has increased 
human mobility across national borders; ultimately leveraging cross borders 
activities across the globe. As a consequence, non-state actors began taking 
advantage of such leverage and began conducting illegal activities and impacting 
human security and destabilising global security. 
A large number of studies in international relations have made use of these two 
clusters in discussing maritime security issues in the IOR. Hence, the thesis has also 
adopted the similar norms in order to analyse the maritime threats faced by both 
Malaysia and India in the EIOR. 
 
2.22 Drivers of Change 
The literature in business management within strategic planning studies defines 
scenarios as detailed and plausible views of how the macro environment might 
develop in the future based on groupings of key environmental influences. The key 
environmental influencers who shape the plausible yet uncertain pictures of future are 
termed as drivers of change (Johnson, Scholes & Whittington 2008). The drivers are 
thus key influencers which can significantly change the external environment and 
thereby the scenario. Strategic planning by the managers relies on the possible 
scenario and the drivers that may shape these pictures of possible future worlds. 
Drivers of change thus refer to factors that are likely to influence future scenarios and 
thus enhance strategic foresight. Understanding of drivers of change provides the 
context and rationale of strategic responses by the policy makers (Shillabeer, Buss 
and Rousseau 2011). The literature on public policy has also been making increased 




enable more effective public policy initiatives and their success (Leigh 2003). Use of 
scenarios and understanding drivers, which may influence these, has significantly 
improved the effectiveness of public policy initiatives
9
. 
Within the context of current study, it seems important to elaborate possible 
scenarios of MIMSC and the key drivers of MIMSC that are important in shaping it. 
By looking at these drivers, the study can propose the possibility and potential of 
maritime security cooperation between Malaysia and India in EIOR. Identification of 
these drivers would significantly enhance the strategic foresight of the policy makers 
in both countries regarding the common issues and a collective response to these. 
 
2.23 Emerging Areas of Cooperation 
As has been discussed in the above section on drivers, scenario analysis is an 
important part of strategic planning. Scenarios are referred to as possible pictures of 
how future would look like and thereby enhance the strategic foresight or ability to 
correctly foresee the strategic environment and thereby enable effective strategic 
planning. Within the context of present study it is necessary to understand the 
possible areas of maritime security cooperation in EIOR between Malaysia and India. 
 
2.24 Critical Success Factors 
The term Critical success factors (CSFs) is used in management literature on strategic 
planning to denote elements that are necessary for an organisation, project or 
proposed plan to achieve its mission and objectives. CSFs are activities required for 
ensuring the success of a proposed strategy, plan or initiative. The term was initially 
used in the world of business analysis. 
 
Critical success factors are those few things that must 
go well to ensure success for a manager or an 
organisation, and, therefore, they represent those 
managerial or enterprise areas, that must be given 
special and continual attention to bring about high 
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organisation's current operating activities and to its 
future success (Boynton & Zmud 1984). 
 
Recently the literature in public management has also made use of the term to 
elaborate on success of strategic planning in public policy and initiatives (Burstein & 
Black 2014). In relation to the current study on MIMSC in EIOR, it is important to 
identify the CSFs, which would influence the desired outcomes or results of this 
strategic initiative. Identifying the mere potential merit of MIMSC is important yet 
not complete enough from strategic viewpoint unless the factors that may influence 
the success of such cooperation are elaborated. Identification of such CSFs would 
help policy makers on both sides to design the maritime cooperative strategy in a way 
that maximises its advantages to both parties. This study thus seeks to identify and 
elaborate the CSFs of maritime security cooperation between Malaysia and India in 
EIOR. 
 
2.3 Buzan’s Regional Complex Theory: Securitising the Threats in Eastern 
Indian Ocean Region for Malaysia-India Maritime Security Cooperation 
The thesis has used the Buzan’s Regional Complex Theory to discuss and securitise 
the maritime threats in the EIOR for both Malaysia and India. Buzan is pioneer in 
modern security studies and has given rebirth to the phenomenon of security using 
his unique methodological approach. According to Barry Buzan: 
“Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom 
from threat and the ability of states and societies to 
maintain their independent identity and their functional 
integrity against forces of change, which they see as 
hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it 
also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns 
about the conditions of existence. Quite where this 
range of concerns ceases to merit the urgency of the 
“security” label (which identifies threats as significant 
enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional 
measures” (Buzan 1991). 
 
Buzan’s approach is an interesting one as he looks at security from all angles 
going from micro to macro and addressing the socially constructionist aspects of 
security elaborating how people or societies construct or “securitise” threats.  Buzan 
attempts to elaborate security or security issues using social constructivism 





security issues need to be seen not just as given but in reference to the people and 
state, their objectives and narratives which are vital in shaping issues as security 
(Buzan 1991). 
His categorisation of security issues in five sectors namely Political, Military, 
Economic, Societal, and Environmental seeks to analyse how these sectors of 
security might affect the “periphery” based on changes in the “center” referred to as 
state. The peripheries are referred to as state’s various sub areas of foreign policy 
and international relations, which are affected when, state or center’s security is 
affected by threats in any of the dimensions of security. Greater contribution of 
Buzan’s theory of security analysis is extending the concept of security to include 
economic, societal and environmental dimensions in addition to existing military and 
political ones. This extension has allowed security studies to look at the phenomenon 
of security and potential threats in a more specific manner. 
Another dimension that is important to consider is Buzan’s contribution to 
the study of regional security. The concept of regional security, while seeming 
obvious to some, is one that, like the issue as a whole, had not been adequately 
addressed before Barry Buzan. When studying this aspect of security Buzan states, 
“security is a relational phenomenon. Because security is relational, one cannot 
understand the national security of any given state without understanding the 
international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded.” In his 
analysis of regional security and how it affects the concept of security as a whole, 
Buzan offers several interesting and important concepts. The first is that of “amity 
and enmity among states”, in other words relationships between states that can 
represent a spectrum from friendship or alliances to those marked by fear. According 
to Buzan, the concepts of amity and enmity cannot be attributed solely to the balance 
of power. The issues that can affect these feelings range from things such as ideology, 
territory, ethnic lines, and historical precedent. This is important to understand as the 
concept of amity/enmity leads to the idea of what Buzan refers to as “security 
complex” which is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered 
apart from one another.” 
This interpretation takes into consideration a security complex that is at odds 
as well as one that is unified under shared interests. Security complexes can be useful 





endemic to any one region. If the solution can be found only from within the context 
of the complex, then the policy should be made from within this context as well. The 
ideas of regional security and security complexes are important as every state can put 
its security in relation to at least one complex. This brings us to the most important 
point about regional security: the fact that regional security is a part of the hierarchy 
of the security problem, sitting between domestic and global or international security 
and cannot be left out of the puzzle. The consequences of not taking regional security 
into consideration could be disastrous for any state that chooses to do so. 
The Buzan’s theory and his pioneer approaches in the study of security have 
been used significantly in drawing a more valid understanding and logical 
explanations of MIMSC in the EIOR. The thesis exploited the overall existing and 
emerging maritime issues that are present in the IOR through a substantial literature 
review process and identified the major security challenges faced by both Malaysia 
and India in the region. Parallel to Buzan’s approach of considering security from all 
aspects of societies, the study has analysed literatures from various perspectives and 
it has securitised the specific maritime issues that are a direct threats to both 
Malaysia and India in the EIOR and its implications to the people of both countries, 
its state’s sovereignty, military and politics in whole. 
Whilst Buzan’s regional security complex theory argues that states the least 
could relate one complex (one issue) with another state, MIMSC are driven and 
influenced by many issues in the region setting a strong foundation of the thesis. 
Using both Buzan’s approach of analysing security of all aspects and clustering 
the issues based on the dichotomy of traditional and non-traditional security threats 
that are often used in the study of international studies has allowed identification and 
analysis of maritime security issues in more specific and rigorous manner so as to 
elaborate their relevance to and significance for MIMSC in EIOR. This theory and 
dichotomy of security issues seeks to enable a more sophisticated academic enquiry 
and produce more actionable policy recommendations through this research study. 
These can be observed in Chapter 5 (traditional maritime issues) and 6 (non- 
traditional maritime issues). 
The securitisation of maritime issues specifically both Malaysia and India in the 
region on the other hand is driven from the problem statement of the thesis. It argued 
that although both Malaysia and India have identified the maritime significance that 





demands their cooperation, it appears at present that MIMSC in EIOR bears a lack of 
robustness in its engagement. The lack of engagement is because Malaysia and India 
holds little understand of its role and function as security partners in the region 
despite both appreciating its historical relations as well as the substantial ability to 
address the maritime security challenges in the EIOR. Hence, it was concluded that 
MIMSC in the EIOR is a missed opportunity. 
The missed opportunity is because both countries fail to securitise the threats 
or in other words the security complexes that links together which otherwise could 
be mitigated as cooperative partners in the region. The literature has provided 
sufficient evidence that diverse aspect of maritime security policies of both countries 
are not affecting the individual countries but the EIOR as whole urging for better 
cooperation. The failure of both countries to considerate the maritime issues as a 
regional security that requires cooperation from both parties will lead to instability of 
region as well as its own individual sovereignty. 
The idea of describing the historical links (Chapter 3) and identifying the key 
drivers of MIMSC in the EIOR (Chapter 4) is driven from the Buzan’s idea of 
security complex where explains that the maritime relations between Malaysia and 
India cannot be vaguely perceived from the aspect of classic balance of power in the 
region but it should focus on shared interests and historical standards embedded in 
the minds of both countries. Analysing and discussing the key drivers of the 
relationship will set forth the level of friendship or adversary and provide better 
appreciation of their primary national interest in the maritime domain. In addition, 
the identification of maritime interests between the countries offers the realisation 
that the roles and functions of both countries in ensuring the safety and security of 
maritime environment in the region cannot be view separately. 
On the other hand, the idea of recognising the emerging areas of maritime 
cooperation in mitigating traditional and non-traditional threats in EIOR (Chapter 5 
and 6) is also parallel with Buzan’s theory. Buzan’s security complex approach 
provides a solid platform in understanding the future directions of foreign policies. 
As discussed earlier, the fundamental idea of securitising issues that are the concern 
of both countries gives a clear viewpoint of the emerging or abandoned areas of 
cooperation that should be in focus. 
In addition, it also exposes the policy failures and encourages the research to 





interviews outcomes both in Malaysia and India to understand the critical factors that 
would ideally contribute towards a successful MIMSC in EIOR (Chapter 7). The 
Buzan’s approach gave sufficient support in providing recommendations for policy 
makers in both countries as well as the region. 
The maritime security cooperation of Malaysia and India in the Eastern Indian 
Ocean region is at rise and there is a high need for securitising the particular 
phenomenon in the study of international relations. The Buzan’s Regional Complex 
Theory has offered a strong manifesto and consciousness in the literature and in 
directing the thesis towards its aim and objective. It assisted in strategizing and 
securitising the MIMSC in the EIOR as an international security issue for both the 
countries as well as the Indian Ocean region. 
 
2.4 Part Two: Look East Policy and Act East Policy: An Overview 
At the outset, an overview of the Look East Policy (LEP) and Act East Policy (AEP), 
usually key elements in the study of India–SEA relations, is presented. The LEP was 
established in the early 1990s and continues to have high-level substance and 
relevance. More recently, AEP under Modi’s government has reenergized India’s 
foreign policy aspirations and initiatives for deeper and more action oriented 
cooperation between India and SEA nations. It is therefore essential to analyse the 
LEP and recent evolution of AEP, of which the maritime dimension is a crucial 
component. 
The LEP signifies the need for enhanced cooperation in all areas of strategic 
cooperation in both regions, especially from the maritime viewpoint. The chapter then 
discusses a much-detailed note on the maritime engagement between India and major 
maritime countries in the SEA region. The third part of this chapter discusses the 
literature on MIMSC and its key features; it also introduces the context and content of 
the research questions and areas of deeper analysis, such as the evolution of MIMSC 
in the post-Cold War period in the context of LEP. This literature review also helps 
the researcher to explain the study results and compare these with the available 
literature on MIMSC in EIOR. 
From the beginning of 1990, the foreign policy resulting from the Cold War had 
brought significant changes to the relationship between Malaysia and India. 
Historically, India’s relationship with the SEA countries had been firm and 





than 1000 years. This relationship was not merely the cornerstone of commerce; the 
partners had profound effects on each other’s linguistics, religion, culture, and 
business (Zhang 2006: 15). To date, SEA countries remain the first resort for Indian 
migrants (ibid). From the inception of World War II and British colonisation, a 
seamless geopolitical situation prevailed in the IOR and SEA (Singh 2001: 25-26). In 
addition, an inalienable cultural bond, in existence since the time of the Indus Valley 
civilisation had been instrumental in establishing formal and informal support. Such 
regional interdependence was witnessed in the areas of development, and was in fact 
the predecessor of the LEP between Malaysia and India. 
In the following section, the literature on LEP and AEP and its influence on the 
two littoral states in EIOR will be discussed. 
 
2.41 India’s Look East Policy and Act East Policy 
At the beginning of the19
th 
century, the insular position taken by India prevented the 
country from upholding the LEP. Moreover, during the Cold War, India’s Non- 
Aligned Movement (NAM) created a temporary rift in co-operation between the 
regions. During this period, India downplayed engagement and cooperation with the 
members of ASEAN
10
. This was pertinent when India signed separate trade accords 
with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand in 1966 and 1968. At the same time, a 
treaty for collaboration for agriculture and culture was signed with Malaysia. 
Although the action was less well understood, this was mainly because ASEAN was 
labelled as anti-communist by other competing nations. 
Further, India’s behaviour during this time created a high level of anxiety 
amongst in the ASEAN countries. For example, in 1997, India owned two aircrafts 
projecting its capability as a big maritime power, perceived during this period as a 
threat (Mak 2001: 152). In addition to this, India’s natural geographical location in 
IOR was viewed with concern by other countries. This is because India’s Andaman 
Islands were adjacent to the SOM, a vital choke point that leads to the far eastern 
hemisphere in theIOR. The location of Andaman Sea in the IOR was seen as an 
advantage for India to have a bigger role, whether amongst the big power league or 
as a leader amongst smaller countries in the region. 
Further, during the Cold War, the ASEAN sub-region was not a priority in   its 
 
10 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a political and economic organisation of ten SEA 
countries formed in 1967. The members of ASEAN are Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, 





foreign policy making and vice versa. This is because the Cold War mentality during 
this time strongly influenced the disconnect in ASEAN-India relations. As a result, 
ASEAN–Indian maritime relations were kept very low-key. 
In 1970, India formally renounced its partnership with ASEAN (Man Mohini 
Kaul 2001: 56), and efforts were made to establish a strong military base in order to 
counter the threat from Pakistan in particular. This action plan intimidated other SEA 
countries, as India began to gain a strong hold in the IOR with substantial maritime 
capability. As a result, the bridge for friendships and partnerships between ASEAN- 
India was not possible. 
At the end of the Cold War, the recurrent economic crises and the constant 
movements of globalisation forced India to change its purview of SEA countries. In 
the 1990s, the upsurge of economic development in the Asian Tigers
11 
redirected 
India from its policy of self-sufficiency to one of reunion with ASEAN, in order to 
gain economic strength and play a vital role in global development (Sikri 2009: 113). 
At this crucial juncture, it became necessary for India to improve its domestic 
economic condition. This need was presented as India’s LEP in the early 1990’s. 
India’s development in communication and the economy was dependent on 
Bangladesh while the LEP provided new sets of opportunities for establishing new 
links with Myanmar through Bangladesh. Notably, there was a pressing need to 
address economic disparities among India’s northeastern states, which had limited 
capacity for investment, trade, infrastructure, logistics, agribusiness, and other 
commercial activities (Zhang 2006: 17). The subsequent dissolution of an economic 
partnership with the Soviet Union compelled India to undergo economic reform in 
1991 (Zhang 2006: 113). 
In 1992, India initiated the first phase of its LEP under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Narashimha Rao. Strong economic pressures revived India’s interest in the 
ASEAN markets, mainly in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. These Asian 
countries had tremendous natural resources and technological skills, and the capacity 
to export many computer and automobile spare parts. Because SEA was more of a 
domestic demand community, it attracted India to build economic space through the 
export of goods, service, technology, and capital (Chowdhury nd: 2). As a result of 
 
 
11 ‘Asian Tigers’ is a term used in reference to the highly developed economies of Taiwan, South Korea, 
Singapore and Hong Kong. They were notable for maintaining exceptionally high growth rates and rapid 





economic interactions with SEA states, India established regional economic and 
political stability, crucial in a growing global economy (Bava 2007: 3). 
Since 1992, India has enshrined its partnership in several agreements with SEA 
nations through the ASEAN platform. These includes: a) Sectoral Dialogue Partner 
in 1992, b) Full Dialogue Partner in 1995, and c) formal membership in the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996. Corroborating evidence suggests that strategic 
establishment diminished China’s influence in SEA, but in turn, China expanded its 
partnership with Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar in the Mekong Sub-region 
Programs (Zhang 2006: 17). 
At the beginning of    the 20
th 
century, raising humanity out of mass poverty was a 
major concern for developing nations. Hence, the LEP focus was on establishing 
economic relationships with the SEA countries through the ASEAN platform. In 
1997, India joined the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectorial Technical and 
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and in 2000. India sponsored the Mekong– 
Ganga River Cooperation Project, to expand solidarity, harmony and cooperation in 
the fields of tourism, culture and education, for the purpose of rapid social and 
economic development. In this project were India and five SEA countries: Thailand, 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar (Mazumdar n.d). In 2002, India appeared 
as a Submit Level Partner for strategic partnership with ASEAN members, and in 
2005, it gained membership of the East Asian Summit (Ladwig 2009: 94). In 2003, 
India established the Long Term Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity 
with ASEAN. This interest was renewed in the ASEAN–India Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) in 2009. 
This was also very apparent in the rhetorical speeches delivered by Indian 
stakeholders on sustainable growth and revitalisation of the rural economy, 
education, health, infrastructure, environmental resources, essential public services, 
and the financial system (Hong 2006: 67). One of the more widely cited quotes was: 
‘India would become free from poverty by becoming a major global power in the 
world economy’ (Hong 2006: 67). For India, the LEP was not just an external 
economic policy to establish partnership with SEA states; it was a passport to serve 
long-term interests for sustainable development and competing in the global 
economic race. 
In fact, the economic benefits of the LEP sparked interest among SEA countries. 





development: trade, foreign direct investment, human resources, infrastructure, 
health, science, technology, and connectivity. In a very real sense, India’s added 
advantages of its population size and its market-oriented economy attracted the SEA 
region as a fruitful ally. In hindsight, economic engagement within the SEA region 
took on a high momentum after the Cold War. 
Whilst many other ASEAN countries were actively engaged, it is vital to 
understand India’s economic engagement with Malaysia, in order to better grasp 
Malaysia and India’s bilateral relationship under the banner of the LEP. In 2007, 
Malaysia and India commemorated fifty years of their diplomatic relations. 
Subsequently October 2010, the Malaysia–India engagement formed a yet stronger 
foundation through the establishment of their Strategic Partnership, which meant 
strengthening their bilateral ties and re-engaging in areas such as the economy, 
security–defence, and  socio-cultural dimensions. 
There are several issues that determine the magnitude of the Malaysia-India 
relationship from an economic point of view. First and foremost, trade and 
investment has been at the heart of Malaysia-India ties for since the launch of the 
LEP. In 2013, trade with India amounted to USD13.38 billion, an increase of 2.49 
per cent from 2012 (Nathan and Chandran 2015: 359–360). According to the 2013 
report by the Ministry of International and Trade Industry (MITI), exports contracted 
by 12.2 per cent to USD8.17 billion, and imports recorded the tremendous increase 
of 38.8 per cent to USD5.21 billion. 
As a developing country, Malaysia is a country that receives foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from growing economic countries like India. This characteristic 
has scored highly in India’s relationship with Malaysia; Malaysia is one of the top 20 
investor in India. At present, there are 61 Indian joint ventures in India, in sectors 
ranging from palm oil refining, power, railways and civil engineering construction, 
to Information Technology (IT) (Bhattacharya 2007). There are 67 Indian IT 
companies that enjoy Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) status in Malaysia 
(Bhattacharya 2007). There are also some 20 other Indian companies in various 
manufacturing sectors (ibid). 
Furthermore, the relationship between Malaysia's Petronas and the Indian Oil 
Corporation, have contributed to strong income. Technological collaboration is 
another driving force. India's superiority in software, biotechnology, 





Malaysia, while Malaysia's vast experience in art information and communication 
technology infrastructure and agro-based industries, as well as the consolidation of 
tourism success, can be valuable learning experiences for India (Bhattacharya 2007). 
Malaysia and India are natural partners, and both countries are emerging economies 
that offer beneficial economic opportunities for one another. 
However, ASEAN did not welcome India’s vision to build security pacts. This 
was mainly due to political and economic instability, and the position India took in 
the Cold War created the strong opinion that India was under the influence of the 
Soviet Union (Sridharan 2001: 74.) One particular incident can conveys this 
scenario. During the Cold War, India supported Heng Samrin’s regime in Cambodia 
during the Vietnam-Cambodia war. This behaviour led many other SEA countries to 
perceive India with mistrust in the region. In a geographical sense, India’s ambition 
overlapped with other South Asian and SEA nations, increasing tension among 
ASEAN states. This was most clearly seen in the countries with neighbouring 
maritime boundaries, generating the potential consequence of a regional middle- 
power tussle for dominance (Grare 2001: 125). Further, India’s hostile attitude 
towards Pakistan and China, and its positivity about the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) and the nuclear test in 1998, added fuel to the fire. 
These perceptions of India slowly declined after India’s rapprochement with the 
USA in the mid-1990s. The rapprochement process did not mean India acted as the 
USA proxy or crony to fight against China’s rising dominance in Asia but rather as a 
responsible emerging power in the region to ensure a more balanced security 
environment. Soon, India projected an independent role in the region and gained the 
confidences of the ASEAN members. 
Tireless confidence-building efforts to gain trust from the ASEAN were visible. 
For example, in a public speech at Singapore in 1994, Prime Minister Narasimha 
Rao said that: 
India wants to be part of the rapidly growing security structure in the 
region to reduce the uncertainty arising from its political military 
activities. Instead, India wants to contribute to the security of Asia, which 
can reduce its suspicions and military intention in the region. (Grare 2001: 
126). 
 
The firm commitment towards the LEP led India to lobby for security in various 
forums. One particularly noticeable form was the ARF, a regional security grouping 





European Union (EU) and Russia (Ladwig 2009: 94). Unsurprisingly, India, which 
had been opposed in the past, received wide publicity and support in the ARF. This 
was mainly because of the drastic revision of Indian policy in support of multilateral 
security. 
From the early 2000s, a series of unforgettable incidents triggered all countries 
to work on a common security agenda. In 1999, the Kargil War (cross-border 
terrorism) challenged India’s security capacity and political will. The 9/11 terrorist 
attack of 2001 in the USA amplified the need for a strong security commitment by 
all countries, worldwide. These events reminded India and ASEAN countries that the 
IOR is also vulnerable to cross-border threats, and that there was therefore a pressing 
need for a maritime security and emergency response to terrorism. During that 
period, the world witnessed unified engagement and defence cooperation in the IOR. 
India’s security vision towards the SEA region in response to threats such as the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), maritime terrorism and 
transnational crime is still under construction. 
On the other hand, the growing influence of China had led ASEAN countries to 
seek a balance in the region. China’s superior attitude in the SCS has created anxiety 
amongst neighbouring countries like Vietnam, the Philippines and Cambodia. In 
addition to this, China is slowly expanding its naval presence by establishing 
friendships with countries like Myanmar and Sri Lanka at the major waters of IOR. 
This security dilemma worried the countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and 
Indonesia that bound the SOM. Smaller countries in the region, fearing unilateralism 
by the big powers, see India as a potential security provider (Sikri 2009: 115). The 
symbiotic relationship between Malaysia and India is the reason for a positive 
engagement between the two regions. Through this, India can seek the friendship of 
Malaysia to ensure its presence at the SOM, the soft belly of China in the IOR and 
on the other hand, Malaysia needs India not just to strengthen security against China 
but also to share responsibility as a partner in ensuring the safety of SOM waters. 
Nevertheless, for a short period, India’s maritime security vision received 
endorsement from the ASEAN, laying the foundations for Phase Two of the LEP. 
This was achieved by an improved alliance with China and diplomacy with the USA, 
and its support and acknowledgement to the provisions of ASEAN’s 1967 charter 
(Mohan 2012: 95). India’s unequivocal position gained momentum for the LEP as a 





beyond the ASEAN extended first phase to Australia and East Asia, and b) there was 
a shift in interest from economic growth to defence among the ASEAN states. In 
expressing India’s second phase, Foreign Minister Vajpayee said that: 
 
The first phase of India LEP was ASEAN-centered (op cit) and 
focused primarily on trade and investment linkages. The new 
phase of this policy is has expanded the definition of the 
characteristics of the East, from Australia to East Asia, with 
ASEAN as its core. The new phase also marks a shift from trade 
to economic issues and the wider security, including joint efforts 
to protect shipping routes and coordinate efforts to combat 
terrorism and joint military exercises with India. This is an 
expansion from the first launch by India in the 1990s to a more 
mature relation today. (quoted in Sinha 2003). 
 
This new trajectory benefited India in many and various aspects and at several levels 
of cooperation. India began with the initial platform used to engage with the SEA 
countries, which is the ASEAN forum. It then gradually grew by participating in the 
ARF dialogues, which specifically focused on security matters of the region. These 
included the safety and security of the IOR. Once India’s established its position on a 
multilateral level, its then shifted its policy in building bilateral relationships with the 
region, involving the Ministers of External Affairs and Defence as well as high level 
defence exchanges. These exchanges involved naval and other services, including the 
air force and army, visits and exercises. 
At this crucial juncture, the excellence of the navy was increasingly recognised 
as having the status of aregional power status by both India and the members of 
ASEAN (Gordon 1993: 55). ASEAN’s acceptance of India’s naval engagement in 
the region was boosted in 2004. It was during this year that India ordered its navy to 
coordinate its tsunami relief operations in the IOR, gaining international recognition. 
India’s positive engagements with the countries of the SEA region give it 
recognition as a responsible emerging power in the IOR. At the same time, India also 
ensured that its position as a benign power was sustained. Accordingly, India shaped 
its maritime policies such that they catered to its interest in the region as well as the 
requirement for a stronger partnership with the SEA countries. At this point, the 
Malaysia-India relationship reached a mature stage whereby it covers all aspects of 





As a result, at the beginning of the 21
st 
century, SEA was viewed as a bridge of 
economic connectedness and a source of economic safekeeping and military power 
between India and the ASEAN countries. This specifically built the connectedness of 
the navy between the two regions. This was also well articulated by C. Raja Mohan. 
He mentioned the potential of the universal character of navy roles at sea for 
ensuring a positive state interaction in the case of India–SEA. He argues that: 
While the logic of rebalancing has begun to create a new basis for 
the participation of East Asia, it noted that the Indian Navy’s 
future chances in New Delhi, in the Pacific. Through a series of 
maritime attacks in the first decade of this century the Indian 
Navy has made it clear that he has made it clear that the 
separation of different theatres was entirely an intellectual 
exercise. [The] [n]avy, after all, had no problem realising that the 
sea is closely linked and their separation is largely apolitical and 
not just the construction of geographers (Mohan 2012: 96). 
 
This leverage was well understood by India. All this was made possible by India’s 
intuitively developed diplomacy with ASEAN. This is because in the 21st century, 
the high seas are a vital area of focus for most countries in the IOR. Further, India’s 
emerging maritime role in the IOR has been frequently debated, and its engagement 
with the littoral states of the IOR is often discussed. Thus, India’s maritime vision and 
engagement with SEA, as an emerging regional power, requires further 
understanding. 
More recently, India’s Act East Policy under leadership of Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi has triggered not only an active action-oriented engagement of India 
with SEA region but necessitated greater understanding of vital areas of cooperation 
(Palit 2016: 18). Indian PM Modi’s quick visits to SEA countries in his first year 
government signify India’s greater aspiration and stronger commitment to work with 
SEA nations especially over issues of maritime security in EIOR. As part of this 
recent AEP, the Indian foreign office is reiterating its focus to enhance regional 
security cooperation in various traditional and non-traditional areas of cooperation 
with SEA nations. India being the oceanic neighbour understands well that maritime 
security issues are key component of any cooperation initiatives with SEA states in 
EIOR. 
Both LEP and AEP by India represent an opportunity for Malaysia to capitalise 
on the existence of India’s desire to work with SEA nations for mutual gains. Yet 





security issues common to both Malaysia and India in EIOR that may become the 
basis of maritime cooperation. This is because in the 21
st 
century the high seas are a 
vital area of focus for most countries in the IOR. Further, India’s emerging maritime 
role in IOR has been frequently debated, and its engagement with the littoral states of 
IOR is often discussed. Thus, India’s maritime vision and engagement towards SEA, 
as an emerging regional power, requires further understanding. 
 
2.42 India–Southeast Asia Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean 
Region 
This section describes the second phase of India’s LEP, focusing on Indian–SEA 
maritime security cooperation in the IOR. Prior to the beginning of the 2000s, the 
focus on maritime security had been relatively minimal. Attention to maritime 
security was then increased due to several factors that took place in the maritime 
domain: a) safety and security of SLOCs, b) the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, c) 
the rising piratical attacks in the IOR and 4) rising natural disasters in the IOR. 
These scenarios led to India’s second phase of LEP, with a major focus on 
developing its maritime relations with the major SEA countries that were also facing 
similar maritime challenges. This section discusses the major SEA countries that 
were associated with India in maritime engagement, mainly Singapore, Vietnam, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines. 
The initial maritime engagement with these countries started in 1991, when 
India regularly conducted joint naval exercises with Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia in the IOR. In 1992, India invited ASEAN to participate in a naval 
exercise, but these attempts were not successful because of the Cold War conspiracy. 
However, India continued commitment with SEA countries through bilateral 
engagement; in 1993, the armed forces of India and Singapore were involved in the 
Lion King series of naval exercises. In the same year, the Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW) superseded the Lion King series and continued for 10 years until its 
replacement by SIMBEX in 2005. After winning an association that promoted SEA, 
in 1995 it raised the military's commitment to India through the MILAN naval 
exercises with the ASEAN countries. In the Bay of Bengal, a collective maritime 
security vision was envisaged for fostering cooperation in areas of common interest: 
safeguarding SLOCs from poaching, piracy and terrorist activities, and promoting 





In 1996, India’s membership was accredited by ARF after several maritime 
operations under the banner of ‘Friendship At Sea’, with the participation of 
Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. As India geared up for Phase Two of the LEP, 
Malaysia and Myanmar joined the MILAN exercise in 2003, then Vietnam and 
Brunei in 2008, and the Philippines in 2010. Singapore, at the eastern entrance of the 
SOM, and a transit portal for one-third of global sea commerce (Cole 2008: 43), 
expanded access to naval facilities in India from the Andaman Sea to the capital 
Southern Naval Command officials in Cochin (Singh 2011: 29). From 2005, India 
conducted several navy exercises with Singapore through the SIMBEX operation. 
During this period, the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) agreement was signed 
between India and Singapore to guide future exercises. This trend indicates the 
development of interest in both states on maritime security collaboration in 
Southeast Asian waters. 
Other naval exercises also took place in the field of search and rescue (SAR) 
through INDOPURA SAREX, initialised in 1995, and transformed in 1997 into a 
multilateral maritime operation including Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. From 
1998 onwards, many Indian ships visited Vietnam; this was enabled through the 
amicable relationship that had existed with Vietnam from the start of the Cold War. 
In 2000, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes ratified a defence engagement 
with Vietnam, which involved periodical dialogues between the navies of both 
countries. As a result of this treaty, the coast guard was strengthen, and goodwill 
visits were made to Ho Chi Minh City in the years 2000, 2002 and 2003. Frequent 
friendship visits by India’s naval ships in Hai Phong province enhanced the 
confidence of both countries. This was well reported in the government source cited 
in the Deccan Chronicle: ‘the move will give India the key to a sustainable presence 
in the South China Sea’ (Vo 2012: 21). 
In addition, after 9/11, India’s naval engagement with SEA states underwent a 
major transformation. All regions paid increasing attention to counter-terrorism 
pacts. India strengthened its maritime policy with the SEA states around the 
Andaman Sea by improving communications to combat extremist groups such as the 
Jihad and Aceh separatists. For example, in 2004 India formed a Joint Working 
Group (JWG) with Indonesia by means of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
for combating international terrorism. During the first meeting, held in 2005 in New 





security collaboration especially on the exchange of information and intelligence in 
curbing non-traditional threats such as piracy and terrorist attacks. 
This was also the case with Thailand. Because both countries perceived the IOR 
as a vital area for maritime activities, taking into account the numbers of insurgents 
groups using the northeast of India to enter Thailand, both appreciated the mutual 
assistance that was offeredfor combating non-traditional issues especially terrorism. 
India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Abhisit Vejjajiva confirmed this in 
2001. This collaboration also involved guarding the waters of SOM with other major 
powers in SEA such as Malaysia and Singapore. 
In particular, the duration and frequency of patrolling in the region was 
reinforced. The 9/11 incidents also led to two important forms of cooperation: a) the 
ASEAN–India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, 
established in 2003, and b) the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), established in 2004. 
The same year, the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) also expressed humanitarian 
concern for SEA regions, by undertaking the biggest peacetime operation in the form 
of humanitarian assistance involving the peoples of Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia in the aftermath of the December tsunami. Similarly, in 2014, India was 
one of the first countries to respond to the MH370 crisis. These timely responses to 
humanitarian crises boosted India’s image as a positive maritime nation in the 
region. 
With the continued support of Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, 
India established a Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) in 2005 at the Andaman 
Islands. This new base contributed further engagement on maritime issues more 
effectively in the IOR. For instance, in 2005, effective coordination was evident in 
curtailing transnational crime such as terrorism, piracy and smuggling, and to secure 
vital SLOCs in the IOR. As a result, the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Thai Navy 
signed an MOU on Coordinated Patrol Procedures in the Areas Adjacent to the 
International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) and Establishment of Lines of 
Communication. This MOU was expected to provide better collaboration in terms of 
coast guard patrolling and other joint collaboration. 
In 2006, with the establishment of the FENC, a higher stage of maritime 
cooperation was witnessed between SEA-India. Typical emphasis has been placed 





SOM with countries in the coastal marine area.  For  example,  India’s  first 
coordinated naval patrol was conducted with Indonesia at Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands in 2006. Just as Thailand coordinated with India on transnational crime, 
Indonesia also sought India’s assistance on these issues, especially terrorism and 
piracy. In addition, since then, the Indi-Indo Co-ordinated Patrols  (CORPAT) has  
been conducted twice a year wherein ships from the two  navies  undertake  
coordinated patrols of the IMBL. This collaboration was expected to provide better 
coordination in terms of radar and communication systems used during patrolling at  
the SEA waters. Both the RIN and the Royal Thai Navy have conducted similar 
counter-piracy projects in the SOM. All these are the integral components of India’s 
maritime policy to the east (Sikri 2009:  253). 
 
Map 2: The Far Eastern Naval Command in the Indian Ocean   Region 
 
 
Source: United Nations 
India’s maritime relationship with Myanmar formed a slightly different scenario.  
India’s engagements during the 2004 tsunami for example portrayed durable 
competition vis-à-vis China in order to ensure a strong presence in Myanmar. 
Geographically located in the northern half of the Bay of  Bengal,  Myanmar  
contributes importantly to many Indian maritime  security  concerns.  But  the  issues 
that have been a concern for India when engaging with Myanmar have been similar  
with respect to their SEA views on other countries in the region, such as the issue of 
piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, drug trafficking and distribution. Other issues 





triangle formed by Myanmar, Thailand and Laos. In terms, of the safety of SLOCs, 
the sea route between Kolkata and Sittwe is a major concern. 
In 2004, India conducted naval exercises with Myanmar, which sent two 
warships Khukri class. In 2006, India announced the transfer of two BN-2 
‘Defender’ Islander maritime surveillance aircrafts and deck-based air defence guns 
to the Myanmar Navy (Sahkuja 2012: 3). In the same year, India’s INS Ranjit and 
INS Kuthar joined Myanmar for joint naval exercises. Many more warship visits 
took place between two countries, marking the first visit by a foreign country to 
Myanmar. In addition, the port of Sittwe has been controlled by India, and the Indian 
government concluded an agreement to change Myanmar’s Daweii Port into an 
Indian deep-sea port. India’s several visits to Myanmar further led to procurement 
purchases from India and talks on establishing a naval aviation training centre in 
Myanmar. 
 
Table 1: List of India–Southeast Asia Defence Agreements (1993–2015) 
 
NO. YEAR COUNTRIES ACTIVITIES 
1 2003 India–Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement and Bilateral 
Agreement for the Conduct of Joint Military 
Training and Exercises in India 
for 5 years 
 2007 & 2009  Bilateral Agreement to utilise facilities in India by 
the Singapore Air Force and Army 
 2014  Agreement to extend the use of training and 
exercises facilities in India by Singapore Army 
2 2001 India–Indonesia Defence Agreement comprises high level visits, ship 
visits and officers studying in staff college 
 2014  1
st Ministerial level biennial defence dialogue 
3 2003 India–Thailand Joint Working Group on Security (upgraded to 
include defence exchange) 
 2011  India–Thailand Defence Dialogue 
 2012  Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on defence 
cooperation 
 2014  Defence ministers visit, and ADMM Plus 
4 2013 India-Myanmar High-level visit by Defence Minister 
 2014  High-level visit by Chief of Air Staff 
5 2009 India-Vietnam Defence Cooperation comprising coordinated patrols 
by Vietnamese sea police and the Indian coast guard, 
and training Vietnam air force pilots 
6 2006 India–Philippines Philippines–India Agreement Concerning Defence 
Cooperation 
 2012  Joint Defence Cooperation Committee 
7 2005 India–Cambodia Agreement on Combating International Terrorism 
Organised Crimes and Illicit Drug Trafficking 
8 2011 India–Laos Indian military delegation to Laos, and setting up an 





Table 2: List of India–Southeast Asia Maritime Exercises (1993–2015) 
 
NO. YEAR COUNTRIES ACTIVITIES 
1 1993-2004 India & Singapore Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Exercises 
2 1995,1997 & 1999 India, Singapore, Thailand & 
Indonesia 
MILAN 
 2003 & 2006 Malaysia & Myanmar joined MILAN 
 2008 Brunei & Vietnam joined MILAN 
 2010 Philippines joined MILAN 
 2012 India, Singapore, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Brunei, & Philippines 
MILAN 
 2014 India, Singapore Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar & 
Philippines 
MILAN 
3 1998 India, Singapore & Indonesia MADAD 1998 SAR 
Exercises 
4 1998 & 2009 India & Philippines Passage Exercise 
(PASSEX) 
 2002 India & Thailand PASSEX 
  India & Singapore PASSEX 
  India & Indonesia PASSEX 
5 2002–2014 India & Indonesia Indo-Indonesia 
Coordinated Patrol 
(IND INDO CORPAT) 
6 2005–2014 India & Thailand Indo-Thai Coordinated 
Patrol (INDO-THAI 
CORPAT) 
7 2004 India, Singapore & Indonesia 2nd Western Pacific 
Mine Counter 
Measures Exercises 
(MCMX) & Diving 
Exercises (DIVEX) 
8 2005–2015 India & Singapore SIMBEX 
9 2002 India, Singapore, Malaysia 2nd Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium 
(WPNS) Sea Exercises 
10 2008 India & Singapore Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft Exercises 
11 2011 India & Indonesia National Disaster 
Relief Force 
participated in the 
Table Top Exercise 
(TTX) & Field 
Training Exercise 
(FTX) of the Disaster 
Relief Exercise 





2.43 Malaysia–India Maritime Security Cooperation in the Eastern Indian Ocean 
Region 
In 1993, India signed a defence cooperation agreement with Malaysia. This was the 
first time that India had signed a treaty with a country outside the region. The 
Malaysia–India Defence Cooperation Meeting (MIDCOM), which was established 
under this framework, marked an important maritime development compared to the 
relations between other SEA countries in the region. Malaysia–India maritime 
interactions were more in terms of multilateral maritime cooperation, such as the 
MILAN, INDOPURA and SAREX naval exercises. In recent years, India revamped 
its cooperation with Malaysia, in response to the increasing number of pirate attacks 
in the SOM. For instance, between 2008 and 2010, vessels from both navies carrying 
live ammunition conducted anti-piracy exercises in the SOM, showing their common 
interest in maintaining a secure vital Strait (The Times of India 2008). Similarly, 
naval exercises were conducted with Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) on the high seas. 
In 2010, the two countries established a framework for a Strategic Partnership 
between India and Malaysia. The move is seen as a mature partnership, which is 
protected in all areas necessary for a broader maritime cooperation. This includes an 
exchange between defense ministers and military officials, together with cooperation 
in defense projects, and cooperation in combating terrorism by exchanging 
information. In 2011, Indian naval ships and the coast guard visited Malaysia, and in 
2012 a number of port calls were made between these countries. 
In addition, both countries sent naval ships and delegations to the biannual 
Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA), MILAN 
regional events, and the Land, Naval and Internal Homeland Security Systems 
Exhibition (DEFEXPO), conducted by India. India also took part in the mechanism 
of cooperation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and contributed to two of the 
six projects, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (Project 1 and Project 4) 
to improve the safety of navigation and environmental protection in the SOM. India 
also signed the annual MIDCOM, and conducts regular visits to Malaysian ports for 
capacity building and patrolling pirate-infested areas at sea for drug-trafficking, 
human trafficking, and maritime terrorism (Mohan 2012: 99). 





dialogues, capacity building, coordinated patrolling to face the increasing maritime 
challenges, especially transnational challenges such as drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, piracy and terrorism. However, although this is the case, cooperation 
remains insufficient. Both Malaysia and India have different forms of potential that 
can be utilised for the advantage of both countries. 
Both countries have explored the possibilities for upgrading several forms of 
defence collaboration, such as training pilots, and exchange of air force personnel for 
maintaining and repairing equipment (Mohan 2012: 101). For example, in the past 
India offered training to Malaysia’s Air Force pilots on MIG-29s, and offered 
training on the SUKHOI and the SCORPENE. There was also some discussion on 
selling BRAHMOS missiles to Malaysia (Mohan 2012: 102). Nevertheless, several 
of these bilateral arrangements on training and exercises at sea are still in the air, not 
enshrined in official agreements. Strategic partnership is often used as a benchmark 
for analysing the intensity of state interactions in IR. In this case, India–Malaysia 
relations can be categorised as a missed opportunity (Singh 2011: 87). 
Malaysia is partly responsible for the ambiguity in the relationship, as it has 
always perceived that India would expand naval boundaries in the IOR. The fear of 
small states such as Malaysia of falling under the shadows of big powers like India is 
the major downfall. This impression was well expressed by Malaysian Defence 
Minister Ahmad Rithauddeen. In 1986, he said: 
India needs to show neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and 
other SEA countries that it has no ambition to interfere in 
regional affairs. We want to see India’s assurance that it will not 
use force against neighbouring countries and aimed that New 
Delhi would not go to the point of doubling of military force 
outside the Indian Ocean or try to control the entrance to the 
Strait of Malacca (Mak 2001: 154). 
 
The lack of possibility for a wiser development between Malaysia-India is 
also due to Malaysia’s egalitarian approach forcing India to look for ASEAN 
countries to assist other maritime action plans in the region. For example, Malaysia 
has refused to recognise the link between piracy and terrorism. Avoiding considering 
Malaysia as a centre of terrorism in the SEA region creates difficulty in establishing 
security cooperation with India. In an effort to counter threats of terrorism, Malaysia 
has joined the USA to stand against terrorism and smuggling, but there is reluctance 





Nevertheless, Malaysia appreciates India’s maritime partnership. For Malaysia, 
avoiding domination by China is the sole solution to its predicament. The defeat of 
South Vietnam was among several disturbing developments of the mid-1970s. 
During that period, China asserted claims in the SCS, and its dominance naturally 
caused anxiety for Malaysia, mainly because Malaysia began to lose control over the 
strategically important Spratly Islands, situated within the waters of Chinese 
neighbouring states (Vietnam, the Philippines, and Cambodia). The aggressive 
Chinese move to capture the Mischief Reef from the Philippines in 1995 (Meyer 
1996:1) was a further warning for Malaysia about another superpower in the region. 
Malaysia’s intention to face China led to its utilising India as a good counter-weight 
against China’s naval expansion in the region. Both Malaysia and India view China 
as key competitor, and both are ready to outstrip each other to obstruct China’s 
dominance in the region. 
Further, Malaysia’s intention to move closer to India would neutralise 
Singapore’s advantageous position in the Bay of Bengal and SOM. This intention 
became clear when the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), which had been operating in 
the Woodlands since 1949, shifted to Lumut in 1997 to monitor the Bay of Bengal. 
Such powerful competition pushed Malaysia to accept any offer from India to 
balance Singapore’s maritime power in the region. 
In sum, strong maritime engagement is equally important for both Malaysia 
and India in EIOR. This is manifested in their engagement in SEA for an enduring 
maritime project to improve the response to security threats, whether traditional or 
non-traditional, and also to restore the balance of power in the EIOR. Both states 
acknowledge the improvement in the volume of maritime cooperation, an effective 
policy prescription for achieving a mutually beneficial goal. 
However, despite an apparently strong intention for maritime cooperation, the 
level of cooperation between these two entities remains surprisingly low. The 
stumbling blocks of this relationship have been little explored in academic enquiries, 
and the evidence available lacks in substance required for a comprehensive 
understanding. The existing literature suggests that the engagement between Malaysia 
and India within the EIOR is minimal. Although both states describe their 
relationship as ‘traditional partners’ under this banner, the relationship between  the 
two countries in terms of maritime security cooperation still remains unclear. 





significance in encouraging MIMSC in the EIOR. Yet the shift to a more action- 
oriented Act East Policy by India under Modi’s government coupled with changing 
security challenges in the IOR (Bhattacharjee (2016)) has brought forward newer 
dynamics to MIMSC. The AEP has signalled India’s ambitions to a more action 
oriented engagement with SEA nations (Mukherjee & Malone 2011). It has been 
emphasized that the enhanced economic and trade relations among SEA-India across 
EIOR requires maritime security cooperation as a vital component of the Act East 
Policy (Limaye 2016). For this reason, this study seeks to look into the dynamics of 
AEP in order to understand the MIMSC in EIOR under the administration of Prime 
Minister Najib Tun Razak and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Securitization of key 
issues in EIOR through this study would enable a more specific dialogue in line with 
the spirit of AEP. The missed opportunities discussed above are examined in order to 
necessitate further understanding of the changing paradigm shift in MIMSC in EIOR 
under the banner of LEP and AEP together. 
 
Table 3: List of Malaysia-India Defence Cooperation and Naval Activities 
(1993-2016) 
NO YEAR ACTIVITIES 
1 1993 MIDCOM 
2 2002 2nd WPNS sea exercises 
3 From 2002 
Regular goodwill visits between Malaysia 
and India 
4 2003, 2012 & 2014 






Indian Air Force (IAF) Air Training Team 






1. India’s Chief of Air Staff visited 
Malaysia 
2. Malaysia’s Chiefs of Arms and 
Navy visited India 
7 Annually Indian participation in LIMA 
8 2012 JWG on Counter-Terrorism 
9 From 2011 India’s naval ship made regular port calls 
10 2012 3rd Army Talks 
11 2012 5th Air Staff Talks 




2.5 Part Two: Methodology 
This section describes the research and the methods employed in writing this thesis. 





design. Second, it describes the use of phenomenology as the strategy of inquiry for 
this study in line with a qualitative research design. Third, it discusses the data 
collection methods, namely in-depth personal interviews and focus group discussions, 
along with the protocols employed to carry them out in this study. Fourth, it describes 
the data analysis strategy, Thematic Content Analysis (TCA). 
 
2.6 Research Design 
In this thesis, a qualitative research design has been employed, due to its exploratory 
nature, and this has determined the qualitative methods and processes of research to 
probe into the antecedents and outcomes of MIMSC in EIOR. It is said that 
qualitative research methods produce different lenses to explore social reality – lenses 
that make society and phenomena understandable (Alasuutary 2010: 39-155). The 
major focus of this thesis is to study one specific emerging phenomenon: that is, 
MIMSC in EIOR. Given the existence of varied perspectives on the issues of 
MIMSC, qualitative methods helped to find specific answers to the research question 
and objective of this thesis. The very nature of qualitative research seeks deep 
understanding and answers to questions that begin with why, how and how questions 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990), guiding the thesis to identify the specific areas of this 
research study that are the drivers of MIMSC in EIOR, the emerging areas of 
collaboration, and the critical success factors of MIMSC in EIOR. 
 
2.7 Strategy of the Inquiry 
This thesis made use of a phenomenological design in addressing the research 
question. This is because the nature of phenomenological research is to acknowledge 
that there are gaps in the research study. Phenomenological research begins by 
examining research in the field of maritime studies, and examines the participants’ 
experiences relating to the phenomenon under study. It involves extensive and in- 
depth study of a small group of participants’ experiences of the phenomenon in order 
to develop themes of meaning in their relationships (Moustakas 1994). 
In this study, the researcher analysed the viewpoints of academic scholars and 
think tanks in the field of maritime studies in order to formulate the research question 
and objective. A phenomenon that is not described or explained openly does not 
necessarily provide a definitive explanation, but it does raise awareness and increase 





consequently shapes the central question of the thesis. A phenomenological strategy 
of inquiry can be witnessed throughout this thesis while studying the debate amongst 
participants on MIMSC in EIOR. The use of phenomenology enabled and guided the 
researcher to focus on the specific questions on MIMSC in EIOR, which are under- 
studied, and which therefore require further interrogation. 
 
2.8 Data Collection Methods 
The research study used two primary data collection methods to examine in depth the 
complex phenomenon of the inter-state relations between Malaysia and India. These 
methods included in-depth personal interviews and focus groups discussions 
(Gubrium and Holstein 2002). 
The criteria for selecting informants were based on purposive sampling, because 
the purpose of the interview determines who is interviewed. More accurate findings 
would emerge from the insights and experiences of those involved in policy making 
in both countries. Hence, this study was aimed at top-ranking officials who had been 
involved, directly and indirectly, in the policy-making process relating to diplomatic 
and defence cooperation between Malaysia and India. The knowledge and expertise 
of these informants made this study more relevant to the actual events, and provided 
more coherent meaning in relation to the issue at hand. 
The informants were chosen based upon their expertise, their willingness and 
their ability to transmit information accurately (Steward and Cash 2003). The key 
informants of in-depth personal interviews and focus groups were from the navy, 
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, armed forces and maritime 
security agencies, ex-navy and think tanks in Malaysia and India. Of course, the 
availability and willingness of the informants to participate in the interview sessions 
limited the number and composition of respondents. 
In line with the qualitative mode of inquiry, the use of these two methods has 
served to provide data triangulation, i.e. confirmatory support for the themes 
appearing from each of these. While the in-depth personal interview is a qualitative 
exploratory research method and is capable of providing deeper understanding of 
why and how, it has been triangulated by another method, that is the focus group, 
which has greatly helped provide more in-depth research findings in answer to the 
questions what and why (Berg and Lune 2004). In order to improve the effective 





study has followed the 32-item checklist proposed by Consolidated Criteria for 
Reporting Qualitative Research (COREQ) (Tong, Sainsbury and Craig 2007: 349– 
357) given in Appendix D. 
 
 
2.81 In-depth Personal Interviews 
An in-depth personal interview is a qualitative data collection method that allows 
deep probing into informants’ experiences of the phenomenon under study. This 
study utilised interviews as a source of primary data collection, specifically one 
particular form of interrogation method, to provide sufficient information for this 
research. During interviews, the questioning was carried out in a systematic manner 
and a consistent order (Muthiah nd: 22). The open-ended nature of the questions 
provided opportunities, freedom and flexibility for the informants to discuss the topic 
in detail, often leading to more than one answer to a question. The informants went 
into the interview process to discuss a limited number of themes and frames, but 
found that in the event they required more thought than previously envisaged, and 
produced more than one answer. Each on-going question was asked on the basis of 
the informants’ previous response (Hancock 1998: 10). A set of questions was 
prepared prior to the interview session. 
Open-ended interviews tend to probe into the experiences of informants in 
relation to the phenomenon under study, and into the meanings they attach to it. The 
researcher’s job is to encourage informants to talk openly about the issue related to 
the research question by asking open-ended questions. In this study, four individual 
interviews were conducted with Malaysians and three were conducted with Indians. 
 
2.82 Focus Group Interviews 
The second form of data collection in this thesis was focus group discussions. Focus 
group techniques for data collection seek to facilitate group discussion and let 
participants explore individual and shared perspectives relating to the issue in 
question (Morgan 1997). These involved 12 informants who were knowledgeable 
about the issue in question. The researcher in this study played the role of facilitator. 
As with the in-depth personal interviews, the researcher asked open-ended questions 
related to the research questions in order to stimulate discussion among the 
participants. The facilitator encouraged the participants to answer the questions 





Casey 2002: 4–23). 
The use of focus group discussions has increased among researchers in recent 
years in social science research for several reasons. In this study, the choice of focus 
group discussions was driven by three major factors. First, as mentioned above, 
group discussion was perceived to stimulate a more interactive session. Second, the 
study made use of this data collection tool to save the time, cost and energy typically 
required for personal interviews. Third, focus group interviews were conducted 
when the participants hesitated to give personal interviews and felt more comfortable 
in a group setting. In this study, three focus groups were conducted with Malaysians 
and two focus groups with Indians. 
 
2.83 In-depth Personal Interview and Focus Group Protocols/Procedures 
Once the informants had been identified, the potential benefits and risks, place, date 
and time of the interview and confidentiality issues, were presented to the informants 
(Appendix A). They were also provided with a consent form to indicate their 
understanding of the research topic, the information needed and their approval of 
participation (Appendix B), a participant agreement form (Appendix C) and the 
questionnaire itself (Appendix E). Once this process had been completed, the 
arrangements for interviews were made based on their availability; office hours were 
chosen for the informants who were still serving as officers. 
For focus group interviews, a letter was distributed to each participant prior to 
commencing the interview about the general background of the other informants, in 
order to help informants become comfortable with each other. This was also to 
ensure that each informant would be aware of the complete arrangements and the 
interview protocol. If any informant did not agree to be interviewed in the presence 
of any other member of the focus group, the interview groups would be reshuffled. 
During the data collection period, checklists were given to the informants to 
ensure that they were aware of the questions, minimising any waste of time. For the 
focus group discussions, a checklist ensured that each informant had the same set of 
questions and was fully aware of the whole process of the interview. This increased 
the amplitude of the data and made the date collection technique more systematic 
(Steward and Cash 2003: 22). The informants had the right to withdraw at any time, 
but because the demands of this study did not pose any serious risk to informants, 





avoiding interruptions during the interview process. In terms of confidentiality, the 
informants were allowed to be anonymous or to provide a fictitious name. This was 
deemed very necessary and in some cases requested by them due to their 
professional position, when they felt their information might be problematic for 
readers or a particular individual. 
All the interviews were conducted between September 2014 and April 2015. 
Given the sensitivity of the information, mainly from the military, and defence and 
foreign offices, the researcher strictly maintained the anonymity of informants. 
Voice recordings were not allowed in any of the interviews, in either Malaysia or 
India, due to the sensitivity of information, and so a research diary was used 
throughout to record all personal and group interviews. After each interview, all 
information was stored in a Microsoft Word file, with a researcher memo describing 
the contextual information of the interview and some personal notes. The interview 
data was transcribed with respect to the research questions and interview questions, 
bearing in mind the required compatibility with NVIVO 10. 
Other written information was stored in files as appropriate. If any of the 
participants wished to withdraw or modify certain information, they would have 
complete freedom to do so, even if the thesis had been in the final stage of the data 
analysis process. After the study was completed, all the records of the interviews, 
transcripts of interviews, and written notes and memos were coded. 
 
2.84 Data Management and Analysis 
There are several ways to manage and store data. In this study, data was preserved 
both physically and electronically. Physically, where appropriate, field notes and 
handwritten transcripts of the interview were placed in a drawer/cabinet in the 
researcher’s home, and therefore were only accessible to the researcher. 
Electronically, the program NVIVO 10 was used as the primary data storage system 
in this study, because it has the ability to store both secondary and primary data 
systematically. Qualitative interviews can be information-intensive and/or extensive 
(Bazeley 2007: 2), and this requires a solid system of data storage. NVIVO 10 has the 
ability to store all the information in the case of interview transcripts, field notes or 
tape recordings manually - and at the same time could quickly trace back to keywords 
or topics. In NVivo 10, a separate folder was created by topic or theme. Secondary 





The program also helped to organise references systematically. 
In analysing the primary data, the interview data sheets were separated into four 
major folders: ‘Individual Interview Malaysia’, ‘Individual Interview India’, ‘Group 
Interview Malaysia’ and ‘Group Interview India’. An example of an individual 
interview label would be ‘Malaysia Individual (MI 1) – (Name), Malaysia Maritime 
Enforcement Agency, 1 June 2013’; and of a group interview, ‘India Group (IG 1) – 
(Names), The United Services Institution of India, 1 June 2013’. 
 
2.85 Content Analysis 
In all research, the first step is to shape the central questions that address the research 
inquiry. For this project, Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) was a good starting point. 
At this stage, the content analysis methods were descriptive, identifying similarities 
and differences in the literature and developing a common understanding of existing 
knowledge. It also identified the strengths and weaknesses of the main arguments in 
the literature in the selected area of science. In short, content analysis provided 
knowledge and understanding of the phenomena being studied (Sivabala Naidu nd: 
102). 
This research study made use of TCA as a method of analysing qualitative data 
and the insights derived from interviews and focus group discussions (Krippendorff 
2012.). TCA is a descriptive presentation of themes or patterns of social reality 
emerging from the qualitative data. Qualitative data may take the form of interview 
transcripts collected from research informants or other identified texts that reflect 
experientially on the topic of study. While videos, images, and other forms of data 
may accompany textural data, this description of TCA is limited to textural data 
(Anderson 2007). 
Content analysis begins with the research objectives and questions to be studied. 
Researchers ask the question "What do you want to know from the content of 
communication?" framing part of the research objectives. The researcher found the 
source of the communication related to the research questions by content analysis 
(Prasad 2008: 173-193). This means that content analysis describes the 
characteristics of data content in terms of what, how and for whom. Inferences are 
made about the causes of content, and provide the answers to why and who questions 
(Berelson 1952). Finally, inferences are made about the effects of the content. As a 





the central argument of the thesis. 
In this research, the content analysis method was used to build the central 
question. Selections of documents such as books, journals, working papers, 
conference papers, political speeches and press releases in both English and Malay 
were reviewed in order to help understand the major arguments and debates on 
MIMSC in EIOR. A literature review based on prior research, using key words and 
phrases such as ‘Indian foreign policy’, ‘defence policies’, ‘maritime’ or ‘naval 
strategy’, ‘Malaysia–India’, ‘ASEAN–Indian maritime cooperation’, was carried out 
to reduce the key issues. 
Computerised data analyses were then conducted. NVIVO 10 allows creative 
and systematic management of ideas that emerge from data. In addition, NVIVO 10 
can build graphical models that will help create a sound relationship between ideas 
and important features, often called the ‘major findings’. 
The primary resources obtained were imported into NVIVO 10, and coding 
methods were adopted to create clustering units of meaning to summarise the data. 
In this research, three major types of coding were conducted in analysing interview 
transcripts. The first was open coding, whereby each transcript was exported into 
NVIVO 10 and each sentence was read manually, so that coding could be done. 
Second was axial coding, whereby the open nodes created earlier were referred back 
to the research questions and the numbers of nodes refined. At this stage, the 
researcher was able to see if the nodes were answering the research questions built at 
the earlier stage of the research. 
The third type is selective coding; the axial coding was read again, and the 
nodes were refined further. At this stage, the researcher was able to describe the 
major themes of each discussion chapter (4, 5, 6 and 7). These three stages were 
separated into Malaysian and Indian data. Finally a combined selective coding was 
carried out for both Malaysian and Indian data, to enable the provision of a larger 
picture of the themes being developed. Finally, models were created in NVIVO 10, 
which were then presented in the discussion chapters to illustrate each research 












This chapter aims to shed some light on the maritime relationship between Malaysia 
and India from the pre-colonial period until the end of the Cold War. It is stressed 
here that this chapter does not intend to describe the maritime events between the two 
nations in chronological order, but instead analyses those events in order to highlight 
the strong maritime bond between Malaysia and India. A preliminary understanding 
of this phenomenon is essential, in order to provide a better perspective of the current 
Malaysia MIMSC in the EIOR. 
The aforementioned objective will be achieved by exploring three major 





century); second, the imperial era, of Portuguese, Dutch, and English 
occupation (15
th 
century to the 19
th 
century); and third the Cold War    (1947–1990). 
 
3.2 India to Meet Malaya 
The IOR has experienced human interaction for many millennia, developing an 
interactive high-seas trade between many different regions even before the arrival of 
European powers. The maritime interactions between SEA and the Indian 
subcontinent represent a large component of the entire volume of maritime 
interception in the IOR. These specific interactions co-existed from the beginning of 
the first millennium CE, continuing steadily to the present  day,  and  surviving  




centuries. Historian G. Coedes called 
SEA the ‘Indianized states’, and others such as C. Majumdar and H. B. Sarkar called 
SEA the Greater India or Further India (Prakash and Lombard 1999: 163-164). Both 
regions were linked by strong maritime bonds, making it necessary to study MIMSC 
from a historical perspective as the introductory debate of the thesis. 
In the study of IR, it is the motivation for two states to connect that often forms 
the fundamental approach to drawing a wider perspective of state relations. In 
understanding the earlier stages of MIMSC, it is difficult to explain the urge of the 





ocean demographies in the world. Travelling in small ships, with limited seafaring 
equipment and technology, to reach SEA waters and thrive, influencing the local 
culture as well as the political and economic structure of Malay is a challenge. 
It is argued that for a full thirty centuries, India stood at the very heart of the Old 
World, and maintained her position as one of the foremost maritime countries 
(Mookerji 1962: 3). India’s traditionally strong maritime presence in the Malay 
world explains the hold of MIMSC in EIOR. The Rigveda and Mahabharata are 
perhaps the best reference points, but the Ramayana mentions Indian and Malayan 
long-distance voyages, with specific references to Yaradvipa (the island of Java) and 
Suvarnadripa (Sumatra and the Malay peninsula) (Sikri 2014: 7). Other sources 
include the Kathasaritsagara (or Ocean of the Streams of Stories), which has a clear 
reference to Indian long-distance interaction by sea, including a specific mention of 
trade and commerce with Suvarnadvipa, the Malay peninsula (Sikri 2014: 9). 
Since the time of Raja Chola in the 11
th 
century CE, Malaysia has been on the 
receiving end of Indian sea voyages for trading purposes. But these trading activities 
soon led to local settlements at major trading ports, spreading the Indian culture, 
religion and language, leading to the diversity that Malaysia has today. India’s long 
voyages can be observed well before the intervention of European powers in the 
EIOR. In 1025, one Tanjore inscription stated that during the early Kingdoms of 
India, Rajendrachola from southern India had organised a punitive naval raid on the 
empire of Srivijaya in Sumatra (Chaudari 1985: 37). This expedition was believed to 
have been a voyage that required great skills in shipbuilding and navigation, 
especially sailing through the ‘black waters’ of the Indian Ocean. The Sammudda 
Vanija Jataka described a ship with 1,000 carpenters built secretly for distant sailing, 
and the Mahajanaka Jataka recounted a specific voyage from Champa with goods 
for trade and export to Suvarnabhumi – Burma and the Golden Chersonese 
(Malaysia) (Sikri 2013: 10). 
It is the same with shipping and seafaring knowledge. Before the arrival of the 
European powers, the Gujaratis were one of the most prominent communities in 
shipbuilding production, in places like Cambay, Surat, Goga, Broach and Diu, (a 
major seaport in Gujarat), hence the Gujarati claim to be pioneers in the Malaya 
trades, with the best quality ships. 
Indian maritime seafaring knowledge contributed to the connectivity between 





Malaya, which also contributed to the connection between the two nations. The 
Malays demonstrated strong open-sailing maritime knowledge around the Malay 
Archipelago (that is, all the islands between South East Asia and Australia, 
regardless of which country they now belong to) as early as the first millennium BCE. 
They were highly skilled navigators, sailing over the oceans for thousands of miles 
without a compass or written charts (Shaffer 1996: 11). They independently invented 
a sail, made from woven mats reinforced with bamboo (Johnstone 1980: 191–192); 
and the typical Malay sailing boat was a jongs, which translates into English as 
‘junk’. 
Their familiarity with wind circulation led them to be the first to work out how 
to ride the monsoon winds throughout the year, thus carrying food to many different 
destinations in the world. A number of Malay ships reached Africa carrying 
cocoyam, bananas and coconuts (Watson 1983: 68). It also likely that their routes to 
East Africa would have been via such island clusters as the Maldives, the Chagos, 
the Seychelles and the Comores. They also voyaged around the islands of the Malay 
Archipelago, including the Philippines, such that the Malay sailors were called 
‘oceanic nomads’ (Taylor 1976: 30–31 & 45–47). These nomadic Malay sailors 
influenced many regions in the world, which indirectly merged with the Indian 
subcontinent, establishing friendship (Taylor 1976: 45-47). 
A region surrounded by water, Malaya has its own history of sea defence. Prior 
to European intervention, its sea forces led by the Orang Laut (sea people) played a 
vital role in defending sea activities in Malaccan waters. Over time, with changes in 
technology and the arrival of advanced European naval forces, the sea forces of the 
Malay region were overshadowed, and soon declined in importance. Little work has 
been done on the roles and contributions of Orang Laut, though they were once 
known as the sea masters of the region. The role of the Orang Laut protecting the 
waters of SEA facilitated India’s peaceful maritime interactions with the region. 
The Orang Laut were a group of Malay-speaking people, originating in the Riau 
Islands of Indonesia; they were also found in the coastal waters of Sabah and 
Sarawak as well as Johor. They are believed to be responsible for the rise of Malacca 
as a global entrepôt before the arrival of the Portuguese, playing a pivotal role in 
providing naval power in Malay waters resulting in the safety and security of the 
Malay Archipelago. Many people feared the Bajak Laut, the sea robbers that haunted 





strongly built junks carrying a large crew, were afraid of these Malayan privateers 
(Chaudari 1985: 153). The local ruler did not exactly acknowledge this aggressive 
behaviour at sea, but later offered a position for a naval fighter to safeguard the 
SOM. The local Malayan rulers utilised the Orang Laut’s seafaring and navigation 
knowledge to reduce piracy, which would otherwise damage the function of the port 
of Malacca as an international trade emporium. As they had been granted authority 
at sea, the Orang Laut helped the sultans to reduce piracy attacks. The tactical move 
to use the knowledge of the Orang Laut was the major contributory factor to the rise 
of Malacca which became the heart of global trade until the   15
th 
century. 
Another tribe, the Bajau Laut, originated from the east – from Kalimantan and 
north Sulawesi and part of eastern Sabah. Also known for piracy, they were 
belligerent to foreigners and were strongly defensive of the area they considered 
their own. Any foreign intrusion into that area would lead to conflict. 
This sensitivity was utilised by the local rulers to ensure the safety of the SOM 
which operated as a crucial entrepôt between east and west, as the acknowledgement 
given to their communities and appointment to the naval forces led the Orang Laut 
to remain faithful to local rulers. For example, in the history of Malacca-Johor, it 
was understood that the Maharaja of Sirvijaya would need more than two years to 
circumnavigate his island, and the Bajau Laut assisted him. They had all the 
navigation skills, they were loyal, and 30 of them convoyed ships accompanying 
Parameswara to Malacca (Lapian. 2009: 104). He later became the ruler of Malacca, 
a pivotal point in its history. In Johor around 1688, Sultan Mahmud had a huge 
number of Bajau Laut as his followers. He was later replaced by Raja Kecil, who 
again was accompanied by the Bajau Laut. Their reputation as Malayan sea raiders 
endured as impressively as that of any group of naval fighters in the EIOR. 
There were also some natural causes that encouraged maritime connectivity 
between Malaya and India. Geographical proximity is an important underlying factor 
for states to establish connections with other states. Distances from and within land, 
water boundaries and overlapping concourses all play an important role in 
determining the intensity of communications and the level of state interactions with 
one another. A state’s foreign policy is often rationalised on these geographical 
factors, and Malayan–Indian maritime relations are a classic example of such 
considerations. While voyages from one end of the Asian continent to the other have 
occasionally been accomplished without calling into Indian ports, in historic 





India generally acted as a bridge between east and west (Arasaratnam1994: 1). 
Similarly, the Malaya peninsula acted as a crucial haven to many vessels sailing 
between the Middle and the Far East. 
Both India and Malaya are situated in positions of great importance to the major 
SLOCs. Deep oceans can be challenging to sailors, so when eastbound sailors, 
having passed the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, approached Sumatran waters, the 
west coast of the Malaya peninsula was a haven where they could repair ships 
damaged by storms before continuing their voyage to the Far East and China. Places 
like Kedah, Penang, Perak, Malacca and Johor, strategically situated between the 
choke points of east and west, facilitated these needs, resulting in the establishment 
of maritime connections between these two regions. On the other hand, when ships 
from SEA sailed westwards, they tended to call into major ports like Nagapatnam, 
Porto Novo and Masulipatnam on the east coast of India, as well as Cambay, Calicut, 
Surat and Goa on India’s west coast before continuing to the Red Sea and the Persian 
Gulf. Malaysia–India’s effective maritime communication in the EIOR occurred 
largely as a result of this longstanding factor. 
Another factor that goes hand in hand with geographical conditions is the 
dynamics of the monsoon in the IOR. In the words of a climatologist, ‘nowhere else 
on the globe is the annual reversal of wind and rainfall regimes as spectacular as in 
the realm of the Indian Ocean and surrounding land areas’ (Arasaratnam1994: 1). 
The mariners of the east coast of India were aware of the monsoon winds and 
currents, and used them for maritime trade; hence the maritime trade from India to 
Southeast Asia was a seasonal phenomenon (Tripati 2011: 1076). During the 
summer (May to September) the southwest monsoon blows in a north-easterly 
direction over southern India, crossing Sri Lanka into the Bay of Bengal and heading 
for the northern part of the Malay peninsula. In winter (November to March), the 
northwest monsoon blows in the opposite direction, from the northern part of the 
Malay peninsula south-westwards, towards the Arabian Sea. Voyages between east 
and west were dependent on these wind conditions, and ships naturally tended to 
stop at certain ports, such as Malacca on the Malay peninsula. 
Eastbound Indian traders would thus cross the IOR, then stop on the west coast 
of the Malay peninsula. Westbound Indian traders sailing from the East would stay 
in Malacca until January, and ships from China would stop at Malacca in November 





junks had to stay on that coast and so this location was used as a transit point, 
convenient for sailors and merchants to anchor their ships in a safe and tranquil 
harbour and to prepare them for continuing their voyages to India or across the South 
China Sea. It is worth stressing that wind conditions could be quoted as a factor 
fundamental to the beginning of the cross-cultural bonds between India and Malaya; 
ships from India would wait for several months in Malayan ports and this led them to 
build local settlements, soon turning into cosmopolitan centres and ports. 
For example, during the late 18th century, vessels would make the journey from 
Madras to Penang, on the Malay coast, in eight days during the southwest monsoon 
(Tripati 2011: 4). Such voyages led to the rise of Penang as a crucial trading port 
between Malaya and India during the imperial era. Similar manoeuvres led to the 
rise of Kedah, Perak and Johor. The various merchants from Coromandel, Malabar, 
Madras, Surat, Calicut, and Cambay at these local settlements communicated by 
means of a local lingua franca and also intermarried with the women of the local 
communities. This created new ethnic and cultural groups, adding more intriguing 
features to an already complex trading society (Hussin 2007: 5). Voyages that had 
started purely on the basis of trade soon grew into a stronger cross-cultural bond 
between Malaya and India. 
Increasing trade contacts with other trading communities also fostered maritime 
links between the Indian subcontinent and the Malay peninsula. But India’s 
civilisation had a wider influence as well – the cross-cultural links between India and 
China, both economically and culturally, formed a strong bond between the two 
nations. During the second century CE, these two civilisations conducted trade 
overland; a route connecting India and China wended its way through Assam, Upper 
Burma, and Yunan (Coedes 1968: 28–29). 
Although these land routes were well used, traders perceived the road between 
India and China via the Tibetan plateau as difficult, and so they began to search for 
new trade routes. Water routes were not only cheaper but were also a form of 
transportation that was believed to be more safe and tranquil. This resulted in India 
venturing through water routes across the IOR towards the east, and its discovery of 
the SEA seas, the Straits of Sunda and SOM, the latter being a safe midway between 





Map 3: Summer and Winter Monsoon Wind   Pattern 
 
Source:  geogonline.org.uk 
The high demand for natural resources and  luxury goods also explains  the driving  
force for Indian traders to go to the Malay Archipelago. The Indians’ obsession with 
gold arises from its being seen as a symbol of wealth. At an early stage, Indian 
merchants were obtaining gold from the Sumerians, the Persians, the Egyptians and    
the Roman Empire. However, as the supply of gold diminished in those places, India 
searched for alternative supplies and eventually saw the Malay world as  the 
transcendent Land of Gold. The (probable)  definition of  Sumatra as Suvarnadvipa,   
the island of gold, was a magnet for many Indian   merchants. 
 







In addition to gold, it was the abundance of spices in Malaya and Indonesia that 
attracted Indian merchants. India clustered its trading partners according to 
commodity cartels. For example, in the islands of SEA grows an abundance of spices 
such as cloves, cardamom and nutmeg. There are other islands, such as Karpuradvipa 
(probably Borneo), which produced camphor; Takkola, perhaps present-day Phuket 
on the north-west of the Malay peninsula, which produced cardamom (Sikri 2013: 4); 
Narikeladvipa, the island of coconut palms; and Yavodvipa, the island of barley, 
possibly near Java. The distinction between the regions based on the commodity 
cartels explains India’s economic interest in the Malay world. But the Indian 
merchants were not the only ones interested in Malaya’s luxury goods and spices; 
there were Chinese merchants as well, and traders from the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf 
and the West. Hence India, whilst making contacts to obtain these commodities, acted 
at the same time as an intermediary between the eastern world and the western world 
for the purpose of such trades. These led to the Indian merchants dominating the 
trading links at the Malayan ports, and building strong maritime bonds between these 
entities. 
 
3.3 India in the Early Malay World 
Historian K. N. Chaudhuri argued there was a strong impression in the minds of 
contemporaries, sensed by later historians, that the ocean had its own unique and 
distinct sphere of influence (Chaudhuri 1985: 3). Malaya–India maritime relations 
also had their own sense of unity. Linking elements that snowballed from natural 
features such as climate and geographical proximity to movements of people with a 
curiosity to connect, and with economic interests, searches for power, religion and 
language, kindled this unity. In addition, maritime connectivity between the two 
states grew on a positive path, Malayans perceiving India as the holy land of 
Hinduism and Buddhism, and Indians perceiving Malaya as the land of gold. In the 
long run, these positive feelings were another factor that led to the strong maritime 
bond between Malaya and India. 
Maritime expeditions between Malaya and India had existed before  the   15
th
 
century, and were a scene of successful trading activities. Around the 11
th 
century, 
the Fatimids of Egypt concentrated on the maritime activities around the Persian 
Gulf and the Red Sea. The sailors of the concurrent Song dynasty of China were, 





regional maritime powers around the IOR, the Kingdom of  Rajaraja  Chola  of 
southern India had been establishing maritime contacts around the SEA region from 
985CE. In 1025, thirteen ports on the Malay peninsula, Sumatra and the Nicobar 
Islands, were raided by the South Indian navy under Rajendra Chola (Prakash and 
Lombard 1999:  19). The Chola supremacy in the lands of SEA is a notable story in  
the maritime history of the Indian Ocean, as even during those ancient times, the 
Cholas mounted an impressive naval expedition to   SEA. 
After establishing outlier ports on the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts, Rajendara 
Chola, son of Rajaraja Chola, expanded his  maritime  powers  by conquering Srivijaya 
in 1020, raiding Tamralinga, known as the Kingdom of Ligor, (now part of Thailand) 
and eventually dominating the SOM and Sunda Straits. The involvement  of Chola in 
Srivijaya later facilitated  their  smooth naval intervention  into Kadaram (present-day 
Kedah) in 1068. The Cholas were not, however, the only early power; the Kingdom 
of Pagan (in present-day Myanmar) was perceived as an equal  competitor  to the 
Chola  Kingdom  in the  mid-11
th  
century,  and  rose to be a glorious power by the 12
th 
century. By that time, the Cholas’ maritime expeditions were focusing on the southern 
part of India and were intervening in Ceylon and the Maldives. 
 
Map 5: Raja Chola’s Maritime Influence in Southeast   Asia 
 
Source:  commons.wikimedia.org 
It was certain that before the arrival of European powers, merchants of Gujarat, 





peninsula, establishing themselves as the pioneer traders in the EIOR. These traders 
were Muslims and Hindus, coming to Indonesia in search of spices. During this time, 
the Gujarati traders alone reached the figure of 1000, accompanied by 4–5000 sailors 
(Chaudhuri 1985: 112). The people of Coromandel had a better knowledge of the IOR 
around the Malay–Indonesian islands than anyone else in the subcontinent 
(Chaudhuri 1985: 124). 
In the search for Indonesian spices, Gujarati traders would usually sail through 
the Straits of Sunda, to the port of Grise in northern Java. Ships leaving Melaka bore 
a wide range of traders, including Arabs, Persians and Turks, and predominantly 
Mughals, calling at Kedah, Tenasserim, Pegu and Aceh. Another group of merchants 
consisted   of  Gujarati  Bania  and   Muslims;  around  the  13
th  
century,  they      were 
dominant in the export of cotton textiles, indigo and grain, commodities which they 
traded to the Malay Archipelago. Other items included cardamom, pepper, ginger 
and cinnamon from the Malabar Coast. The Gujarati merchants would then bring 
back spices from Sumatran islands such as cloves, nutmeg and mace, plus dyes and 
gums, with Port Pase and Pedie being the first ports of call (Arasaratnam 1994: 38). 
Commercial exchanges were made at Cambay and Calicut, and items were re- 
packaged and re-exported to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. 
The Gujaratis had of course discovered the SOM very early on. It became a 
crucial link between the Indian maritime trading network and the eastern trading 
network. The SOM was a strategic port for the trade between India and China 
relating to Indonesian spices such as nutmeg and mace from the Banda islands and 
cloves from Amboina, Ceram and Moluccas, and grain from Java (Gupta 1994: 410). 
The SOM was a vital link between the Indian and eastern trading networks, 
providing a network for commercial exchanges with China, Sumatra and India up to 
Cambay. At the same time, SOM acted as a safe haven during the annual monsoon 
season. 
The founding of Melaka in the SOM rapidly replaced the Sunda Straits (between 
Sumatra and Java) as the gateway into the Malay world. The co-existing pivotal role 
of the Gujaratis in the sphere soon became more powerful, with the establishment of 
Melaka as an entrepôt. The founding of Malacca by the Gujarati merchants elevated 
India’s position in the SOM to the point of supremacy. As a result, in the 15th 
century Gujarati traders played a signal role in the expanding and ever more 





the Islamic world and Europe. The SOM formed the central international trading 
emporium. 
All the trading activities at the SOM – from commercial exchange to the re- 
packaging of a huge bulk of goods, ship-repair services and the re-export of 
commodities to other destinations – were conducted by Gujaratis, and indeed 
dominated by them. In addition to controlling the trading activities of the SOM, the 
Gujarati merchants protected the strait with an armed flotilla, to help the safe 
navigation of the many ships, as well as to protect the environment during trading 
activities. The similar port establishments at Calicut and Cambay on the Malabar 
Coast are evidence of strong Indian elements in their trading system with the Malay 
world; Calicut, Cambay and Malacca were designated to support long-distance trade 
covering the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and eastwards from Malacca (Arasaratnam 1994: 
35-36). 
As all three ports were believed to stimulate trading activities, and as Melaka 
was clearly the linchpin between the Indonesian, Indian and Muslim worlds – no less 
than 84 languages were spoken in this port – it was dominant like no other trading 
place of the IOR. The Chinese brought salt in exchange for Indian textiles and spices 
from  Indonesia.  Junks  called  in  there  for  maintenance  before  continuing their 
voyages to India. These dynamics constitute an answer to Tom Pires’ question as to 
how an obscure port without any natural resources could become in the 15
th 
century 
the halfway house in the trade between China, Japan, and SEA and India 
(Arasaratnam 1994: 110). 
By  the  end  of  the  15
th  
century,  as  Malacca  rose  to  become  an     established 
maritime port and major trading power was in the Gujarati community. Gujarati 
commercial interest was dominant in Malacca, with 1000 merchants domiciled in the 
port and a few thousand more people providing support in various marine and 
service activities (Arasaratnam 1994: 35-36). To intensify Gujarati supremacy in 
Malacca, the Gujaratis appointed a highly efficient administrator, Syahbandar, to 
manage trade business and other work such as law and order, the organisation of 
ships with various goods for different destinations, and the welfare of merchants, as 
well as the security and safety of the ports. There was also a custom judge who 
would assemble a panel of ten merchants, of which five were from Kalinganas 
(Southern India). Their roles were to value merchandise, manage the quality control 





great influence in the internal politics of Malaya, where they could advise on 
political issues and trade policies. A contemporary Portuguese chronicler says that it 
was Gujarati merchants who persuaded Sultan Mohammad to attack the Portuguese 
fleet under Lopes do Sequeira in 1509, and when Alfonso Albuquerque attacked the 
port, he saw Gujarati vessels fighting the Portuguese (Arasaratnam 1994: 39). 
The Malabar merchants were also believed to be involved in long-distance 
trading to the SEA region, and in fact they were described as being present there 
earlier than the Gujaratis, but their role was overtaken by the latter due to 
geographical considerations given that the Malabar Coast was relatively exposed to 
the Arab world. However, the Malabari merchants took a different approach in 
engaging with the Malay world; direct political involvement was acquired through 
intermarriage by Malabar merchant families intermarrying with Arab ones, the 
Malabari Muslims of Mapillahs and Tamil Muslims even marrying into the Malay 
royal families. 
Similarly, the Chulia merchants from the Coromandel Coast sailed around the 
Malay peninsula with textiles as their staple commodities. They included the Telugu 
and Tamil Chetti families, such as the Balija Chettis, the Beri Chettis, the Komatties 
and the Kayalpatnam, whose members later integrated with the local community. 
The Chulia Muslims from southern Coromandel were found in places such as Port 
Novo, Masulipatnam, Nagore, Karikal, Pondicherry, Nagapatnam, Thondy, Killare 
and Cuddalore, and they traded actively in the Malay peninsula. The principal port of 
Coromandel was Pulicat, linked via Tirupati and Penukonda to the imperial city of 
Vinayanagar to the northwest (Prakash 2004: 448). 
The Chulia Muslims had also formed close links with Tamil Hindu states such 
as Madura, Thanjavur, Ramnad and Maraikkar, establishing a good trade 
relationship with the SEA region. The diversity in the Coromandel community of the 
10
th 
century led the Arabs to call the Chulias the Chola Muslims, to differentiate 
them from other ethnic groups. Another ethnic group was the Bengali merchants, 
who were both Hindu and Muslim, arriving in the Malay world with expensive 






3.4 The Imperial Eras of the European P o w e r s  
Prior to European intervention, the Malayan community had already established a good 
relationship with the Indian merchants. The various merchant communities coming 
from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds, religion and  culture  were welcomed with 
open arms, and both regions encouraged all merchants to conduct free trade. Indian 
merchants had control over the trading network of EIOR but neither sought nor imposed 
any form of law over shipping movements or indeed any taxation   of commodities. No 
change of policy took place; instead the traditional maritime interaction continued to 
benefit all participants in trading activities in the EIOR. The Indian trade with Malaya 
was basically a means of economic   survival. 
But the accord by which no power would seek monopoly or dominance over the 
maritime trading system of EIOR was challenged by the arrival of the European 
powers. Early in the 16
th 
century, a power vacuum arose, and when the Portuguese 
arrived this vacuum allowed them to intrude into the trading network between the 
two regions. The influx of the Portuguese soon attracted  other European  powers  –  
the Dutch, the English, the French and the Danish were drawn in as if by a magnet, 
thus turning the EIOR into a competitive territory for economic and political 
supremacy. 
 







3.41 The Arrival of the Portuguese 
The arrival of Portuguese ships with Vasco da Gama at Calicut on 20
th 
May 1498 
marked the dawn of a new era in the history of Euro-Asian contacts in general and of 
trade in particular between the two continents (Prakash 1998: 23). It was initially 
claimed that the Portuguese voyages to the SEA region were motivated by three G’s – 
God, Gold and Glory (Sar Desai 1969: 501). However, Portugal’s maritime interest 
was unambiguous – the monopoly of the spice trade – and the Portuguese intended to 
achieve this by the use of naval force. This can be clearly comprehended by noting 
the ports that flew the Portuguese flag, such as Colombo (1505), Socotra (1507), Goa 
(1510), Malacca (1511), Hormuz (1515) and Diu (1535). 
On dropping anchor at Calicut, the Portuguese were impressed by the abundance 
of cloves, nutmeg, mace, pepper, sandalwood, camphor, gold, tin and precious 
stones from various parts of the Malay Archipelago, such as Sumatra, Borneo, the 
Moluccas, and mainland Malaya and (the then) Myanmar. The Portuguese also 
appreciated the high profit that they could make from having a monopoly on these 
items, not to mention the power that they gained by controlling the major routes of 
these spices. At the start of  the 16
th 
century, it was    Indian merchants who dominated 
all the major ports, but the urge to monopolise and profit from the flourishing trade 
encouraged the Portuguese to gain a toehold at Malacca. Soon, Portuguese voyages 
were being made with the help of a Tamil Kaling, a merchant from the Coromandel 
Coast, and in 1511 Malacca, the major transit point, fell into the hands of the 
Portuguese. 
Upon their conquest of Malacca, the Portuguese took charge immediately. They 
imposed a specific maritime policy to ensure their complete control of the trade 
between Malaya and India. Their cartaz-armada-qafila system (Chaudhury nd: 10) 
in particular was believed to have the greatest effect on traders on the traditional 
routes between Malaya and India. A cartaz was a passbook containing the name of 
the captain, the crew and the types of commodities carried, as well as the destination 
decided by the Portuguese authorities. The owner of this voyage would owe customs 
duty for the items carried. The qalifa system was a process whereby the ships on 
voyage under the cartaz system were escorted in convoys – armadas – by Portuguese 
flotillas. This was a direct attempt to ensure that the ships could not escape from 
paying the Portuguese duty. This situation did not, however, damage the maritime 





passes system introduced by the Portuguese. It did not win hearts and minds among 
either the Indian merchants or the Malay traders. 
The Mughal traders had established a strong friendship with the orang kaya 
(royalty) of Aceh, who also had strong family ties with Malaya. This acquaintance 
allowed the Gujaratis to utilise the royal family ties within the Malay Archipelago to 
ensure that their political influence and economic partnership would remain 
dominant over the incursive Portuguese. The strong foundation that had been built 
thousands of years earlier fostered great friendship between Malaya and India such 
that their trading partnership was seen to be appreciated irrespective of the new order 
of law, which was of benefit only to the Portuguese economy. 
In the mid-16
th 
century, the Portuguese intensified their efforts to gain monopoly 
and dominance by offering incentives to the Coramandel Hindu Chettis to counter 
the Gujarati strategy of redirecting trade to the Spice Islands. The Hindus of 
Coromandel cooperated with the Portuguese, and this allowed them to enjoy 
Portuguese protection, including naval support for their voyages in the Malay world. 
The strategy adopted by the Hindu Coromandel merchants was thus in complete 
contrast to that of the Mughals, instead taking advantage of their conquest of 
Malacca to further expand their trade into the Malay Archipelago by engaging with 
the Portuguese to whom they would otherwise have had to pay high prices for tolls 
and passes. The maritime links between the Hindu Coromandel and the Malay world 
was vital for the economic survival of both regions. A similar scenario was seen with 
the Hindu Chetties from Coromandel and the Konkanis from Malabar. However, 
these groups of merchants did not at any point lose their maritime connections with 
the Malay world. Their weak maritime power led them to fall under the shadow of 
the Portuguese who had a relatively stronger naval arsenal, but with Portuguese 
protection, they continued to be part of the traditional trading activities of EIOR. 
Clear changes did take place with the arrival of the Portuguese in both Malaya 
and India. The Portuguese landings at Goa and Malacca led to the reinvention of new 
trade communications, with concentrations in the Sunda Strait and the Red Sea. 
Ports such as Surat, Cambay and Calicut were renovated for their political and 
economic gain. The distribution of merchant communities was slightly adjusted to 
accord with Portuguese preferences as well as the imposition of taxation, duty 
payments and the passes system under the cartaz-armada-qalifa system, resulting in 





Panikkar called the arrival of the Portuguese the ‘western dominance’ (Panikkar 
1953) of the maritime environment of the IOR. Van Leur asserted that the belligerent 
activity of the Portuguese had by the close of the 16
th 
century become one more 
thread in the fabric of the international exchange of goods in the Indian Ocean (Van 
Leur 1956: 776–778). Such debates propose that the Portuguese appearance in  the 
EIOR did impact the overall IOR trading paradigm, triggering new strands of 
argument in the literature on Malay–Indian maritime relations in the 16
th 
century. 
Nevertheless, the maritime relations between Malaya and India were not 
tarnished, and scholars of this academic field of study still investigate the strong 
relationship between Malaya and India. Scholars such as J. C. Van Leur, Niels 
Steensgaards, and C. R. Boxer, who wrote substantial work on the role of the 
Portuguese in Malacca, uphold one point strongly: the Portuguese were unable   to 
dominate, control or even diminish the dominant role of the Mughals in the spice 
trade between India and Malaya.
12 
Their relationship remained undiminished, and 
still remains important; Portuguese imperialism was never powerful enough to 
unlock the strong bonds of rapport between Malaya and India. The Portuguese did to 
some extent manage to impose a taxation system, but it did not make much 
difference to the maritime policy of the EIOR, resulting in Portugal’s agreement to 
the supremacy of the Gujaratis and other major Indian merchants. M. N. Person once 
stated that he saw the role of the Portuguese as irrelevant (Pearson 1987: 71–93). It 
is therefore clear that the Portuguese impact on the co-existing maritime relations 
between India and Malaya was minimal. 
 
3.42 Enter the Dutch 
The Portuguese trade monopoly led the Dutch and the English to make their first 
voyages to the Malay world in the early 17
th 
century. The voyage of Vasco da Gama 
had opened up the IOR to many other European countries seeking a foothold, such as 
the French, the Swedish, and the Danish. There were also the French in the form of 
the Compagnie Perpetuelle des Indes (East India Company), the Dutch in the form of 





12 This argument was drawn from Van Leur 1956: 776–778, Niels Steensgaard 1974 and Boxer 1969: 415-428. 
13 Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) - United East India Company - was a chartered company 
established in 1602, when the States General of the Netherlands granted it a 21-year monopoly to carry out 




the English in the form of the East India Company (EIC),
14 
which did manage to 
make significant changes despite the continuity of the Malaya–India maritime links. 
The arrival of these powers led to strong competition between the Portuguese, 
the Dutch and the English, all striving to become the dominant maritime power of 




centuries. The Dutch did impact the 
Malaya–India trade system to a much greater degree than the Portuguese, and  this 
had huge implications on the status of Malacca as an entrepôt. The situation did not, 
however, reduce the Indian merchants’ maritime involvement in Malaya. The Indian 
merchants and the Malay world found innovative ways of staying connected and 
indeed strengthening their maritime relationship. In fact, the competition was more 
between the various European powers for the hegemonic role of the EIOR trading 
structure. 
In 1607, the VOC sent its first expedition to Surat. The presence of a European 
power with the same economic and political interests led to a series of conflicts and 
power struggles with the Indian merchants who, not unnaturally, wished to maintain 
their presence in the Malay world. Ships that tried to sail to Perak or Kedah from 
India without calling at Malacca would have to pay a 10 per cent toll on their goods 
to Portuguese merchants. Some Mughal merchants even tried sailing to Johor, but a 
similar policy was implemented whereby the VOC persuaded the Sultan of Johor to 
ban Indian shipping in the southern sphere of Malaya. 
The arrival of the Dutch at Surat and their frequent voyages to Malacca and 
Sumatra allowed them to control cloves and nutmeg from the 1620s. In addition, in 
around the 1630s, the Mughal Empire was undergoing a terrible famine due to the 
high prices charged by the trading companies on crucial commodities, as well as 
food scarcity among consumers and the public. The Dutch, who had already 
conquered Malacca and taken the Spice Islands in the Malay Archipelago, utilised 
this delicate situation to their benefit. This generated the Mughals’ downfall in 
respect of freedom of navigation. 
The Dutch attempted to impose a pass system to restrict and control the volume 
of Gujarati ships and at the same time to redirect these items from Malacca, to 
ensure full control over the trading of textiles. To impose even greater authority, the 
 
14 The East India Company (EIC) was originally chartered as the Governor and Company of Merchants of London 





Dutch signed treaties with the local rulers of important trading points, such as the 
Governor of Malacca, and other lesser rulers, such as the Raja of Kedah and the local 
Governor of Ujang Selang. For example the first treaty signed with the ruler of 
Kedah in June 1642 stated that ships coming from Surat, Bengal and other regions to 
Kedah must hold Dutch passes (Arasaratnam 1994: 70). 
The overwhelming imposition of the pass system toppled the Mughal traders 
from their position as the dominant free traders of the region (Arasaratnam 1994: 
71), resulting in the revolts of the Mughals against the Dutch to save their long-held 
maritime agreement with the Malaya community. Complaints were filed against the 
VOC, and Gujaratis seized the goods arriving at Surat, as well as their factories 
there, to supplement and compensate for the loss caused by the Dutch tariff policies. 
The Dutch re-joined by seizing the ships and goods at Malacca, Perak, Kedah and 
Ujang Selang – all the crucial trading ports – and in fact managed to continue sailing 
to Surat while maintaining their blockade of the Malaya ports. They also tried to 
attract vessels arriving in Malacca by providing other valuable goods, to help destroy 
the spice monopoly held by the Mughals. 
However, it was impossible to overturn the Mughal monopoly on spices from 
the Malay world, let alone their dominant role of intermediary between the Indian 
subcontinent and the Malay world. By the mid-17
th 
century, despite various 
strategies to overturn the Mughal supremacy in the EIOR, the Dutch realised that the 
strong maritime relationship between Malaya and India was impossible to dismantle 
or rather take charge of through any form of force. This situation led to the signing 
of a treaty between the Dutch and the Mughals in 1659. In 1660, the Dutch released 
tariff policies, which were believed to be a failure, and passes were soon given 
without any restriction in Surat to Aceh, Perak, Kedah, Malacca, Johor and  Perak. 
Trade in Malacca, which had slowed, rapidly picked up again. By the end of the 17
th
 
century, there was a certain expansion of Gujarati commerce. In the Sunda and the 
Malacca Straits, several ports were constructed in good anchorages such as at Johor, 
Kedah and Perak. A saudagar raya (royal merchant) existed among the Mughals 
who were believed to have strong authority in the state administration deciding on 
maritime policies. They had access to the political system of the states and at various 
other levels of administration, for solving maritime disputes and problems. Even in 
conducting routine business manoeuvres and decisions, the local merchants sought 





the role of middlemen or brokers on market information, and sheriffs, and financiers, 
among others. 
Another group of merchants that had to cope with the monopoly of the Dutch in 
Malaya were the Coromandel merchants. The rise of tin as a new commodity, later 
emerging as a crucial trade item, was seen coming from Johor, Perak and Kedah. 
Perak in particular grew greatly due to its tin production. The Dutch established a 
watchpost in Pulau Dinding near the Perak River to monitor the trade of tin in Perak. 
However, the Chulias countered the Dutch tactics by establishing direct contact with 
all the crucial ports around Dutch Malacca, and bringing tin back to Perak. The 
Dutch responded by restricting most commodities and tin from Perak and Kedah. A 
Coromandel merchant caught carrying tin would be redirected to Malacca and forced 
to pay taxes. Half of the products produced or brought in from outside had to be sold 
to the Dutch at a lower price. 
The Dutch also signed treaties with Ujang Selang in 1643 and Bangery in 1645. 
These treaties affected the trade between Coromandel and Kedah. However, they 
constituted only a temporary success for the Dutch, the trade agreements between the 
rulers and the VOC suffering from various contradictions and misconceptions. The 
treaties turned out to be more in the interests of the VOC than those of the Malaya 
rulers, and as the Coromandel merchants soon began to sail to all the places 
restricted by the Dutch and found that the treaties had neither any reasonable 
treatment of trade nor enticement for trade, the treaties came to a dead end. 
The Chulias, like the Mughal officials, failed to complain against the Dutch sea 
blockades and maritime policies. The Chulias were seen as more rebellious than the 
Gujaratis when a Dutch soldier in Ujang Selang was murdered in an altercation over 
the tin trade (Arasaratnam 1994: 134). There was an important maritime battle 
around the mid-1670s when the VOC tried to intrude into the ports in Coromandel 
and west Malaya, dismantling the trade between these two points. The presence of 
the EIC, the French and the Danish were utilised to balance the maritime game in the 
EIOR. These European powers, unlike the Dutch, were willing to use the pass 
system, and even to voyage in convoys, ensuring safe navigation between Malaya 
and Coromandel. 
Around  the 18
th  
century, the strong  maritime links between  Malaya and     India 
were increasing. Kedah in particular rose as a crucial entrepôt, with huge settlements 





Cuddalore, Nagore and Mylapore, carrying textiles (from Thanjavur and south 
Arcot) and spices – particularly nutmeg and cloves – and tin, elephants, horses, and 
ivory. The direct trading by the Chulias with these western ports of the Malay 
peninsula allowed them to be directly involved in the Kedah administration as well 
as securing political support from the sultans and rajas of these states. The Chulias 
drew closer to Malay royalty and also to the powerful orang kaya (rich merchants) 
of the ports. The Indian merchants managed to obtain administrative positions in 
court, managing the rulers’ trade and shipping. In the Malay sultanate, an official 
saudagar raya was manager of the Sultan’s trade, where there were settlers in the 
Kedah and Johor rivers (Arasaratnam 1994: 137). Such officials were so   involved 
that by the end of the 18
th 
century, the Malay sultanate was seen to be expanding on 
various positions in the local administration. Thus, the Dutch rule actually resulted in 
the Malay–Coromandel maritime link being strengthened. 
Trade with Bengal was in particular seen as an advantage to the VOC Company. 
Bengal had a profitable bulk of cotton that could be obtained at a cheap price, as well 
as raw silk which was in great demand in the European markets. Another interesting 
product was gunpowder (Sushil Chaudhury nd: 10) which was of great value given 
that much of Europe was at war. Gunpowder was a product of importance even to 
the EIC Company, leading the Dutch to build factories in Bengal around the mid-16
th 
century. The trade with Bengal was positive – but the trade relationship between 
Malaya and India did not change. 
The Dutch imposition of a similar taxation and pass system onto the Bengali 
ships was not, of course, in favour of Bengali traders. Soon, they too were avoiding 
the Dutch. The Bengali merchants had also become involved with local state 
officials, creating strong political links with the communities of the Malay world to 
sustain their maritime relationship. Dutch control over the SOM and Sumatran 
waters weakened when the Anglo-Dutch war ignited, and also with the entry of a 
new European power, the French, spreading their power with their navy in around 
the 1670s, establishing their position in Masulipatnam under Francois Martin.  The 
Gujarati, Coromandel and Bengali merchants used this distraction to their advantage, 
strengthening their maritime ties with the Malay world. By the end of the 18
th 
century, the Dutch lost their grip on the control of the trade between Malaya and 






3.43 British Entry 
The Dutch commercial control over staple commodities threatened the commercial 
success of the British, who soon began to seek a new port. They saw that establishing 
trade interest with the Chinese would be a platform that could help facilitate their 
trade interest in Malaya. So in the mid-18
th 
century, the EIC and several private 
traders began to make contact with the Chinese. The EIC wanted to secure its 
maritime and trade interests to counter the control of Dutch in the ports of the western 
Malay peninsula. In addition, the EIC needed a post to utilise as a naval base in the 
archipelago, and to stem the growing power of the Dutch in the Malay peninsula 
(Cowan n.d: 3). 
After an exhaustive search at the Bay of Bengal, with a major focus on Aceh and 
the Andaman Islands, and with a negotiation with the Kedah ruler, Francis Light 
began searching in SOM, and finally in 1786 the opening of the port of Penang by 
the Prince of Wales took place. The significance of Penang as a major British port 
was due to its location adjacent to Malacca, which covered the major trade between 
Coromandel and Malaya. Penang is also located close to Thailand and Burma, 
facilitating trade with the Indian subcontinent. After great efforts had been made by 
Francis Light to build the reputation of Penang as entrepôt in rivalry to Malacca, the 
opening of Penang marked the British rise in the Malay world. The British took 
advantage of Dutch attention to the Bugis’ intrusion in Riau, and penetrated into 
areas in Malaya where the Dutch did not have control. As a result, by the 1770s, the 
British completely dominated the India–Malaya trading network. 
As the Dutch held Malacca, and the British held Penang, the competition was 
primarily between these two European powers. It did not change or reduce the scale 
of the trade or indeed the links between Malaya and India. The Coromandel Chulias 
saw the opening of Penang as an opportunity to counterbalance the Dutch dominance 
in Malacca with their pass system. So the Chulias began to link up Coromandel ports 
such as Proto Novo, Nagore and Nagapatnam, with Penang. Before the founding of 
Penang, the Chulias had conducted trade in the Bay of Bengal, and with the opening 
of Penang the trade intensity grew stronger and more frequent. A large number of 
Chulias began settling in Penang and establishing contact with the local people. A 





By the late 18
th 
century, following the British settlement on the island of 
Penang, the Chulias were the third largest population there, after the Chinese and 
Malays. The Chulias were involved in lower social order occupations, such as shop 
keeping, peddling, poultry rearing, a coolie harbour on the waterfront and as crews 
on ships (Arasaratnam 1999: 320). In 1788, most of the Chulias who had settled in 
Malaya were in Kedah, where most of them intermarried with local Malays and were 
well integrated into the local society. 
It is quite clear that the traditional trade between Malaya and India continued to 
exist throughout the British presence in the EIOR. Items such as tin, opium, gold, 
textiles and grain remained as staple commodities in Malacca during the second 
quarter of the 19
th 
century. Although the items were limited, the role of Malacca as 
the redistribution port that it had become during the 15
th 
century was still 
maintained. The brief Dutch administration over Malacca between 1818 and  1824 
did not change the trading system between Malaya and India, nor indeed the items 
themselves; no longer did any change take place when Malacca fell to the British. 
Malacca under the British still maintained contact with Indian ports such as Bombay, 
Calcutta and Madras. The only difference was the reduction in the volume of trade 
due to the rise of Penang, when Indian merchants shifted from Malacca to Penang, 
turning it into an entrepôt identical to that of Malacca. 
Indian traders from Bombay, Madras, Nagore, Coromandel and Bengal were 
seen coming to Penang, especially the pioneer Moors and Chulias. The Chulia 
merchants, believed to be coming from Kedah, were seen trading in Penang. This 
shows that the relationship between Malaya and India still continued, the only 
change being that the trading routes differed slightly in the sense that British ships 
were seen coming to Penang from Pulicat, Madras, Calcutta and Bombay. Due to 
their geographical proximity, ports in the northern part of the Malay peninsula such 
as Perak, Kedah and Ligor were actively conducting trade with Penang. Tin from 
Perak and rice as well as poultry from Kedah led Penang to become a focal point of 
trading voyages from India. 
The British attempt to endow Penang with a free trade policy gave the Indian 
merchants an advantage to utilise this situation to their benefit. The Dutch, who had 
hitherto held the tin trade in their monopolistic grip through a system of trade treaties 
with the tin-producing areas of the peninsula, such as Perak and Selangor, gradually 





prices and encouraged the smuggling of tin to Penang (Newbold nd: 180). The Dutch 
and Portuguese pass policy was rapidly counterbalanced by the British free trade 
policy, reducing the importance of Dutch Malacca. As part and parcel of their 
programme to promote Penang as a vital port in the East, the British also encouraged 
Malacca’s residents to migrate to Penang by reducing taxes and transforming Penang 
into an entrepôt (Hussin 2007: 108). The rivalry between the Dutch and the British 
accelerated and an aggressive trading policy as well as anti-Dutch propaganda were 
adopted. British captains would go around the area singing the praises of Penang and 
predicting the ruin of Malacca; and a statement appeared in the Calcutta newspapers 
asserting that the establishment of Penang was to avenge the Amboyna ‘massacre’ 
(Arasaratnam nd: 181). 
This scenario was to the Indian traders’ advantage and soon a large number of 
Chulia merchants were seen migrating to Penang, setting up settlements there and 
conducting trade. The free trade policy was considered a success both for the EIC 
Company and for the Indian Chulias to continue their trade with the Malay world. 
Long voyages were less visible between India and Penang, although they did not 
cease altogether – instead, there were many short voyages carrying Indian goods 
along the west coast of Malaya, for example Kedah–Penang and Malacca–Penang, 
also Perlis and Larut. In the early 19
th 
century, Penang held a great volume of these 
goods, which had already found a steady market in India. From 1806 to 1818, trade 
increased and Penang became an important centre for opium, tin, Indian textiles and 
pepper (Cowan nd: 86). 
The continuous British pressure over two decades led to the withdrawal of the 
Dutch from Malacca, shifting their focus southwards, to the Malay Archipelago. The 
British took over Malacca soon after the departure of the Dutch, but the port did not 
thrive as it had in the 15
th 
century. Also, the initial idea of building Penang as a naval 
base and shipbuilding port was rethought in view of the idea of commercial 
exchanges reaching the Chinese market. The uncertain aim contributed to the decline 
of Penang as a port. The British were also interested in building another new 
entrepôt, Singapore, which soon led to the establishment of the Straits Settlements in 
1826 under the EIC, became an official Crown Colony in 1867. Even in this 
situation, the maritime links between Malaya and India still continued, as the many 
major commodities, which were the major focus of these European powers, were 





In sum, the occupation by the European powers in fact only strengthened the 
maritime relationship between Malaya and India. The success in the use of force to 
dominate the trade between Malaya and India was a lesson learnt; they would need 
to be prepared in the future in terms of maritime defence. More crucially, however, 
both countries now appreciated each other to a deeper extent than the already co- 
existing maritime bond concealed within their deep-rooted cultural ties. Philip Curtin 
developed the concept of merchants’ diaspora to explain the functioning of the cross- 
cultural trade over the centuries. Although this concept was believed to have limited 
applicability to the trade of the EIOR in the 17
th 
century, this particular cross-cultural 
trade was the leading and core reason for the continuous strong bond between 
Malaya and India despite European intervention. This strong bond was not built 
overnight, but over centuries. It may therefore be concluded that the Malaya–India 
maritime nexus is a good case of sociocultural assimilation. 
 
3.5 Malaysia–India Maritime Relations: The Cold War Period (1945–1990) 
This section aims to analyse the maritime cooperation of Malaysia and India during 
the Cold War period. This era was a critical component of Malaysia–India maritime 
policy as it is a timeframe where the long-standing relationship between Malaya and 
India underwent a brief interval due to the exigencies of the Cold War. What was the 
cause of that intermission? Did either or both of the countries make any efforts to 
ensure that their relationship would be sustained? An assessment of this intermission 
will shed light on maritime policy between both regions after the end of World War II 
(WW II). 
During the Cold War, most newly independent countries did not involve 
themselves with military pacts, in order to avoid entanglement in the competition 
between the big powers. However for the purpose of self-defence, military build-ups 
were often undertaken and India – with one of the largest populations in the world – 
was no exception. Driven by its exit from a colonial power, the India government 
understood the need to have considerable maritime strength to protect its long 
coastline. Hence, India was interested in building a fully-fledged maritime structure, 
and in its aspiration to be a regional power in the South Asia Region, it reinforced its 





3.51 Self- Sufficient Maritime Strategy (1947–1961) 
Prior to independence, the RIN had relied on the British Royal Navy (BRN). From 
1945 until the mid-1960s, the RIN did not have an independent structure; its roles and 
functions were based on and determined by the British. The initial role of RIN was 
confined to coastal defence, with just one naval base in Bombay and basic navy 
training undertaken in England. 
As India began preparing itself for independence, economic development 
became the major agenda of its foreign policy. The devastating occupation of the 
British in India had led to poor economic conditions, and reorganisation of economic 
and industrial expansion was the primary order of business. However, aspiring to 
achieve regional maritime supremacy, India mapped out its own independent 
maritime ambitions. K. M. Pannikar recommended a number of elements that would 
fit the Indian maritime structure into the existing security surroundings. 
The first was to develop a rounded maritime training institution to foster an 
effective naval force which could be mobilised at any time, whether in peace or in 
war. The second was to produce a small but effective naval force. Financial 
constraints were a concern – the major part of the nation’s finances were apportioned 
to economic development, so only a small sum could be allocated for the purpose of 
maritime development. The final element was the shipbuilding industry, which 
would physically realise India’s blue water ambitions. All these elements 
complemented the larger picture of effective self-sufficiency, a rounded concept of a 
durable maritime power. 
However, with the major focus being economic development, the RIN was 
designed merely to defend coastal territory. It was important for India to safeguard 
the Indian shippers and to ensure that all supplies could come and go by sea under 
every possible condition. The two objectives were imperative, because a tranquil and 
peaceful environment would strongly contribute to India’s economic growth. The 
policy thus focused on developing the ability to escort and protect small numbers of 
ocean convoys, concentrating on the important trading shipments and crucial 
national assets, which could contribute positively to the economy. While India was 
slowly recovering from the aftermath of the upheavals of independence, its 
government also wanted to expand RIN’s maritime capability from 6000km to 
200,000km from its coastline (Rahn 2006), to encourage and meet the growing and 





an overseas ocean-going shipping state. 
Although this was the focus, India during this time was vulnerable to external 
threats believed to be coming from its immediate neighbours, China and Pakistan. 
This situation demanded a stronger and resilient naval force, and led to the 
restructuring of the Indian navy. Hence, importance was given to naval development, 
but this was strictly pacifist and non-aligned. Priority was still given to the economic 
development of the country, therefore the navy’s development was based on the 
fiscal income of the country; in other words, a self-reliant maritime design. 
The Indian Navy mission was thus proposed, and two functions were presented. 
The first was the basic capability to face and defend the country’s coastal SLOCs 
from mines, submarines, surface and air attack. The second was cooperation with the 
two other Indian military forces – the army and air force – to fortify and calibrate the 
overall structure of the Indian military in order to defend the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the country. The maritime ambitions were targeted at achieving 
regional supremacy in the IOR by preparing the RIN to respond to and counter 
small-scale threats, and to become a formidable maritime power in the region. 
This mission suggested that the RIN wanted a steadfast ability to combat major 
naval operations. India’s progressive ambitions at this early stage of its maritime 
evolution could be seen when the government announced the need for no less than 
two aircraft carriers, three cruisers, eight escort destroyers, four fleet destroyers 
(British Battle Class/Weapon Class), four submarines, six frigates, six minesweeper 
fleets, one survey fleet, five motor launchers, seven small landing crafts, some small 
boats, and two squadrons of aircraft – which served both the battle and attack and 
were also for search and rescue (Rahn, 2006). This long list was submitted to the 
Defence Committee for approval, but was rejected due to financial constraints. 
In 1956, Pakistan joined the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), thus gaining assistance from the 
USA. This situation made it urgent for India to reinforce its naval defence and to 
match the naval competition of Pakistan, for which purpose it sought assistance from 
the British. The Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan made it glaringly obvious 
that the military build-up on the Indian side had been neglected. The USA’s 
announcement to transfer one of its cruisers to Pakistan, along with providing other 
military assistance, increased India’s concern. Pakistan’s naval superiority created 





aircraft vessels, two first-rate anti-submarine ships, three second-rate anti-submarine 
ships and six minesweepers – four coastal and two offshore – and also asked for 
three Hunt Class destroyers and one light fleet carrier, HMS Hercules (Rahn, 2006). 
In 1958, a Khukri Class destroyer was required to provide an aircraft carrier 
with anti-submarine protection. While Virkant acted as an escort during a surface 
action during night-time, India also gained a second-hand tanker from Italy, and was 
working towards building its own tankers. In addition to this, India proposed the 
setup of a major naval base at Visakhapatnam, and established a presence in the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands to keep an eye on Pakistan’s naval activities in the 
Bay of Bengal. The importance of submarine purchases during this time was also 
apparent; the Indian navy monetary fund rose from 4 per cent in 1951 to 9 per cent in 
1957, to 12 per cent in 1960, presenting a major maritime concern in the IOR (Rahn, 
2006). Various plans and proposals were submitted to the British for naval support 
against the threat posed by Pakistan. In the end, India settled for four sloops, two 
frigates, one corvette, twelve minesweepers, four tankers and limited auxiliary 
vessels (Rahn, 2006), seen as sufficient to defend itself against the threatening 
adjacent nations (taking budgetary constraints into consideration). India’s maritime 
policy was a self-sufficient maritime strategy with high focus on economic 
development and a self-reliant defence policy. 
 
3.52 Blue Water Maritime Strategy (1962–1990) 
Pakistan’s membership of CENTO and SEATO drew India’s attention to a possible 
extension of Pakistan’s navy around the Bay of Bengal. The USA military assistance 
allowed Pakistan to begin developing a maritime presence on the Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands. This geographical area is a crucial part of the IOR, as it is also close 
to India. During this time, India looked on the IOR as its own backyard. Thus, from 
1962 to the mid-1970s, India began considering strong maritime build-ups. 
The Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 contributed strongly to India’s decision to gear 
up its maritime capacity. With the possibility of sporadic attacks by Pakistan on the 
Indian west coast and the Arabian Sea area, and India’s rivalry with China and its 
maritime expansion in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India perceived that 
Pakistan would take advantage of the Kashmir skirmishes. Chinese antagonism 
during the border conflict impelled India to work towards a more resilient maritime 





maritime capability was one light carrier, two cruisers, six destroyers, two old 
frigates, eight new frigates, six minesweepers, three seaward defence craft, one small 
tanker and one maintenance and repair ship (Rahn, 2006). After the Chinese 
aggression, India began to rethink its maritime capabilities. In its planning, RIN had 
projected China as a naval threat in the IOR. So in 1962, the RIN shifted its strategy 
by proposing another three-year plan, the Frigate Project, and recommended the 
construction of three Leander class frigates (ibid). The need to modernise and 
strengthen the RIN became imperative when attacks from China were made in 1962. 
India wanted to ensure its navy was capable of facing the possibility of future attacks 
from its immediate neighbours, and requested the acquisition of second-hand craft - 
one aircraft carrier, two cruisers and six destroyers, as well as one tanker and eight 
new frigates, four coastal minesweepers and two inshore minesweepers (ibid). 
In 1963, in its Defence Review, India stressed the need to garrison the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands. This statement was believed to be the first point of reference for 
India to lay its foundations for a more resistant maritime strategy in the IOR. For 
this, India suggested the commissioning of INS Jarawa at Port Blair. India also 
continued to set up the Visakhapatnam naval base that had been proposed in 1957. 
Two more important events took place: Goa introduced a naval base with the 
commissioning of INS Gomantak, and the naval base station facilities were updated 
to facilitate jet aircraft operations. 
India’s maritime policy was challenged further when the Indo-Pakistan War 
broke out in 1965. Pakistan conducted three major operations against India. The first 
was Operation Desert Hawk, a manoeuvre to slowly deflect the Indian military away 
from the Punjab and southward towards Kutch, and thus to open the territory to 
Pakistani invasion. This was because the Indian fleet was believed to be visiting 
Bahrain and Kuwait, and the aircraft carrier Vikrant had been carrying out routine 
operations in the Kutch area. In addition to this, there were economic considerations 
by Pakistan to focus on Rann, with its offshore oil drilling activities assisted by the 
USA. As a result, Pakistan held a series of exercises off Bombay and Cochin, India’s 
major seaports, involving submarines and anti-submarine vessels, destroyers, frigates 
and anti-aircraft strikes. India’s riposte to this situation was slow because Pakistan 






The second operation was Grand Slam, whose objective was to reach the 
boundaries of Chamb in order to capture Akhnoor and impede India’s access to 
Kashmir. The last was the Dwarka Operation, which provided leverage to the 
Pakistani Navy to block and divert the RIN from the north. The Dwarka Operation 
was a good opportunity for Pakistan, because the RIN was focusing its efforts on the 
west coast of Pakistan. The Indian navy was also fixated on the Arabian Sea and also 
the major ports of Bombay, Goa and Cochin on the west coast of India. This gave 
the RIN the ability to move and conduct blockades in the Arabian Sea, yet also 
moving closer to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as India was conducting annual 
exercises in that area. 
Besides the Soviet Union, India’s traditional partner, the British agreed on the 
construction of three Leander class frigates, proposed in 1962, and funded the 
Frigate Project for four years plus the expansion of Mazagon Docks Ltd. However, 
again due to financial constraints, it was the Soviet Union which provided four 
submarines to replace the Oberon submarine promised by the British, a submarine 
depot ship, five Petya class submarines chasers, two Landing Ships, Tank (LST) and 
five patrol boats to help garrison the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. 
Financial constraints were a major factor in India’s ability to respond to the 
conflict with Pakistan. Funds for the army and air force were deemed more 
important, at this time, for India. Most intrusions were land-based, and army 
garrisons were the priority. Sea incursions did take place, but the RIN could neither 
conduct a coherent defence nor counter invasions. As far as defence was concerned, 
protecting the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was more crucial for the IOR, 
connecting India to SEA countries. Hence, India’s role in the west was generally to 
support the major ports and protect merchant ships. An effective naval deployment 
with a significant role could not be executed because of India’s lack of autonomous 
oceanic ventures throughout the years. India’s continued dependency on foreign 
assistance allowed the big powers to impede India’s ability to have the most 
effective and dominant naval strength. 
It could be concluded that during this time India was aware of the importance of 
maritime compatibility vis-à-vis that of other powers. However, during the Cold War 
period, India could not execute these ambitions due to other primary responsibilities 
that seemed more crucial to the wellbeing of its citizens, such as economic 





was important, but it could be attained through assistance from foreign countries 
such as Britain and the USSR. Under these conditions, India’s maritime relationship 
with Malaysia was weak. This was due not just to India’s vulnerabilities within but 
also from Malaysia’s point of view. 
Malaysia’s heavy dependence on the British was due to its internal vulnerability, 
especially in terms of defence. After merdeka 
15 
, Malaysia had only one army 
division, the Rejimen Askar Melayu
16
, and had neither air force nor indeed any other 
force. Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in his parliamentary debate 
on 2
nd 
October 1957 argued: 
Let us face facts, and the facts are that we have at our command 
an army of less than one division strength, we have no air force, 
not even a single plane or sailor, and we have not even a sea- 
going craft. With the revenue at our command, we can never be 
able to build our force at the strength, which we could require for 
the defence of our country.
17
 
Under these conditions, the maritime relationship between both states was poor; like 
India, Malaysia was concentrating on economic necessities, and in term of defence, it 
was a land force that formed the major military focus of the Malaysian government, 
in order to deter the communist movement. Its economic resources were low, and in 
both countries the major focus was on economic development. India’s pace in 
responding to the conflicts imposed by China and Pakistan was slow, and this led 
India to be more diplomatic and pacifist in handling threats and conflicts around the 
IOR. In Malaysia, a similar condition applied, with its major interest in internal 
development. 
 
3.6 Malaysia–India Maritime Relations under the Non-Alignment Movement 
(NAM) 
The Cold War created a temporary separation between the governments of Kuala 
Lumpur and New Delhi. The difference in ideology was a major factor in the schism, 
and their strong maritime relationship was put to the test during the tense period that 
lasted throughout the Cold War. However, as independence had also led both 
countries  to concentrate  on  internal development rather than  engaging in military 
 
15 Independence. 
16 Malay land force. 





confrontation in the EIOR, both countries did continue to have international relations, 
as shown through their exhaustive communications through the NAM to discuss the 
safety and security of the EIOR. By scrutinising Malaysia’s and India’s roles in the 
NAM and the varied ideas that both presented through this movement, we will be 
able to identify key similarities, notably regarding maritime issues. 
India’s first official NAM meeting, the Belgrade Conference, was held in 
September 1961. The purpose of the conference was to exchange views on 
international problems, focusing on effectively contributing to world peace through 
amicable cooperation amongst all nations. 
18 
The conference debated that world 
peace could only be achieved if notions of colonialism, imperialism and neo- 
colonialism in all their manifestations were eradicated.
19 
It also urged for peaceful 
cooperation based on principles of independence and equal rights, leaving no room 
for intimidation, interference or interventions. The independent right to pursue 
policies in order to preserve sovereignty, and the independent choice to stay away 
from military pacts that included the acquisition of WMDs nuclear and chemical 
weapons, were the primary themes of this conference. 
Nehru, the founding father of the NAM, said: 
We call ourselves the conference of non-aligned countries. Now 
the word non-aligned may be differently interpreted, but basically 
it was used and coined, almost with the meaning: non-aligned 
with the great power blocs of the world. Non-aligned has a 
negative meaning but if you give it a positive connotation it 
means nations which object to this lining-up for war purposes, 
military blocs, military alliances and the like. Therefore we keep 
away from this and we want to throw our weight, such as it is, in 
favour of peace (Malaviya 1981: 5). 
 
Nehru further argued for the architecture of India’s policy of non-alignment, saying: 
We have to achieve freedom and defend it. We have to meet 
aggression and resist it and the force employed must be adequate 
to the purpose. But even when preparing to resist aggression, the 
ultimate objective, the objective of peace and reconciliation, must 
never be lost sight of, and heart and mind must be attuned to this 
supreme aim, and not swayed or clouded by hatred of fear 
(Malaviya 1981: 24). 
 
The intention Nehru tried to put across during the Belgrade Conference was 
India’s ambition to shape its own nation, its community, with unconditional freedom. 







At the Belgrade Conference, he further stated: ‘freedom is essential, because freedom 
will give us strength and enable us to build prosperous societies’ (Datta 2005: 81). 
The NAM was a launchpad to progressively start building societies that would be 
prosperous and filled with economic opportunities. It was these elements – freedom, 
peace, and independence, avoiding military pacts contributing to the deterrence of 
third-party involvement in internal affairs – that determined foreign affairs. This did 
not exclude the independent policy of regulating maritime affairs in the EIOR. With 
the tug-of-war between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and USA 
permeating the EIOR, India wanted to avoid the arms race, which could involve 
military developments like the building of bases and other facilities within the EIOR. 
However, this caused unease, in that it could cause instability and distract India from 
its focus on developing its economy. It also gave rise to concerns of being dragged 
into a military pact, opening the doors for either bloc to impose their own political 
interests on India. 
Although Malaysia did not officially support NAM at this time, it did share the 
same general idea of the national interest that was present in India. Malaysia was all 
for the eradication of colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism – naturally so, 
being a newly independent state itself. Both nations worked diligently towards world 
peace, and wanted to be left free to concentrate on their respective economic growth, 
including the safety of navigation in the SLOCs in the EIOR. Malaysia saw its pro- 
western ideology as a military deterrent to communism – but this was also another 
form of imperialism by western powers over Malaysia, in that the Anglo-Malayan 
Defence Agreement (AMDA) was a military pact allowing the Malaysian army to be 
utilised by the British for defence purposes. 
However, more often than not it was actually Malaysia that sought assistance 
from Britain, in order to deter threats of communist insurgency. Tunku stressed,  ‘I  
have made myself clear before that we side with the western ideology or the western 
understanding of democracy’,20 and this is because of the threat from communism. 
That said, Malaysia was, just like India, clearly against colonialism or any form  of 
risk to its own sovereignty. The fact that Malaysia was not part of the NAM at that 
particular time was due to its conviction that it should stay neutral – it refused to 
engage directly with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or indeed any other 
 





communist nation the world over. Despite the different paths that Malaysia and India 
had decided to take, they both still held true to the same fundamentals – respecting 
state sovereignty and working towards world peace, while concentrating on closing 
the gap between rich and poor. 
In the 1964 NAM Summit in Cairo, the participants agreed to follow 
independent policies on a number of issues: peaceful co-existence with other 
countries of different political and social ideologies, or showing trends towards such 
policies; to always support popular liberation movements; not to become party to 
any collective military pact that would have implications for current East–West 
wrangles; not to become party to any bilateral treaty with any regional defence bloc, 
if that would mean involvement in East–West disputes; and not to have on its 




The summit stated that although the tensions between the two blocs might have 
reduced, the threat of imperialism was still present. However, the positive response 
during the summit – the increase in NAM members while the ideological war 
between the two blocs was ongoing – demonstrated the success of the NAM 
throughout the globe. In that conference, the members pointed out the major issues 
that were challenging the current international situation at that time and expressed 
their support in ensuring peace and security in the world.
22 
Similar agendas from the 
Belgrade Summit were reinforced, such as military interventions, pacts or alliances 
with  great  power  that  could  cause  instability  to  the  international  system. The 
possibilities of economic exploitation by big powers in developed countries were 
also pinpointed. The conference condemned all colonialist, neo-colonialist and 
imperialist policies.
23 
In addition, the summit urged all international conflicts to be 
settled by peaceful means to preserve state sovereignty and integrity. 
The positive growth of the overall NAM notion demonstrated India’s success in 
promoting it. During this time, the late Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri – 
Nehru’s successor – brought forward further refinement of the elements of NAM. 
They included: nuclear disarmament; peaceful settlement of border disputes; 
freedom from foreign domination, aggression, subversion and racial discrimination; 
 
21 National Archives of Malaysia. Straits Times, 15 December 1962. Retrieved on 20th November 2013. 







acceleration of economic development through international cooperation; and full 
support for the UN and its programmes for peace and development (Malaviya 1981: 
5). Shastri recalled Nehru’s famous words, that where freedom is menaced or justice 
is threatened or where aggression takes place, the non-aligned cannot be and shall 
not be neutral (Malaviya 1981: 5). 
All the members of the NAM stressed the desirability of restoring stability and 
peace with regard to this conflict and refrained from actions that could further 
accelerate the repercussions of war. The NAM expressed the need to terminate all 
foreign interference in the internal affairs of the countries of that region.
24 
Malaysia 
was not yet an official member of NAM, but did express its support to the NAM, by 
declaring Chinese attacks on India as naked aggression towards its territorial 
integrity. In addition, Malaysia offered help by allowing the recruitment of Indian 
Malaysian armies to assist India during the border conflict. Malaysia’s commitment 
towards friendship with India was more than evident. As mentioned earlier, after 
independence Malaysia had no air force or navy, but did have the Rejimen Askar 
Melayu; and with only this, Malaysia still expressed its support to help India on the 
basis of the long-standing foreign relations between both states and also because of 
both states being Commonwealth Nations. 
At the Lusaka Summit in 1970, the NAM continued towards its major 
objectives. The summit stressed that the détente was a positive indication, but that 
the military blocs were not totally disbanded. It argued that although clashes between 
the great powers had lessened, the security of developing countries was still 
threatened. India’s Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, stressed that by staying out of 
military pacts the non-aligned countries could use their collective wisdom and 
influence to tip the balance of power in favour of peace and international cooperation 
(Malaviya 1981: 6). She also urged members to remain focused on economic 
cooperation. These being the common challenges for NAM members. In addition, 
Mrs Gandhi also urged all NAM members to work towards unity to increase the 
solidarity of the institution. 
The 1970 Lusaka Summit was a great turning point for Malaysia’s and India’s 
bilateral relationship after the temporary split. Tun Abdul Razak had taken over 
Tunku’s administration, and had strongly adopted the NAM approach in shaping its 
 






foreign policies. Malaysia thus joined the summit for the very first time. During the 
summit, Razak said: 
The non-alignment principles to which Malaysia wholeheartedly 
subscribes … call for … restraint and consideration from the big 
powers in their actions and decision, which affect smaller 
countries. In keeping with the letter, the non-aligned countries at 
Lusaka looked to the neutralization of Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia. Malaysia for its part had taken this a step further and 
called for the neutralization of SEA – a neutralization that 
necessarily requires the endorsement of USA, USSR and China, 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia cannot be considered in isolation. 
They are very much a part of SEA, which has all the potentialities 
of becoming an arena of conflict of the super powers intent on the 
extension of their spheres of influence. In our view, therefore, 
peace and stability in this region can only be a reality of the 
neutralization that should cover the entire area as guaranteed by 




Though Malaysia’s induction into NAM brought the two countries closer, 
Malaysia did not, due to its lack of maritime supplies, have the ability to assist India 
in its conflict with Pakistani naval forces. This was because maritime divisions were 
still secondary to land forces in the allocation of resources, due to threats of 
communist attacks on land. Indonesia then threatened the Bay of Bengal and claimed 
the EIOR as part of the Indonesian Ocean. Malaysia did not respond to the issue 
because it did not have the resources, but it did, as mentioned above, have support 
from the British through AMDA, established in 1957, which had promised assistance 
in the case of military threats from neighbouring countries. 
It was the Malaysian membership of AMDA that caused friction with India, 
which strongly upheld the NAM policy of not engaging in any form of military pact. 
However, as an independent sovereign country, Malaysia had decided to engage in a 
military pact for its own defence, taking into consideration its vulnerability as a 
developing country, and AMDA was a form of military deterrent. In 1967, Britain 
decided to pull its military forces east of Suez but due to the historical relations 
between them, Britain, together with Australia and New Zealand, managed to 
maintain the chain of security structures in the IOR. By 1971, after the change of 
administration from Tunku to Razak, the AMDA meeting in London concluded that 
the formation of the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) – a new name for the 
 






AMDA – obliged its members to consult each other in the event of an external 
aggression or threat. There was, however, no requirement for physically stationing 
multinational forces in Malaysia or Singapore (Khoo, 2000). 
This suggests that Malaysia’s interest in FPDA is purely on the basis of defence, 
and not a coercive military pact against any country or any form of aggression 
against another state’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. It was a pact made with 
self-defence in mind, when the SEA region was under threat from the communist 
insurgents seeking assistance from bigger powers. Malaysia’s agreement with 
AMDA was similar to the nominally democratic invitation for India to intervene in 
the Maldives. Based on this, it is apparent that Malaysia strongly supports the 
principle of Panchashila – mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
non-aggression, non-interference in one another’s internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. Therefore, Malaysia’s actions opposing 
communist insurgency did not imply that it was projecting provocative behaviour or 
instigating disorder in the EIOR, but merely ensuring its own protection against 
communist threats. In fact, this demonstrates that Malaysia – like India in ensuring 
the stability of south Asia’s waters through its intervention in the Maldives – was 
pursuing an anti-communist policy, to minimise the instability that could be caused 
by communist movements in countries sharing borders with Malaysia around SEA 
waters. Both states seek a peaceful environment, and stable waters for safe and free 
navigation for the purpose of economic communication. In addition, they both 
require a stable environment to promote a proper focus on internal developments, 
especially as domestic uncertainties could be seen as an invitation for external 
intervention. 
More summits were held in subsequent years, with the focus on solidarity, unity, 
freedom, and the importance of economy and avoiding military pacts, including 
peaceful relations with all nations. Malaysia, alongside India and other newly 
independent countries, was integral to these summits, even though Malaysia 
continued its association with FPDA. At the Algiers Summit in 1973, Mrs Gandhi 
urged that non-aligned countries should speak for those whose numbers were large 
but whose voices were muted.
26 
The need to provide a voice for such peoples   was 
seen  during Tun Mahathir Mohammad’s  tenure as the fourth  Prime Minister    of  
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Malaysia, when she spoke on behalf of newly independent countries, voicing each 
state’s solidarity with southern countries and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC). In 1975, in the Indian National Congress at Komagatamaru 
Nagar, she said: 
India’s own unique struggle for freedom, its consistent support to 
the liberation struggle of people under colonial domination, its 
tradition of strong opposition to imperialism, neo-colonialism and 
external intervention against the sovereignty and independence of 
any country, its rejection of the division of the world through 
military pacts and sphere of influence and its abhorrence of all 
forms of racialism and discrimination provide the basis for its 
solidarity with other non-aligned countries and progressive forces 
in the world (Malaviya 1981: 31). 
 
She concluded by saying, ‘we must determine to help ourselves, to sacrifice, to 
pool our resources, knowledge and initiative. We must work together on a bilateral, 
regional and multilateral basis’ (Malaviya 1981: 29). This choice of communication, 
multiple diplomacy, resulted from India’s weak internal condition, both economically 
and politically. It was also adopted by Malaysia. In 1967, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand established ASEAN, a regional cooperation in 
SEA covering various factors such as economic development, social evolution and 
also the peace and stability of the region. The membership expanded with new 
entrants – Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Vietnam. ASEAN’s creation was a 
result of the growing threat of communism; it was a regional cooperation that was 
deemed imperative in the fight against this increasing menace. It also served as a 
deterrent against intervention from external powers, building on common ground 
among its members to promote better economic and social conditions. 
In the Colombo Summit of 1976, with more participation coming from African 
states, India reinforced the idea of NAM and urged its members to remain committed 
to the results of the previous gathering, which had built a strong platform for the 
continuing success of the NAM movement. Mrs Gandhi again urged that this unity 
would have a positive impact on world peace. She believed that though the colonial 
years were over, the newly independent states were still vulnerable to exploitation. 
She believed that economic focus was more important than being involved in the 
Cold War proxies, which only benefited the big powers. 
The NAM movement grew from building strong fundamentals based on unity 





the Cold War, apart from focusing on a new economic order, members were urged to 
cultivate freedom and peace by encouraging negotiation instead of confrontation, 
and cooperation instead of conspiracy. It was suggested that banks and international 
monetary institutions should help developing countries for economic enhancement. 
At the Lima Summit of 1975, it was concluded that cooperation among the non- 
aligned countries was critical in deflecting any threats to their sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence. Significant, too, was promoting new economic and 
political relations between nations founded on equity, respect and justice for their 
respective interests. In 1980, Mr Narasimha Rao stressed that NAM never had been 
and never need be between the great powers of power blocs, that ‘non-alignment’ 
meant not taking sides, but maintaining some kind of rigid balance in relation to the 
great powers in order to defend national independence and sovereignty, which took 
care of all its other interests (Malaviya 1981: 33). He argued that NAM was a unique 
method adopted for the promotion of national interest within the overall framework 
of peaceful co-existence and cooperation (Malaviya 1981: 33). 
In 1979, during the Havana Summit, on the issue of Vietnamese action in 
Kampuchea, India urged for the elimination of any use of force and to remain 
focused on cooperation and dialogue. Even in the case of Soviet action in 
Afghanistan, India opposed the use of force through intervention in the internal 
affairs of Afghanistan. It pressed for independence, respect of territorial integrity, 
non-interference, non-intervention and the non-alignment status of Afghanistan, also 
criticising the Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel. As the NAM institute 
matured and handled more acute issues, it followed strict rules of non-interference, 
following through with the establishment of informal and ad hoc committees over 
bilateral issues, favouring a firm non-intervention policy among its members. 
Chairing the New Delhi Summit in 1983, Mrs Gandhi said that the summit 
maintained and would remain committed to the previous objectives and agreements 
formed during the previous summits. She stressed the relevance of the principles and 
objectives of the NAM movement in the contemporary international situation, and 
emphasised the interrelationship between peace, independence, disarmament and 
development (Datta 2005: 40). She also strongly pleaded for unity, harmony and 
collective self-reliance among non-aligned countries (Datta 2005: 40). 
This development illustrates how the NAM policy had been the bedrock of 





same elements were incorporated into Malaysia’s foreign policy from the early 
1970s. Both countries worked towards similar interests, such as sovereignty 
sustainability, foreign policy choices free from colonial or outside influences, and 
internal development, especially economic. The early stages of NAM focused 
heavily on state integrity, territorial strengthening, independence, freedom and anti- 
colonial policies. It rejected military pacts, which could cause unnecessary  friction 
among nations during the peak of the Cold War. In a wider context, it also involved 
the peace and safety of the IOR. In the 21
st 
century, the big powers began exercising 
their power in the IOR, with the rise of major Asian powers. Maritime activities 
being integral to a state’s power, both Malaysia and India were aware of the 
situation. Freedom of navigation was applicable to all states, and voyages that were 
genuine trading ones should have been indisputable, thus strong policies particular to 
sovereignty were an important factor to avoid intrusion by external entities. Both 
states also wanted to conduct their maritime activities in a peaceful way, so the 
fundamentals of NAM were essential to build a strong foundation for sound 
maritime policies. 
As both states strengthened the NAM policy domestically and on an 
international level, peace within the EIOR became a crucial agenda, and details on 
maritime cooperation began to arise. With this, maritime cooperation between 
Malaysia and India began building up once again. 
 
3.61   The Indian Ocean Region as a Zone of Peace 
The acceptance of NAM as the cornerstone of their foreign policy was prevalent both 
in Malaysia and India during the peak of the Cold War. It was a central choice for 
both to remain isolated from the maritime conflicts happening around them. In other 
words, although both states appreciated their long-standing historical connections, 
their concern was predominantly on ensuring a peaceful environment so as to enable 
more resources to be directed towards their internal affairs and development. 
Focusing on their maritime military prospects was not favourable to either Malaysia 
or India at this time; therefore both underwent a temporary change in direction. In 
order to build the IOR as a zone of peace, devoid of coercive activities, 
communications on the grounds of maritime reasons was seen as more critical. Naval 
competition between great powers further urged this necessity. 





IOR as a zone of peace, free from nuclear proliferation, WMD, the arms race, 
military build-up and any other form of coercive activities that could lead to 
instability of the IOR. Most of these objectives were achieved through NAM 
summits and the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. This had started 
during the Cairo Summit in 1964. The declaration included: 
The conference recommends the establishment of denuclearized 
zones covering these and other areas and the oceans of the world, 
particularly those that have hitherto been free from nuclear 
weapons, in accordance with the desires expressed by the states 
and peoples concerned … The conference also requests the 
nuclear powers to respect these denuclearized zones.
27
 
The Prime Minister of Ceylon in 1964, Sirimao Bandaranaike, was one of the 
many leaders of developing countries who adamantly stressed the concept of a 
nuclear-free zone in the IOR. Similarly, at the third summit in Lusaka in 1970, the 
topic of sea policy coordination was introduced by urging all members to utilise 
marine resources and the protection of the marine environment at all levels including 
bilateral, regional and inter-regional levels. Threatened and intimidated by foreign 
intrusion at the IOR as the global shift began turning towards it, these newly 
independent countries wanted to deter the possibility of triggering the IOR as a 
bargaining chip to be used in the rivalry between the USSR and USA, which would 
also include the likelihood of a nuclear arms race and military competition. Realising 
it was the peak of the naval rivalry between the USSR and USA, the Prime Minister 
of Ceylon declared that it would close its seaports and airfields to ships and aircraft 
either carrying nuclear weapons or equipped for nuclear warfare (Raghavan nd: 18). 
Mrs Gandhi, supporting the idea, urged for the need to declare the IOR as an 
area of peace and cooperation. She argued: 
The external powers’ perception of their interests in the Indian 
Ocean and their politico-military response had resulted in 
enhanced military capability in the area which could be used by 
them as a diplomatic leverage not    only in their global political 




The plea put forward by Mrs Gandhi and other non-aligned members ended the 
conference with the following: 
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The Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: 
Adoption of a Declaration calling upon all States to consider and 
respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great 
power rivalries and competition, either army, navy or air force 




The ‘zone of peace’ notion was further submitted at the UNGA to ensure the IOR 
would not be subjected to any ocean or air military exercise by great powers and to 
consult the littoral states of the IOR with regard to military bases, installations, 
logistic supply facilities, nuclear weapons and WMD. Sri Lanka also proposed that 
the peace zone concept be stretched to the high seas, declaring the IOR as a Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) and stated that all members should close their ports  to 
vessel and aircraft carrying nuclear bombs.
30 
The Prime Minister of Ceylon urged that 
all countries bordering the Indian Ocean should join not only in giving effect to this 
proposal, but also in keeping the Indian Ocean as an area of peace.
31
 
The Lusaka Summit also expressed a similar concept from an economic point of 
view. The summit conveyed that the seabed, the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the area, are the 
common heritage of mankind. 
32 
They should be used for purposes of peace, 
benefiting all humanity especially in the interests of developing countries. 
In 1972, the General Assembly requested its 1971 Declaration of the Indian 
Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The declaration expressed: 
A common view point among the littoral and hinterland states of 
the Indian Ocean should be attained through  close  
consultations … the states should affirm their resolve to settle 
disputes between them through peaceful means and without 
resort to force, in conformity with the principle of mutual respect 
for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of 
states, and without prejudice to the exercise of the right to use 
force in self-defence and in attaining self-determination … there 
was need to promote and ensure conditions of security within the 
region so as to strengthen sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean (United 





29 3rd Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Alignment MOVEMENT???, Lusaka, 8- 








During the Algiers Summit in 1973, members of NAM adopted the Declaration 
of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and urged that the attempt to declare the IOR 
as a zone free from any military activities or expansion, was an aid to ensure the 
safety and tranquillity of the IOR. In addition, NAM members opposed the 
construction of the Anglo-American base at Diego Garcia. This later led to official 
opposition to the project, quoting the possibility of conflict of interest, increasing 
tension and rivalry between developing nations as well as the big powers. It was also 
in this year that the question of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was discussed 
mainly in the First (Political and Security) Committee. 
During the New Delhi NAM Summit in 1973, the consensus reasserted the 
objectives of the previous declaration in ensuring the IOR as a zone of peace as well 
as the role of non-aligned states to continue supporting these goals. The summit 
argued that the presence in the IOR area of any manifestation of great power – 
military presence, foreign bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, 
nuclear weapons and WMD – conceived in the context of great power competitions 
will be a flagrant violation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of 
Peace. At the Initiative of Mauritius, the New Delhi Summit elevated Diego Garcia 
from a solely Indian Ocean issue to an anti-colonial issue, declaring the base not 
only as a threat to peace, but also as a residual imperialist presence perpetuated in 
contempt of the littoral states (Harrison, Subrahmanyam and Misra 1987: 22). It also 
expressed concern about the possible search of great powers for new bases to build 
military facilities for further military activities. 
At the Lima Summit in 1975, the participants opposed the great powers’ further 
attempts to continue with the Diego Garcia base in the IOR. The declaration called 
upon the Indian Ocean states to refuse the granting of facilities to warships and 
military aircraft of the great powers used in the context of their rivalry or for any 
other purpose that might be detrimental to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
security of the region (Raghavan nd: 20). As a consequence, in 1976 the Colombo 
Summit urged the great powers and major maritime powers to commit to an early 
consultation of UN resolutions on the IOR. The Colombo Summit continued to press 
that any attempt to develop military bases in the IOR, not just Diego Garcia, would 
be seen as a threat to the sovereignty and peaceful development of states in the 
region. 
In  1976,  at  the  5
th  





Summit was brought forward, and it drew the attention of members to the 
declaration of the IOR as a Zone of Peace from the great powers. The roles of the 
great powers were emphasised because the objective of the proposal was to ensure 
the stability of the IOR despite any form of military activities during the peak of the 
Cold War. NAM members, including Malaysia and India, were deeply concerned 
about the historic victory of the liberation struggle in Indo-China, which could cause 
tension in South Asian waters through the naval expansion of the great powers and a 
battle for supremacy. The NAM gave a commendation for them to use the IOR for 
the peaceful and innocent passage of vessels along the littoral states. It stressed that 
the IOR should not grant facilities to any other states for the purpose of any arms 
race. It referred to the installations on Diego Garcia as a threat to the sovereignty and 
tranquillity of neighbouring states and stressed that a strong collective security 
organisation should be recognised at an international level but without any military 
alliances. 
In 1978, about 42 delegates from 18 countries participated in a six-day regional 
colloquium on ‘The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace’ in New Delhi to ensure 
security interests, not allowing the intrusion of outside powers. The Havana Summit 
in 1979 further stressed the objective of littoral states over the shows of strength by 
big maritime powers in the IOR. The summit expressed its concern on the intentions 
of great powers to deploy military and naval forces in the IOR on a permanent basis. 
They stressed that the littoral states of the IOR should not join any form of military 
blocs and pacts, welcoming the fact that a number of the region’s countries had 
withdrawn from such pacts. The conference stressed that any form of military bases 
or installations are a direct threat to a state’s sovereignty and its future 
developments. Therefore it is vital to discourage and subvert any form of such 
developments in the IOR. The forum noted that talks had been held between the 
USSR and the USA on reducing their military presence in the IOR. 
With the development of the NAM to the Declaration of the IOR as a Zone of 
Peace, new elements to support this policy began to surface in the SEA region, a 
crucial component of the IOR. During the Lusaka Summit in 1970, when Razak 
adopted the NAM policy, he strongly supported the concept of Zone of Peace of 
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the IOR. However, it was Malaysia’s Foreign 
Affairs Minister, Tengku Ahmed Rithaudden, who was the first SEA member to 





and Neutrality in Southeast Asia’. 
During the discussions, Malaysia and India continued their demands at the UN 
meeting and openly opposed USA nuclear attempts, arguing that the nuclear arms 
race was escalating with the development of newer and more destructive and lethal 
weapons systems such as the neutron bomb. 
During  the   6
th  
summit  in  Havana  in   1979,  Malaysia   stressed  the  need    to 
implement the IOR as a zone of peace and to respect the freedom of navigation and 
to limit maritime movements to peaceful ones. In 1981, in a conference on the IOR 
to implement the Assembly of 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of 
Peace, a final document was assembled: 
Limits of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace … halting the 
further escalation and expansion and eliminating the military 
presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean conceived in the 
context of great power rivalry … elimination of great power 
military bases and installations from the Ocean conceived in the 
context of that rivalry … denuclearization of the ocean in the 
context of implementation of the declaration … non-use of force 
and peaceful settlement of disputes … strengthening of 
international security through regional and other cooperation in 
the context of the implementation of the declaration and … free 
and unimpeded use of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace by vessels 
of all nations in accordance with the norms and principles of 
international law and custom (United Nations Yearbook 1979: 
49). 
 
Similar agendas continued to show interest in the following summits with 
further argument on disarmament issues, as in New Delhi in 1983 and 1986.I In 1989, 
the international seminar on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was held in Sochi, 
USSR, where the Secretary General of the UN stated: 
Peace in the Indian Ocean is of great importance to all the states 
in the region as well as to the international community. At a time 
when, with the active assistance of the UN, the threat of a global 
war is receding, international tension is abating and regional 
conflicts in virtually all regions are gradually being settled, the 
establishment of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean could only 
contribute to further general relaxation (International seminar on 
the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 1989: 113). 
 
In sum, Malaysia and India did drift apart temporarily during the early years of 
the Cold War. However, around the 1970s, during the détente periods in both USSR 
and USA, while Malaysia was shifting from anti-communism to a non-alignment 





cooperation on the grounds of maritime security continued to exist through their 
common ground as newly independent countries on international platforms such as 
the UN, NAM summits and ASEAN summits on issues that helped to economically 
and socially enhance both countries. For this to be accomplished, both states upheld 
the NAM policy to ensure peace would be preserved. Moreover, because maritime 
competition was significantly present in the IOR during the Cold War, both countries 
worked towards ensuring the presence of a peaceful environment and the avoidance 
of military pacts that could turn their traditional maritime link, the EIOR, into a 
maritime battlefield. 
International platforms were the communication instruments of choice because 
both were newly independent countries with various internal vulnerabilities. This 
meant that their pace of response to a maritime conflict would be slow by virtue of 
their poor maritime capability and capacity. Furthermore, economic and social 
boosts were their primary objectives. To achieve these goals, both countries needed 
to ensure the presence of a peaceful environment. The safety and security of major 
SLOCs in the EIOR, devoid of any military intervention, was the major focus of 









THE DRIVERS OF MALAYSIA–INDIA MARITIME SECURITY 
COOPERATION IN THE EASTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION DURING 




The IOR is one of the largest oceans and has always attracted world attention on 
maritime issues in IR. A more acute focus was directed towards the IOR when the 
global shift took place from West to East. With two major rising Asian powers, India 
and China, along with an increasing importance of energy politics and innovative 
non-traditional threats, the IOR became the ‘strategic heart of the world’ (Kaplan 
2010: 134). In fact, Alfred T. Mahan stated: ‘whoever controls the Indian Ocean 
dominates Asia’ (Mahan 1987). The ocean is the key to seven seas and in the 21st 
century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its water (ibid). 
Thomas P. M. Barnett has stated that no ocean is in need of strategic stability 
more than the Indian Ocean, because the IOR is the gateway for the West to East 
Asia and Oceania via South East Asia (Barnett 2001). In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Indian Ocean was regarded as its own strategic entity, which should not 
automatically become a prize for superpower conflict (Hatcher nd: 3). At the UN, a 
proposal to adopt an Indian Ocean Peace Zone was tabled and discussed annually. It 
was claimed that the IOR was an important area for seaborne activities, especially 
trade, and therefore the safety and security of the IOR should not be compromised at 
any cost. 
This chapter discusses the drivers of MIMSC in the EIOR in the post-Cold War 
era. It will discuss the following factors: a) geographical proximity, b) the 
geopolitical scenario, c) China’s maritime ambitions, d) economic significance, and 




MIMSC in EIOR 
 
 
Diagram 1: The Drivers of Malaysia–India Maritime Security Cooperation in 




4.2 Geographical  Proximity 
The distances between and within land, water boundaries and overlapping concourses 
play important roles in determining the intensity of communications and the level of 
state interactions with one and another. A ‘region’ can be defined on the basis of a set  
of countries in close geographical proximity with each other that share a certain 
commonality of national interests. These interests could include social, economic, 
political, cultural and historical factors. Hence, the  need  to  understand  the  
significance of placing cooperation above conflict in the  conduct  of  interstate  
relations is in rise.     These elements are evident in the case of MIMSC in EIOR. 
Geographically, Malaysia and India are  wide open to  threats from the sea,  both  
on the eastern side and through the western channels to the IOR. Thus, geographical 
proximity  plays a  vital part
33 
and  is  an  important  factor  in  determining  MIMSC  in 
EIOR. 
34  
Proximity   is  an  important   underlying  factor   for   one  state   to  establish 
connections with another and if anything, the changing regional geopolitical context 
including China’s rise, and the myriad of security   challenges
35
. 
SOM in particular was an important entrepôt for both Malaysia and India during  
the  pre-colonial and  Cold  War  era,  and  it continues  to play an  important point    for 
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MIMSC in the post-Cold War era. It was the Gujaratis who discovered the SOM, 
which later turned out to be such a crucial link between the Indian maritime trading 
networks and the eastern trading networks. The SOM was appreciated because it 
acted as a much more strategic port for trading activities between India and China, for 
Indonesian spices such as nutmeg and mace from the Banda islands, cloves from 
Amboina, Ceram and Moluccas, and grain from Java (Gupta 1994: 410). 
Geographically, SOM is strategic as it provides a shorter route to the eastern trading 
network, a network for commercial exchanges with China, Sumatra and India and up 
to Cambay. At the same time, SOM acts as a safe haven during the annual monsoon 
season. With the rising sophisticated and complex international trading network 
comprising the Far East, SEA, the Islamic world and Europe, the SOM became the 
central international trading emporium. 
The SOM soon arose as a strategic entrepôt and safe midpoint between the great 
civilisations of India and China, and this process established a new maritime link 
between Malaya and India. Today, the port of Malacca still plays an important role 
in connecting the India–China trading network in EIOR. The strategic location of 
SOM acting as a choke point at the Bay of Bengal is China’s biggest concern, and 
China’s web of relationships in the IOR explains China’s Malacca Dilemma in the 
EIOR. Geographical proximity and climate factors are natural occurrences that are 
adequate to create the leverage needed to befriend each other through history, and 
remain an important driving factor of MIMSC in EIOR. Therefore, as the security of 
the EIOR and its SLOCs impacts both Malaysia and India, it is affirmed that 
geographical proximity plays a fundamental driving force for both Malaysia and 
India to engage in cooperation concerning MIMSC. 
In addition to their geographical proximity, the protection of their maritime 
sovereignty from invasion by another country is in the interests of both nations. India 
is a country with huge land territory, open to maritime threats both from the west and 
the east. In addition, India also neighbours sensitive and unstable countries, which 
has direct implications for the sovereignty of the states within India. It has been 
suggested that India's maritime projection has the ability to drive and decisively 
affect land military operations (Pant 2013: 3). Similarly, the Chief of Naval Staff 
Admiral Suresh Mehta has said that the Indian Navy’s 2020 goal was to have the 
capability of influencing the outcome of land battles and performing a constabulary 





stability of India’s inland sovereignty has been the driving force for India’s maritime 
ambitions in the region. Similarly, for Malaysia, the safety and security of its waters 
in SOM and EIOR is vital to deter inland invasion. Malaysia is also open to threats 
from the sea, both on its eastern coast and to the west, facing the Indian Ocean, 
directing Malaysia’s strong maritime ambitions in the region. 
 
4.3 The Geopolitical Scenario in the Eastern Indian Ocean Region 
The changing geopolitical scenario in the EIOR is another driving factor of MIMSC 
in the EIOR. This includes the need to secure major SLOCs, tackle transnational 
crimes and avoid a naval arms race between powers and provide a peaceful 
environment for seaborne activities in IOR. The transnational nature of these 
challenges necessitates, ideally, a collective and multilateral approach, and certainly 
the coordination and equivalence of approaches amongst countries. 
The rising threat from non-state actors is of particular importance for both 
Malaysia and India and plays a vital role in shaping MIMSC in the EIOR. The 
advent of 9/11 had increased concern over terrorist attacks in the region. As the 
threat emerged from Afghanistan, this directly affected the security of India as it 
borders with both Afghanistan and Pakistan – notwithstanding the fact that India is 
still at war with Pakistan. According to a statement on his official website, Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi told the soldiers in the town of Leh: “The neighboring 
country has lost the strength to fight a conventional war, but continues to engage in 
the proxy war of terrorism.” Modi’s words reflect the deep-seated animosity between 
India and Pakistan, countries which have fought three wars since they gained 
independence from Britain in 1947 (Bengali 2014). 
An October 2014 report by the USA Department of Defense stated that Pakistan 
had been engaging in fighting India’s ‘superior’ military by proxy. Thus the 
Pentagon brought Pakistan's use of militant groups as proxies to the attention of the 
USA Congress (Jha 2014). “Pakistan uses these proxy forces to hedge against the 
loss of influence in Afghanistan and to counter India’s superior military,” the 
Pentagon told Congress in its latest report, ‘Progress Towards Security and Stability 
in Afghanistan’ (USA Department of Defense 2014). This therefore affects the 
behaviour of India towards its neighbour and, most importantly, its commitment to 




War on terror is not new;
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(JI) from the Philippines and Indonesia, which have carried 
out attacks in the sea, were mostly found operating in Singapore and Malaysia 
during the post-9/11 investigations. The War on Terror after 9/11 has made the 
situation more volatile for Malaysia, and Malaysia seeks to keep the EIOR away 
from terrorist activities and movements.
41 
The threat posed by the Islamic State (IS) 
is now spreading southwards and eastwards from the Middle East towards the IOR 
and Southeast Asia (where a significant Muslim population resides), and this is a 
potential area for further Malaysia–India military and security cooperation.
42 
These 
groups have also been closely linked with an increasing number of acts of piracy, 
armed robbery, drug trafficking and epidemics in the region, especially in SOM. 
In addition to this, the geographical nature of SOM, being narrow at both the 
eastern and the northern ends, provides greater opportunities for such attacks. For 
example, terrorist groups often target SOM because ship movements around this area 
are usually slow at narrow waters and this condition is an advantage for easier 
attacks (Cole 2008: 86). The fact that the 9/11 investigations discovered that the 
major terrorist groups are shifting focus towards Singapore and Malaysia naturally 
meant that SOM is exposed to such threats, thus bringing the question of Malaysia’s 
sovereignty and the safe navigation of the strait to the fore. 
In terms of traditional security threats, there have been conflicts such as the 
clash between the USA Navy and Iranian Navy in the SOH. At one point, senior 
Iranian officials even threatened to seal off the Strait of Hormuz, which would have 
wreaked havoc in the oil markets. In response, USA deployed its Fifth Fleet, then 
stationed in Bahrain, across the Persian Gulf from Iran, to forestall such a possibility 
(Ho 2011). Similarly, closure of the SOM, through which flow nearly 9.4 million 
barrels of oil per day according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), can 
affect  the  economies  of  SEA and  this can  impact  global economy as  a   whole 
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(REFERENCE). Unfortunately, along with this rise in traffic, the variety and 
intensity of threats, including piracy, maritime terrorism, drug trafficking, 
gunrunning, human smuggling, pollution, accidents and inter-state conflicts, are also 
expected to show a proportional rise (Zakaullah 2012). 
Lying between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, the SOBM is a strategic 
link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Therefore, maritime 
security remains a concern especially when a large number of economic and other 
seaborne activities are concentrated at the IOR. In the case of Malaysia-India, the 
IOR plays a predominant role specifically along the eastern hemisphere. This 
scenario encourages both Malaysia and India to cooperate in the EIOR. 
 
4.4 China’s Maritime Ambitions 
The changing geopolitical condition of tue IOR from a traditional point of view is 
also important. Specifically, the rise of China’s maritime ambition is a significant 
driving force for MIMSC in the EIOR. Naval power remains the dominant sector 
where holistic maritime power is concerned, and Malaysia and India are certainly 
leveraging on it. The recent RIN deployments and resource allocations appear to give 
stronger  emphasis  to  the Far  Eastern  Naval Command,  and  this  testifies  to the 
readiness of New Delhi to implement a greater maritime role in the EIOR.
43 
With this 
development, India stated that it would focus its naval forces more with Eastern 
Naval Command and, as far as holistic maritime power is concerned, would expand 
such security provisions to other IOR states, as can be seen from the new linkages 
with the Maldives, Mauritius and Sri Lanka, as well as the recent supply of a patrol 
vessel to Mauritius, amongst other initiatives.
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After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the global scenario shifted 
from a bipolar to a unipolar world, the USA emerging as the de facto hegemonic 
power. The USA followed a ‘forward deployment’ maritime policy, terming the 
Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf ‘places to which we routinely deploy 
naval expeditionary forces’ (USA Department of the Navy 1994: 2). Thus, relying 
on its base in Diego Garcia and its Fifth Fleet stationed there, the USA still has the 
strongest military presence in the IOR. 
France and Japan also have some military presence in this region. France   has 
 






some bases in its overseas territories in the Indian Ocean, and its ‘bases in La 
Reunion, Mayotte, Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates have led to a 
“quadrilatère français” in the Indian region’ (Bruno de Paiya nd: 3). Moreover, ‘[a]s 
a leading military power, France’s military presence in the region could be drawn 
upon to ensure that its energy security requirements are addressed’ (ibid nd: 3). 
Japan set up its first foreign military base since World War II in Djibouti in July 
2011, allowing Japanese aircraft to conduct patrols over the Indian Ocean and the 
Gulf of Aden (Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defense Navy nd: 35). 
China is extending its diplomatic, economic and military forays into the IOR, 
and an overland energy pipeline as well as port projects with various IOR littoral 
states are designed to solve, or at least reduce, the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ by providing 
alternative energy routes to China and thus reducing the need for Beijing to channel 
its energy supplies  through the  Malacca Strait.
45 
India is consciously looking    at 
China’s ‘strings of pearls’ strategy and its intrusive engagement in the IOR through 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma.
46 
China is now a crucial factor in the IOR. As a 
rising power in the Asia-Pacific region, China is a significant driver of MIMSC  in 
the EIOR. Its maritime development around the IOR shows its interest in ensuring 
that its position as a maritime power is recognised.
47
 
The ‘Modi Doctrine’ also reflects a significant China factor. Since taking over 
the administration, Prime Minister Modi has been visiting several countries in the 
region. Strengthening ties with India’s littoral states such as Sri Lanka, Mauritius 
and the Maldives directly reflects his policy to tackle China’s maritime ambitions in 
India’s own backyard. China’s naval presence at ports such as Sri Lanka is highly 
criticised by India. This criticism was clearly seen during the 2014 ‘Galle Dialogue’ 
in Sri Lanka. During this time, the Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval 
emphasised the cooperation amongst littoral states of the IOR to continue work 
towards a peaceful and stable region. He also urged all the countries to continue not 
to allow any form of military dominance or development that may hamper the 
stability of the IOR. 
China was the major concern behind this statement. This is because China has 
dominated the SCS and is slowly expanding its military presence across the IOR 
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with specific focus on major littoral states near India. Its maritime friendships across 
the IOR are highly driven by its Malacca Dilemma and its tactical strategy – the 
stretching of China’s ‘string of pearls’ is seen as a form of encirclement of India. 
Due to the rise of China and the exponential development of its naval strength, 
China’s presence and influence caused enough apprehension for not only the USA to 
shift its focus to the East, but for other countries in Asia to be mindful of its 
territories. China’s greatest strength – and its greatest vulnerability – is its economy, 
and as for any other country, SLOCs are important for China's trade, which is 
therefore the linchpin of Chinese policy and strategy (Cheng 2005: 18-19). 
According to Harsh V. Pant, China’s expansionist behaviour has long been 
evident. China has been acquiring naval facilities along the crucial choke points in 
the IOR, not only to serve its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic 
presence in the region (Pant 2010). China’s growing reliance on bases across the 
IOR is a response to its perceived vulnerability, as mentioned in a secret 
memorandum issued fifteen years ago by the Director of the General Logistics 
Department of the PLA: “We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an 
ocean of the Indians (Bodansky 1995: 6-13)”. 
In discussing China’s maritime ambition in the IOR, many scholars have argued 
that it is driven only by commercial purposes. However, China is seen as an 
important determining driver, especially if one sees its maritime ambitions in the 
IOR  as  a  border  issue,  e.g.  in  Sri  Lanka  and  Myanmar. 
48  
Kaplan,  for   instance, 
referred back to history in understanding China’s maritime ambitions in the IOR. It 
was argued that during the Song and Ming dynasties, China does not have a 
permanent presence in the Indian Ocean ports, but built partnerships in the form of 
the tax system – and today China is most likely to follow the same policy (Kaplan 
2010: 290). Therefore, the authors argue that China ought to follow this step in 
fostering security and trade relations with Pakistan and Sri Lanka. With the SOM in 
the soft underbelly of China, the friendships between China and these countries are 
only for access purposes and not for a permanent base (ibid: 290). 
The same views were articulated by Brewster when he says that the participation 
of China in Pakistan and Myanmar is only for commercial purposes, and history 
shows no additional expansion by China beyond its coastal waters – and even if this 
 





were to occur, it would take a long time (Brewster 2010: 6). Jonathan Holslag also 
emphasises these points: firstly China’s ‘string of pearls’ along its sea lines of 
communication is more of a network of commercial ports than military ones 
(Holslag 2008: 23), and India is consciously looking at China’s ‘string of pearls’ 
strategy and its intrusive engagement in the IOR through Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Myanmar.
49 
Secondly, Holslag suggests there are other ways by which China could 
counterbalance India. 
Therefore, it would be mistaken to argue that China’s maritime presence in the 
region is to openly counter India. China’s engagement in the IOR could dilute 
India’s power projection in the IOR, thus creating a potential threat for India. 
Although it is wise to see China’s attempt to exert maritime power as a threat to 
India’s maritime position in the IOR, China just like the USA, Japan and Australia  
are seeking a role and position in the region. It is seeking accessibility in this sphere 
because of the growing focus on the IOR in the 21
st 
century. Even so, the IOR by no 
means represents a trump card for China (Holmes, Winner and Yoshihara 2009: 
142). China’s interest is only in trade in the IOR security scenario.50 
However, in an anarchic world where conflicts are common, China’s maritime 
presence in the region should not be taken lightly. For example, Gwadar could 
represent both a new economic gateway and a military stance for China during a 
crisis. Taking into consideration Mahan’s view on using the seaport as a form of 
defensive platform during times of war, Gwadar has all the characteristics in terms 
of strategic positioning, the strength (defensibility) and resources. It can act as a 
strategic protection - and from a military point of view, it is useful to control the 
commercial and military traffic through a critical bottleneck, the SOH. 
China cannot have full control over the IOR port, but access to a fair market can 
be a great asset in times of crisis. Corbett explains that trade sanctions are an attempt 
to stop the flow of maritime commerce and deny the enemy the use of commercial 
communications (Corbett 2004: 185). He also maintains that trade embargos have an 
intimate relationship with the naval blockade, and the most effective use of sanctions 
to strangle the flow of events in the country afloat (Corbett 2004: 186-187). The 
following analysis of China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy will reflect Corbett’s 
argument. 
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Map 7: China’s String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean   Region 
 
Source: www.isj.org.uk 
China’s first pearl is in Pakistan. India has the resources to impose a naval  
blockade off the coast of Pakistan, but this is being protected  and  garrisoned  by  
China. In addition, China has had assistance in the construction of a naval base in 
Gwadar, which will have the advantage of monitoring the activities of the USA and 
India in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf. In economic terms, this port is a weakness for  
the cooperation of India-Iran-Russia Multimodal Transport links in Chabahar, on the 
Gulf of Omar coast of  Iran. 
The second pearl is in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is the shortest bypass route to 
Kunming. A strong combination of China–Pakistan–Bangladesh can affect India and 
its Siliguri Corridor. Other similar concerns for India in  its  own  backyard  are  
China’s USD1 billion project at Hambantota Port Project, the Kra Canal Project and 
the deepwater ports in Laem Chabang in Thailand, deep-sea port in Cambodia and 
Sihanoukvillen naval base in Marao, Maldives (Mohanan   2010). 
In the SEA region, China has also attempted to threaten India. In Myanmar, 
China’s National Petroleum Corp has begun construction on two natural  gas  pipelines 
connecting Kyaukpyu and Rili. China also has naval bases on the Hainggyi Island near 
the Irrawaddy River Delta and Akyab and Mergui on the Bay of Bengal. The most 
significant facility is on Zadetkyi Kyun Island off the Kra Isthmus, which connects the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines to  their  home  base. At Great 
Coco Island and the Alexandra Channel, China has developed an electronic 





Islands and traffic at the Straits of Malacca (Mohanan 2010). Chinese maritime 
development in the IOR projects China’s ambitious maritime policy to maximise 
power in the region. This in turn has disturbed India’s position as a predominant 
power in the region. 
Nearly 90 per cent of Chinese arms sales go to countries located in the IOR. As 
mentioned above, Beijing is investing heavily in developing the Gwadar deep-sea 
port in Pakistan, and naval bases in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. The 
concept of ‘string of pearls’ is often used to reflect China’s maritime involvement in 
these countries. But whether one calls it a ‘string of pearls’ or a series of maritime 
platforms which can be used for both an economic getaway or military bases, it has 
threatened India’s position in the IOR. New Delhi is also shaping its own set of 
friendships with similar littoral states, but it has projected a more benign role which 
can be seen through both bilateral and multilateral platforms, e.g. through the IONS, 
to ensure that if the military need arises, the necessary support infrastructure and 
network will be in place (Malik 2012). Nevertheless, China’s behaviour in the IOR is 
a vital factor for India’s maritime ambitions in the EIOR. 
For Malaysia the nature of its relationship with China reflects its level of 
concern and its drive to engage deeply with India on the maritime domain in the 
EIOR. Malaysia’s friendship with China is currently in a positive phase; however its 
relationship is in a constant state of rivalry, specifically on the disputed islands in the 
SCS. This is in complete contrast to India, whereby both Malaysia and India have 
been projecting strong and benign foreign policy engagements. Malaysia’s stand at 
SCS  vis-à-vis  China  –  e.g.  the  James  Shoal  case  –  is  helps  us  to understand 
Malaysia’s maritime behaviour in the EIOR.
51 
The constant contest over the Spratly 
Islands between Malaysia, China and the other littoral states of SCS could impact 
Malaysia’s stance and its point of view on China’s overall maritime ambitions in the 
EIOR and its focus on SCS compared to the EIOR. But it could actually drive a 
stronger engagement with India in order to counterbalance the force of China’s 
maritime expansion in the region. A common interest in ensuring China’s maritime 
power balance in the EIOR could lead to MIMSC in the EIOR. As both Malaysia 
and India are seeking new opportunities for a comprehensive framework of MIMSC 
in the EIOR, China’s maritime ambitions will be a significant factor. 
 





4.5 Economic Significance 
The IOR and its littoral states formed the centre of some of the oldest  trade  
connectivity routes throughout history. With the shift towards the IOR as a vital area  
for economic activities, countries throughout the world have concentrated  on  this  
place for various reasons: trade activities, competition for raw materials and other 
resources such as energy especially amongst developing countries.  Along with this  
shift also are the emerging Asian powers in the region such as India and China as well 
as the Asian Tigers in SEA such as Malaysia and Singapore, which have compelled 
western countries to  give extra focus to the region. This has also contributed to the  
shift of global focus towards the  IOR. 
In the case of Malaysia-India, India is a large market in the EIOR, thus the 
diverse diplomatic maritime commitments influence the MIMSC.
52 
Malaysia is also a 
significant partner for India; Malaysia is the third largest trading partner for India  
within ASEAN – and India is the largest trading partner for Malaysia and many other 
countries  in  the  region. 
53 
A   range   of  agreements   has   been  signed,   such  as  the 
Malaysia–India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement  (CECA), covering 
goods and services as well as investment. Others are the Revised Double Taxation in 




Map 8: World Oil Chokepoints in the Indian Ocean   Region 
 
 
Source: U.S Department of Energy/ Energy Information   Administration 
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Like the discussion on geographical proximity, this also leads both countries to 
perceive the EIOR as a natural medium for economic purposes. The sea has always 
been the easiest and the cheapest way of transporting goods for trade. Malaysia’s 
maritime imports account for almost 80 per cent of its trade, while its maritime 
exports account for 78 per cent (Harun, Wan Abdullah and Abu Hassan 2004: 123). 
Of this amount, more than half of Malaysia’s GDP is generated through maritime 
foreign trade (Harun, Wan Abdullah and Abu Hassan 2004: 123). For example, three 
quarters of China’s maritime imports and a quarter of its imports come from South 
Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan, passing via the deep-water Lombok Strait, near the 
eastern end of Java. 
Of Japan’s total exports and imports, 40 per cent goes through the Malacca– 
Spratly route (Harun, Wan Abdullah and Abu Hassan 2004: 123), thus going through 
Malaysia’s home passage and the territorial waters claimed by the country. For 
Australians and New Zealanders, Malacca and the passage through Malacca are the 
preferred routes for commercial activities. Although commercial activities of USA in 
SEA cover only 3.3 per cent of the imports and 4.5 per cent of the exports from the 
region (Harun, Wan Abdullah and Abu Hassan 2004: 123), this does not mean that 
the SEA is not important to the USA. The American economy is highly dependent 
upon trading activities in the IOR. In addition to this, Malaysian ports handle almost 
77 per cent of these countries’ imports and exports (Harun, Wan Abdullah and Abu 
Hassan 2004: 123). Apart from maritime trade in general, the gas and oil sectors are 
vital to Malaysia, and important areas such as Pulau Layang-Layang, Miri and 
Bintulu make a significant contribution in terms of oil revenue to the growth of the 
Malaysian economy. This is of great significance to Malaysia, which may potentially 
face threats and disruptions, making it certainly the highest scorer of the major 
maritime policy issues in Malaysia, and further raising interests in the IOR. 
For India, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands situated close to the SOM, are rich 
in minerals, which should be an added strength to India’s economy, as it is believed 
that their undersea oil and gas fields will go on to be explored (Jarocki 2012). These 
minerals could benefit the region’s population and impact the raw materials policy of 
the Indian government, whose energy demands increase every year (Jarocki 2012). 





other adjacent neighbourhoods in the EIOR, especially Malaysia, which plays a 
major role in the safety and security of SOM. As economic cooperation increases, 
the need to secure the SLOCs around these islands will be an important agenda for 
both Malaysia and India’s policy makers. More maritime policy implementation will 
take place, and future cooperation between both Malaysia and India is expected. 
The geographical proximity of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the SOM in 
the EIOR is a major area of interest for the economic development of both countries. 
India’s central position in the IOR is a unique position – especially situated adjacent 
to the SOM in the east, and the SOH and the Gulf of Aden in the west. This aspect 
becomes clearer on revisiting the USA’s definition of Asia–Pacific. The definition 
includes the IOR as ‘strategic importance of the energy resources and trade that pass 
through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca before reaching the 
manufacturing centers of East Asia’ (Parmar 2014). It is evident from recent writings 
that USA has been looking at the IOR as an emerging area of strategic Interest 
(Parmar 2014). 
However, the issue of economic prosperity is an area of grave concern. As India 
moved into the post-Cold War era, its overriding urge to reform its economy was a 
difficult goal to achieve. The long dictatorship of the British seriously affected 
India’s economic condition. India’s overdependence on the USSR left India in 
instant weakness with the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. This worsened the 
economic landscape of India. The Cold War conspiracy had left India with no 
friends, and as a result the country had to struggle to develop its out-dated economy 
by itself. Yet India has many advantages: a large land mass and population, a huge 
economy and in terms of strategic positioning, India is a vital power for many 
countries in the IOR. Although this is the case, India still faces struggles in terms of 
fulfilling the basic needs of its people such as lack of food security, health and 
education, and inadequate infrastructure. 
The issue of poverty is a classic example of the fundamental problems in India. 
According to the United Nations Development Report (UNDP), out of a population 
of 1.25 billion, 32.68 per cent are living on less than USD1.25 per person per day.
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These people are especially found in sub-Saharan Africa and southern Asia. India 
has the largest population with hunger, and it is a cause of serious alarm. It also has 
 






the largest population of children with a low birth weight, and requires significant 
improvements in reducing hunger and food security (Sinha 2012). To add to this 
burden, India is the second most populous country with a population of 1.22 million. 
It is estimated that with the population growth rate at 1.58 per cent, India is expected 
to have over 1.53 billion people by the end of 2030.
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Meanwhile, the Malaysian Human Development Report (MHDP) 2013 
commissioned by the UN says that although the city of Putrajaya claimed to have 
successfully reduced absolute poverty to 1.7 per cent in 2012, relative poverty has 
now emerged as a growing concern.
57 
Based on the report, the absolute poverty line 
was fixed at RM763, but the relative poverty scores at RM1,813 projected a huge 
gap.
58 ‘If poverty is measured using the relative poverty rate as suggested in the New 
Economic Model, about 20% of Malaysian households are considered poor.’59 
There is an urgent need for security cooperation amongst the littoral states, 
especially relating to the access of resources in the IOR. With all focus on the IOR, 
the level of conflicts are also expected to rise both within state, regional as well as 
amongst external regional powers. 
The economic development of a state is closely linked to its trade and energy 
supply. Since most trade of the IOR littorals and the south Asian states is seaborne, 
SLOCs form the lifeline of these countries. The IOR is home to three critical SLOSs 
used for global energy transportation. Two of them, the SOH leading out of the Gulf, 
and the SOM linking the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, are two of the world’s most 
strategic choke points. An enormous volume of international long-haul maritime 
cargo from the Gulf, Africa and Europe transits this ocean. Some of the primary 
items transported are energy products, mainly oil and gas. The disruption of these 
SLOSs, even temporarily, could lead to substantial increases in energy costs. 
Disruption in energy lifelines can also arise from patterns of trade flows. Imports to 
south Asia from west Asia utilise the SOH; closure of that strait would practically 
cut off Gulf supplies to the east altogether, and also affect the west considerably (Ho 
2011). 
Due to competition over energy, the IOR is labelled as an intensified area    for 
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political competition. The global demand for energy is growing, and the IOR – 
specifically the Middle Eastern part of it – contains most of the known oil reserves in 
the world and is the largest exporter of crude oil. Oil is an important element in the 
geopolitical IOR and has been the ‘backbone’ of the American model of modern 
civilisation since the First World War, and is the most strategic resource in 
conducting war. Since the Second World War, the USA has demonstrated a desire to 
control the oil resources in the Gulf, because of the growing need for it and because 
of China’s growing interest in it. The IOR is therefore of great mutual interest to the 
USA and India, and it is of growing importance for traders in other energy 
commodities by sea (e.g. LPG and uranium). 
Energy supplies that run through the IOR remain an important element in the 
past and will be in the future too. The rising energy demand for economic prowess 
opens up possibilities especially for big powers that aim to become a superior 
military power. This also compels countries to compete, ensuring thatquestions of 
security and stability will remain a concern. The Gulf is the major focus for oil 
supply and any disruption to this area will cause the entire chain of global energy 
supply to be interrupted. 
This competition has brought about another major maritime challenge, namely 
resource scarcity. As China and India develop to become an economic power with 
great military capability, both countries will continue to be dependent on the Middle 
East and Africa. Both are actively seeking to forge closer defence and security ties 
with resource supplying nations (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Iran). China has especially 
geared up its game and drawn closer to these countries, also by investing in its 
littoral state economies, building ports and infrastructure, providing weaponry and 
acquiring energy resources. 
China is the world’s number two oil consumer and has accounted for 40 per cent 
of the growth in the world’s crude oil demand since the year 2000 (Pant 2010). Since 
oil connects closely to its economy, as is the case with any other country, China has 
been shaping its economic policy based on this need. In the process, China has been 
building strong alliances and friendships with vital powers in the IOR. 
During the colonial era, the IOR as the birthplace of maritime civilisation, was 
considered a playground for rich, industrial European nations. In the 21
st 
century 
however, it has become a key strategic arena. The main reason is the growth of the 





energy from the Middle East, that fuels their economic growth. The ocean covers a 
surface area of some 73,600,000 km
2 
with a coastline of 66,526 km (Howell nd). It 
has many choke points, such as the SOH, SOM and Singapore and the SOBM.  As 
the international energy market is dependent on reliable transport, even a temporary 
blockage of a choke point can lead to a substantial increase in total energy costs. 
Hence, the disruption of energy flows is a huge security concern for both its littoral 
states and the international community, as most of their energy lifelines are sea- 
based and the IOR plays a vital role in world oil production and global maritime 
trade. The high demand for energy resources in both Malaysia and India encourages 
their positive drive towards stronger maritime security cooperation in areas of the 
EIOR. 
Their current internal atmospheres have led both Malaysia and India to build a 
strong economic relationship for the wellbeing and development of their people. At 
the same time, both countries have also understood that strong economic 
connectivity where they are mostly dependent on the sea requires strong maritime 
power. They should have the ability to protect and garrison the water from threats 
and provide a peaceful environment for a sustainable economy. 
With their long coastlines, both countries also face huge challenges from the 
sea and need the cooperation of both navies and maritime enforcement agencies to 
ensure smooth economic transactions. This naturally creates positive interaction  
by both powers in the IOR, with a strong focus on the EIOR. In the EIOR, the 
mutual area of cooperation would be the safe navigation of SOM because both 
Malaysia and India are situated adjacent to this geographical area; the busiest water 
route in the world thus gives great importance to sea challenges for both nations in 
the EIOR. In addition, the safety of SLOCs around the Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands, close to the SOM, is also the concern of navies of both Malaysia and India, 
encouraging them to seek stronger cooperation to ensure preservation of their 
maritime interests. Economic consideration is a traditional common ground for both 
Malaysia and India, making it a natural driver for MIMSC in the EIOR. Factors that 
influence state interaction may differ under different circumstances but the economic 
factor has always been an underlying one for state interaction. Utilising the sea as a 
medium of communication for economic development is a norm, and it sets the trend 





4.6 Maritime Significance 
Malaysia and India’s desire for maritime power are important drivers for MIMSC in 
the EIOR. Geographical proximity and economic development form a natural 
condition for state interaction; but if a state seeks power in the global system, it has to 
work for it. This attitude is vital in an anarchic world, and MIMSC in the EIOR is not 
possible without a strong determination to rise to become an important maritime 
power. This is the fundamental element for a closer and comprehensive MIMSC in 
the EIOR. 
As mentioned above, until the end of the 20th century, the IOR had been a 
predominant area of competition for maritime powers from the western world. 
Following the discovery of Vasco da Gama from Portugal, major maritime powers 
such as the Dutch, French and British often visited the IOR. It soon became an area 
for economic interchange as well as power rivalries amongst countries because of its 
strategic location and also its economic resources. 
This situation also shows that India had abandoned its sea prowess in its own 
backyard, which led to the dominance of western maritime powers in the IOR. This 
maritime blindness was criticised by Chitrapu Uday Bhaskar, a retired Indian Navy 
commodore, who chided India for being uniquely ‘maritime-blind’ throughout much 
of its history (Pannikar nd: 14). K. M. Panikkar, the father of Indian maritime 
history, also postulated that although there had been invasions and conquests of India 
and its land, India never lost her independence until she lost control of the sea in the 
first decade of the 16
th 
century (ibid: 100). Thus, he argued that the future of India 
was determined not by the land but by the oceanic expanse which washes the   two 
sides of India (ibid: 100). This mind-set has changed dramatically and today, India 




India’s position in the SEA region is unique, and SEA is balanced more or less 
equally between India and China.
61 
India is considered a key player in the IOR 
because not only is it seen as a nation that can counter the influence of China and its 
‘strings of pearls’, but also, most fundamentally, it houses one of the most important 
oceans of the world, the IOR. Malaysia needs to show more active involvement and 
interest  in  India; it  should  recognise  India’s  role as  a  rising power  in ensuring 
 





maritime interest in the EIOR, and value India’s involvement on maritime issues.
62 
Even taking the SCS into account, according to Y. J. Sithara and N. Fernando, there is 
little doubt that the IOR will be the new pivot of 21
st 
century geopolitics. Malaysia 
should therefore show more commitment to recognising India as a major and crucial 
power, to create a new power structure in the EIOR region. 
India has declared its blue water navy strategy, and it is up to the nations of SEA 
to seek their opportunities. Malaysia acknowledges India as a regional power; it has 
emphasised that India is Malaysia’s very important traditional partner, in comparison 
to China. However, no policies have been implemented. This could be the reason 
behind Malaysia’s consistent focus on China rather than on India, as India reflects 
benign maritime behaviour. This does not mean that India will only be noticed if it 
projects coercive behaviour, but it is vital for both states to work together towards 
more realistic policy implementation, reflecting more serious cooperation in the 
EIOR. India is a natural friend to Malaysia, and taking into consideration India and 
China’s contest in the IOR, a stronger relationship could be shaped by Malaysia, 
especially in maritime affairs, as it has a sense of universality compared with other 
armed forces. 
Neither Malaysia nor India have any disputes comparable to that of China, 
which is claiming the Spratly Islands. There are three pivotal factors that would 
ensure global fixation on the IOR: first, the IOR is the locus of traditional trade 
routes and has contemporary importance in terms of being the dominant route for the 
transport of hydro-carbon resources for a large number of states, especially China 
(the largest importer of energy through this route); second, the IOR is critical in the 
rise of non-traditional threats to security such as piracy and drug trafficking; and 
third, it poses continuing significance as an arena of big power competition (Acharya 
2012). In the current globalised world, states realise the importance of the sea, and 
the challenges that can arise from it. The sea has become an everyday playground in 
the 21st century, for both traditional and non-traditional activities, by which most 
states began to develop their own versions of maritime definitions by which to 
classify themselves as maritime nations. This situation is common, especially in 
states like Malaysia and India that have long coastlines. 








powers. The Indian coastline stretches for about 5,700 km on the mainland (nine 
states and two union territories) and about 7,500 km along two island groups that 
include Lakshadweep and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In addition, most of 
India’s states rely on trade by sea, the maritime industry and other economic fields, 
and sea borders are close to major SLOCs in the IOR. Its geographical dimensions at 
sea, open to waters at both sides, its long coastlines and the presence of islands, 
makes India a natural maritime nation. 
Using the same approach, Malaysia is also a maritime country. Malaysia’s 
maritime region covers an area of 614.159 km
2
, which is comprised of the South 
China Sea, Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea, the Straits of Singapore and the Gulf of 
Thailand (Basiron 2012: 72). All these sea passages overlap the waters surrounding 
Malaysia. Moreover, Malaysia also encompasses one of the busiest international 
trading routes, the SOM. The highest number of ships and volume of ships pass 
through the SOM, and this is indirectly responsible for shaping Malaysia’s maritime 
policy. In addition, the Malaysian coast extends approximately 4675 km, consisting 
of 2,068 km in peninsular Malaysia, plus 2,607 km 
63 
in East Malaysia, whose 
landmass is twice the size of peninsular Malaysia (Basiron 2012: 72). 
However, this is not the only way by which a nation may be categorised as a 
maritime nation or have a strong maritime policy that is competent. The most crucial 
question lies in its desire for maritime power in the overall maritime power game. 
Overall, India has the potential and energy to project a great amount of power, 
particularly in the EIOR. India has desired to become a great economic power as 
well as develop strong defence, but has never taken the steps necessary to advance 
these aims. India has the potential capabilities and resources but they are 
underutilized and irregular. Although it may be suggested that the possession of 
nuclear energy means that the country has the potential to become a great power, in 
the case of India, this is not the case. It may instead be argued that unless and until 
India can influence countries to comply with India’s demands and desire, be valuable 
in big international organisations and have a say in security matters worldwide, for 
example gaining a permanent seat at the UNSC, and set aside its internal 









Although this is the ultimate goal in the long run, in the current context of IR, 
India is not focusing on these aims. Chinmaya R. Charekhan, former Indian 
Ambassador to the UN, believes that the title is a myth and that the government of 
India does not seem particularly concerned with this recognition. At the current 
stage, India is more interested and in fact focused on pushing its economic status 
towards a more sustainable position. It is in the minds of the Indian that, unless and 
until India can reach great economic prowess and especially reduce the levels of 
poverty in the country, then can India work towards other national goals. Therefore, 
it is proposed that India only has enough power to resist the influence of others, but 
has not made much progress before it can achieve greater power over other states 
(Perkovich 2004: 129-130). Getting India ‘right’ would be a manifestation of great 
global power; failing to meet these aspirations would consign India to remain in the 
middle rank (Perkovich 2004: 129-130). 
India has the all the capabilities to ensure the safety and stability of the region, 
but its behaviour does not appear to be aiming at projecting a coercive or dominating 
effect in the region. India has been seen as a stable and responsible power, but does 
not show dominance. It has never showed, or indeed projected, maritime conflict 
with any country. It shows good maritime governance capabilities, and India will 
soon lead, as it is a responsible power. Yet it has not been anywhere near the 
Atlantic. It has the capabilities to project maritime power in the IOR, but globally it 
has no need to cross the IOR (Perkovich 2004: 129-130). Its maritime capability is 
only enough to ensure the safety of its national territory. India has far more potential 
to respond to other navies compared with its past performance, but it has no intent to 
project global power, except as a responsible power (Perkovich 2004: 129-130). 
The idea that the Indian Ocean is India’s ocean is a misconception.64 It is correct 
merely to say that the Indian Ocean is India’s underbelly, and maritime security and 
the safety and peaceful environment of major SLOCs in the IOR are vital for its 
national interests to be preserved.
65 
Any discord in the IOR is a direct threat to 
India’s national interests and sovereignty, but there is no proclamation that India 
owns the Indian Ocean.
66 
India understands its responsibility as the major maritime 
power  in  the  IOR.  It  has, unlike  the Chinese,  openly expressed  its blue   water 
 
 







ambitions, which demonstrates India’s benign behaviour. 
India is seeking support from the littoral states of the IOR, and Malaysia’s views 
of the IOR and Asia-Pacific will affect its overall view of India’s role in the larger 
context of the Indo-Pacific region, 
67 
which will be a unique case, as it can be 
balanced equally between India and China. Malaysia should not forget that India is a 
vital power in the Indian Ocean, and one cannot ignore India’s involvement when it 
comes to the Indian Ocean.
68 
India is one maritime nation that Malaysia cannot 
avoid in the geopolitical scenario of the EIOR. 
69 
Malaysia, as a vital power at the 
SOM, cannot ignore India’s role as a defender or protector of SOM in the EIOR.  
India’s role has great and enduring potential, because it is regarded as an 
indispensable partner of ASEAN for a number of reasons: as a net security provider 
using its comparatively larger resource capacity, as it did for the tsunami disaster 
relief and the MH370 search-and-locate mission; not to mention its value as a partner 
in the SOM.
70 
ASEAN countries see India as a leading power, which has projected 
good maritime governance capability; and India will soon lead, as it is seen as a 
responsible power in the region. Singapore and Indonesia show signs of respect to 
India’s position in the region, and Malaysia may need India as an emerging power in 
ensuring the safety of SOM  waters.
71
 
On the other hand, Malaysia is known as an average power in the region. This 
can be justified because Malaysia is defined as the region’s third richest country. 
However, from the point of view of India it looks like a small power, with limited 
economic and military capabilities. Also, Malaysia requires the assistance of other 
forces in terms of security. This means that Malaysia is defined as a state that cannot 
be influenced or resolve security issues in international fora. Therefore, Malaysia is 
keen to boost its economic development to strengthen its internal situation and 
international terms. Malaysia has difficulty expressing its interest in the international 
arena, and therefore views ASEAN as the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign 
interactions, to enable it to make a significant impact on the international system. 
Hence, with such limitations it is vital for Malaysia to accept India’s leading 
position. This realisation is important for shaping new policies under MIMSC  and 
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even strengthening the current maritime cooperation in the EIOR by mitigating 
security concerns, both traditional and non-traditional. Malaysia requires both the 
capabilities and the strategic interest for more proactive engagement, and needs to 
strengthen its attitude on security matters and draw a broader vision like its 
neighbouring country  Indonesia.  President Joko  Widodo  has had a  very positive 
vision of Indonesia’s maritime policy since he over the administration.72 Malsindo, 
a trilateral antipiracy patrol force started in 2004 by the navies of Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Singapore, was active for three years, following which it seemed to 
stagnate. The Malaysian navy lacks equipment, and a focus on logistics is vital to 
create a shift in the relationship. It has been argued that the time has come for 
Malaysia to look west to India whilst India is looking east or acting east.
73 
The 
maritime domain is flexible, and cooperation is easier and hence should be used as 
an opportunity for MIMSC in EIOR. Although India’s maritime significance and 
maritime position have been identified and suggested as a vital driver of MIMSC in 
the EIOR, MIMSC is also heavily dependent on Malaysia’s proactive engagement 
and its positive response towards India’s maritime role in the EIOR. Malaysia’s 
receptive behaviour will determine a much more resilient MIMSC in the EIOR. 
India, on the other hand, also needs to respect and recognise Malaysia’s position 
and wishes in the EIOR. Malaysia lost Pedra Branca to Singapore; this hit hard, and 
Malaysia will try its best to defend the Spratly Islands, a move that is likely to 
influence its policy with China.
74 
SCS is in the interest of Malaysia as it has issues 
that overlap with those of the IOR.
75 
Today, it is more plausible to see the Malaysian 
government remaining more focused on issues in the SCS in particular.
76 
Malaysia 
argues that any diplomatic cooperation is sought only for the safety and security of 
SLOCs in SOM, not to dominate or project power in these areas.
77 
Malaysia would 
accept any form of assistance from India as long as it accords with the NAM policy 
and helps Malaysia improve its maritime power. 
78 
It is the responsibility of 
Malaysia-Singapore and Indonesia to make major maritime decisions in the  SOM, 
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Hence, in order to seek responsive cooperation from Malaysia, India should 
support and project a more positive engagement with Malaysia in the EIOR. Prime 
Minister Modi has announced the Act East Policy to accelerate diplomatic 
commitments  in  strategic economic and security partnerships.
80 Modi’s Act  East 
Policy has replaced the LEP, and has been viewed as a promising policy by the 
Malaysians.
81 
It should not just involve engagement but also create conditions
82 
that 
will win Malaysia’s trust and confidence over India’s involvement and presence in 
the SOM. India needs to create the conditions, and have a clear policy prescription, 
for maritime security issues in LEP facing Malaysia in SCS and SOM.
83 
Such clarity 
will attract a much stronger and more resilient drive for MIMSC in the EIOR. 
Although Malaysia is a small power, there are a few strong characteristics of 
such a small power that could be utilised by India in shaping its policy and maritime 
interactions in EIOR. It is said that small forces conducive to good relations amongst 
the great powers and small powers is likely to generate a positive-sum game between 
the major powers, which could come at the expense of smaller power. Its existence 
can save power relations, which can be used as tradable goods, like chips at the 
table, in order to settle the outcome of a great power war or prevent a new one (Kuik 
and Lee 2008: 6). In some cases, small independent neutral power can abolish the 
superpower competition (Kuik and Lee 2008: 7). The geographical position of small 
forces can also act as a springboard for other powers either store resources or expand 
their sphere of influence in counter-balance enemy. Malaysia, as a small power, is 
believed to reflect this behaviour. 
SOM is the busiest trade route in the world, and it is vital for India’s maritime 
interest due to its strategic location in SEA waters.
84 
It is a vital location as it 
connects east and west. India may need Malaysia, as India has no power in the SOM, 
making it vital to have a positive engagement with Malaysia. Malaysia is a maritime 
power in the SEA region and the big powers cannot ignore the importance of 
Malaysia in the SOM.
85 
There is economic and political interdependence   between 
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India and Malaysia when seen in the overall context of all these issues together. 
Even though Malaysia and China are potential partners in this regard, the closest of 
all is still Malaysia, thanks to its natural geographical proximity. As such, an 
eastward focus of India’s maritime efforts are of greater imperative. Malaysia is 
certainly  a   natural  close   partner   where  SLOC   security   is  concerned. 
86     
These 
imperatives should be utilised by India to create a stronger MIMSC in the EIOR. 
As much as Malaysia needs to recognise India’s role as a regional power in the 
EIOR, it is important for India, too, to recognise Malaysia’s prominent role in the 
SOM. India’s attempt to create neutrality in SOM with a major focus on ensuring the 
safety of SLOCs will win Malaysia’s vote in the maritime domain. Malaysia is also 
highly dependent on India’s reaction towards China’s behaviour in the SCS. India’s 
smart policy of NAM, and its policy choice in the case of Malaysia’s claim over the 
disputed islands, will determine Malaysia’s maritime strategy options. Malaysia’s 
maritime relations with India are tied to its engagement with India in addressing any 





The IOR is facing more fragmented and diversified security threats, which may 
persist for a long time due to current demographic trends. The IOR is a ‘sea of 
troubles’. Under these circumstances, the three most important stakeholders in the 
IOR – the USA, India and China – share the responsibility of maintaining regional 
stability and progress. India is a benign power; benign engagement by China is not a 
threat,  and  China   is  rather  seen  as  a  strategic  partner  in  the      IOR. 
88  
Regional 
instability will only damage their interests. The USA is deeply engaged in the anti- 
terrorism war, and India is itself plagued by a rough India–Pakistan relationship and 
the  worsening  Pakistani  situation.  The  Pakistan  factor  also  deters  India  from 
projecting   a   coercive   outlook   in   the   region.  
89   
Foreseeable   changes   in     the 
international geopolitical scenario in Asia would encompass the following: questions 
about the USA’s commitment to its espoused Asia-Pacific ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’, 
as well as growing forays by other interested extra-regional powers in the region, 
such as Japan. 
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These may provide potential opportunities for India to seek a bigger role – 
diplomatic, economic and security – which means avenues for India to utilise its 
maritime power.
90 
Relatively speaking, China is not as severely affected by regional 
instability, although its energy and trade routes are increasingly facing serious 
threats. Hence, China is seen more as a potential threat than a real one,
91 
as its power 
projection in the IOR, if not militarisation, is no threat to India. The two important 
principles of Chinese foreign policy are a good neighbourhood and a harmonious 
ocean, which calls for China to play a more active role in maintaining regional peace 
and tranquillity. This should act as an advantage to India. 
As much as India should realise this condition, Malaysia should also understand 
this scenario and attempt to strike a balance in its position between India and China. 
In this case it is engaging more closely in a proactive manner with India, and at the 
same time recognising efforts by other big powers that seek a peaceful role in the 
EIOR. Focusing merely on SCS and not the EIOR is an immature policy choice. 
Seeking stronger engagement with India in the EIOR will positively reflect on 
China’s behaviour in SCS and it may draw a more settled policy. It also allows India 
to practise its IOR policies across the region, and allows Malaysia to see Indian 
maritime policy in action. Through this proactive engagement, both Malaysia and 
India will be able to build more trust and confidence, and this will drive a positive 
outcome of MIMSC in the EIOR. 
The next chapter discusses the MIMSC and mitigation of traditional maritime 
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MALAYSIA–INDIA MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE 
MITIGATION OF TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS IN THE 




This chapter discusses the MIMSC and the mitigation of traditional security threats in 
the EIOR. It has two sections: first it discusses the traditional threats faced by both 
Malaysia and India. Looking at these threats, both Malaysia and India have expressed 
concern over SLOCs as a major maritime concern that they have in common. The 
second section discusses the emerging areas of MIMSC in order to secure the  safety 
and security of SLOCs in the  EIOR. 
 
5.2 Traditional Maritime Security Threats Shaping Malaysia–India 
Maritime Security Cooperation in the Eastern Indian Ocean   Region 
This section will discuss the common traditional threats that are  shaping MIMSC  in  
the EIOR. The first issue concerns the safety and security of SLOCs for economic 
prosperity, and the second concerns safety and security of SLOCs from state practice 
over  regional autonomy. 
 
Diagram 2: Traditional Maritime Security Threats Shaping Malaysia–India 














5.21 Safety and Security of Sea Lines of Communication for Economic   Prosperity 
 
 
Map 9: Major Sea Lines of Communication in the Indian Ocean   Region 
 
 
Source:  indiandefencereview.com 
Shielding and protecting the SLOCs has been an important maritime concern that has 
been shared between Malaysia and India in the EIOR, especially from the perspective  
of economic prosperity, as the major economic commodities of the world pass along 
these shipping lanes. 
92 
As mentioned earlier, the IOR is probably the origin  of  
maritime  civilisation, and  was viewed as an economic  playground by rich     industrial 
European countries during the pioneer  period. 
During the Cold War, temporary internal clashes occurred between states but 
this did not stop the newly independent states from continuing to support and treasure 
the IOR as a sphere of vital influence for the development of economic  wellbeing. 
Hence all littoral states worked together to ensure that collective  maritime  security  
was present around the IOR. The post-Cold War period has generated a  similar  
scenario amongst littoral states especially with the effects of globalisation. This has 
prompted the upgrading of oceanic  security. 
On the question of provincial exchanges, the IOR can be termed  ‘the lifeline of  
the global economy’ and is essential to every nation’s economic advantage. It also 
boasts of extensive stores of energy and other assets, including oil, gas,  seabed  
mineral assets and fish. The economic advancement of a state is closely connected to 




its exchanges and energy supplies. Since the majority of the exchange of IOR 
littorals and the south Asian states is seaborne, the SLOCs are the lifelines of these 
nations. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
Report, ‘Survey of Maritime Transport 2000’, notes that the world’s    ocean-based 
exchange  recorded its 14
th 
consecutive yearly  expansion, and  that Asia contributes   a 
huge amount of import and fare value to overall exchanges.
93 
Therefore, the income 
from seaborne trade is expected to increase tremendously in this sphere of influence. 
The IOR comprises major SLOCs and has several vital maritime choke points 
used for seaborne trade activities such as cargo transportation, oil and gas transport 
and other vital economic exchanges. Any form of interruption in these energy 
lifelines can impact the overall trade flow patterns and cause disorder to the 
international trade system. With regard to vital choke points such as the SOH, SOM, 
SOBM, and the Lombok and Sunda Straits, any disturbance in the shipping 
movements coursing through these vulnerable points could have disastrous 
outcomes. The interruption of sea lines of energy, which are usually sea routes in 
particular, has huge security consequences amongst the affected littoral states. Since 
the availability of energy affects the geo-political policies of a country, any reduction 
in its supply results in genuine security issues. Given the rising interest in energy in 
countries like Malaysia and India, it is certain that these two countries are in constant 
watch over the security of the SLOCs and the choke points of the region. 
IOR waters are of great importance to the planet’s oil shipments, mass freight 
movements and a large proportion of its container shipments. Out of the seven world 
oil chokepoints, four are in the IOR, including the SOH and SOM, the Suez Canal 
and SOBM. According to the US Energy Information  Administration (EIA),    the 
SOH recorded a transit volume of 15.4 million barrels of oil per day in  1998.
94 
As 
mentioned earlier, any closure of SOH would practically cut off Gulf supplies to the 
East altogether, and also seriously affect the West. As for SOM, the safety of the 
SLOCs especially SOM, is vital for Malaysia, as it is the busiest trade route in the 
world.
95 
Another vital factor to consider is the security of Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs). The economic development of a country is dependent on the fact that cargo 
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ships can move freely, without any restrictions, through these zones.
96 
EEZs are a 
sensitive issue because of the jurisdictional rights of individual coastal  states. 
97  
Where   EEZs  are   not  overlapping  or  adjacent,   it   would  be   easier  to      foresee 
cooperation where EEZs are  concerned.
98
 
Clearly, the security of SLOCs in the EIOR is a legitimate concern for both 
Malaysia and India. Nine crucial choke points provide access to the IOR, of which 
five are key energy SLOCs. An obstruction to any of these – especially SOM where 
it connects Malaysia and India in the EIOR via the Andaman and Nicobar Islands – 
would result in serious disruption of seaborne exchange and uncontrolled instability 
in oil and merchandise prices, prompting changes in the global economy. 
 
5.22 The Safety and Security of Sea Lines of Communication from State Practice 
over Regional Autonomy 
Though water has no visible boundaries, the littoral states alongside the major SLOCs 
have a basic claim over their coastal waters. Territorial waters, defined by the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), says that any country 
that has coastal water extending to 12 nautical miles from the baseline of its land can 
claim those waters as sovereign territory of the state. The movements of any form of 
foreign ships in these territorial waters are allowed, as long as they are what is 
referred to as an ‘innocent passage’. However, permission from the state in question 
is   required.  From  this  perspective,  SLOCs  are  an  important  element  in      the 
understanding of traditional maritime security threats.
99 
Furthermore, as the sea does 
not have visible boundaries, territorial disputes can occur in areas of overlapping 
territorial waters.
100 
In such a case, violation of the UN ruling is a direct threat to a 
state’s sovereignty. In the case of MIMSC in the EIOR, China’s active involvement 
in the EIOR is perceived as a challenge. 
There are currently two main sources of insecurity in the IOR. The first is 
instability in some of the littoral and hinterland states around the Indian Ocean 
(Potgieter 2012). To some degree, both sea-based terrorism and maritime piracy 
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Kamerling 2014). For example, the intrusion of state sovereignty at the SOM by 
Malaysian Customs vessels that stop vessels, including fishing boats, and demand 
payment for the government is a major concern.
101 
SOM is vital to Malaysia, and a 




The other main source of insecurity relates to the rise of new naval powers in the 
Indian Ocean. While piracy and terrorism in the Indian Ocean are current issues, the 
so-called Great Power rivalry is not yet an immediate security threat in the region 
(Putten, Wetzling and Kamerling 2014). However, the potential effects of Great 
Power rivalry are more fundamental than, and extend beyond, acts of terrorism or 
piracy (Putten, Wetzling and Kamerling 2014). China’s rising maritime power in the 
EIOR is seen as a major concern by both Malaysia and India. 
In terms of this rivalry, one major issue stands out: the increasing maritime 
rivalry between India and China. Tensions between these two Asian powers have 
existed since the 1959 exile of the Dalai Lama to India, and the 1962 Sino-Indian 
border war. Moreover, China is a close security partner of Pakistan, which ever since 
Partition has had a troubled relationship with India.
103 
Now that China is emerging 
as a major power and India’s population may overtake that of China in a few years’ 
time, the IOR has become an additional area of potential tension between the two 
countries. While China’s policy towards the USA has been more absolute in the 
recent years, India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis China has become more vocal. India is 
shaping its policy with its IOR neighbours and major Asian powers in various ways 
to match China’s strategic partnership, in an eastward crescent along the Asia– 
Pacific Rim. In this process, India also hopes that the USA will help to neutralise the 
continuing Chinese military efforts and ambitions at the IOR. 
While the growing competition between China and India is particular evident in 
the context of the IOR, the concern raised amongst the littoral states relate to China’s 
increasing economic ambitions, especially the search for energy at the IOR. China’s 
tactic of investing money abroad and in vital industries for energy development has 
been fruitful in terms of locking access and other related energy resources and 
materials for the development of its country. Some see China’s efforts to secure 
 






energy resources as the beginning of a new era, focusing on the ‘geopolitics of 
energy’, which would impact on development, bring about competition and even 
result in conflict (Rumley 2012). In fact, this situation, which can be termed a power 




Energy security and resource diplomacy have compelled China to cast an 
anxious eye at the SLOCs. Sea transport is China's most cost-effective mode of 
energy supply. Free passage through the straits between China’s coastlines and the 
IOR has become of exceptional strategic significance for China. China’s energy 
purchases have expanded comprehensively throughout the Middle East, central Asia 
and Africa; more than 70 per cent of China’s oil imports are ocean based. Despite 
the fact that China is trying to acquire secure supply lines and thus decrease its 
dependency, China is seen as continuously relying upon energy supplies particularly 
from the Middle East and Africa. 
This dependency is largely due to the chokepoint at the SOM. According to 
mainstream Chinese writings, the SOM constitutes the ‘soft underbelly’ of Beijing, 
thereby introducing the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ to the Chinese Government.104 That is 
why, as previously mentioned, we have been seeing China extending its diplomatic, 
economic and military forays into the IOR. Its overland pipeline and its port projects 
with various IOR littoral states are all designed to reduce the Malacca Dilemma by 
providing alternative energy routes to China, reducing the need for Beijing to 
channel the energy supplies through the Malacca Strait.
105
 
The water routes connecting China to the Middle East and Africa go through 
SOM (a restricted entry cooperatively managed by Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia). No less than 95 per cent of the oil utilised in China is transported via 
sea, and 80 per cent of that goes through the SOM. Besides that, the SOM is an 
amazingly crowded passage and so it is thick with privateers and terrorists. Based on 
the IMB yearly theft report, a huge number of incidents take place in the SOM, a 
large proportion of which include hijacking for payment or assault by automatic 
weapons and rocket launchers. The problem for China is that SOM is a vital water 
route for China’s energy resources but at the same time it is far from reach due to 
geographical conditions. Accordingly, any weakness in the vital chokepoints of 
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SLOCs at the IOR waters is a major issue for China, and China’s method of assuring 
the security of these choke points is amazingly constrained. This is one of the 
components of the Chinese ‘string of pearls’ policy (Pathak 2009). 
Indian security challenges in the case of China’s maritime ambitions in the 
EIOR can be observed on several occasions. In the middle of 2010 for example, 
India attempted to block China’s aim to become co-chair of the Shared Awareness 
and Deconfliction (SHADE) initiative – a trilateral pact between Japan, China and 
India to share data to achieve the most efficient use of Naval Forces present in the 
IOR (Gokhale and Josh 2012). Another event could be seen in the western 
hemisphere of the IOR. For example, due to the concerns of a possible limitation of 
India in its own backyard, India cast an unfavourable vote against China’s idea of 
clustering the Gulf of Aden into smaller sections for easier patrolling by responsible 
individual countries, and strongly argued that it was not meeting the criteria 
presented by UNCLOS. A similar situation can be seen along India’s littoral states. 
For example, in 2011, China proposed to place a military presence at Seychelles to 
curb the increasing concern of piracy. This idea was seen as an indirect attempt to 
reduce India’s prominent role at the IOR waters. The exact same scenario was seen 
when India tried to prevent Sri Lanka from engaging with China at the Gulf of 
Mannar, just adjacent to India’s coastline. 
China’s offers of military or economic assistance are seen as gaining influence 
in the region. Just as China is expanding its maritime influence along the littoral 
states next to India, its anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa are another form 
of encirclement against India in the IOR. As other countries begin to counterbalance 
China’s positions in the same sphere of influence, for example Japan and Korea 
deploying naval presences at the Horn of Africa, India is also presenting similar 
behaviours in order to remove competition for its regional position in its own 
backyard. 
A similar intention is noticeable in China, to check and balance India’s ties with 
both SEA nations, which is strongly reflected through its LEP. China’s continuous 
attempts to have a strong position in this region through its partnership with vital 
IOR countries is believed to be a possible extension of its ‘string of pearls’. Whilst 
India is ensuring that its regional power in the IOR is not jeopardised by China, the 
SEA region recognises India as a healthy check against China, especially in SOM. 





context. In the case of maritime security especially, SEA countries seem to be more 
willing to cooperate with India than with China, especially in ensuring that no 
regional autonomy is present at the SOM. 
India’s role in Asia can be observed in its relationship with various SEA 
countries. A key element of India’s Pacific outreach has been regular joint naval 
exercises, port calls, security dialogues and meetings as well as different levels of 
defence cooperation amongst like-minded countries. For instance, India has accepted 
Vietnam’s offer of berthing rights in Na Trang Port in SCS. In addition to this, there 
are some reports that mention that India will be offering its BRAHMOS cruise 
missiles as it has to Malaysia for ‘friendship prices’. On the other hand, India’s  
participation in the ASEAN + 8 meeting between the defence minister, an important 
platform, discussed evolving security issues faced by affected countries. New Delhi 
is also scaling up defence ties with Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra (Malik 2012), to 
counterbalance China’s strong position in SCS waters. 
However, as confirmed by the Malaysian Minister of Defence, Hishammuddin 
Hussein, in October 2014 Malaysia and China agreed to hold joint military exercises, 
subsequent to an MOU that the two had signed in 2005. Although the joint exercises 
were in the event cancelled, Malaysia’s Minister of Transport, Liow Tiong Lai, 
announced that Malaysia, in collaboration with China, was planning to develop a 
maritime training hub for the ASEAN region. He said China had in the past provided 
technical assistance and numerous capacity-building programmes to ASEAN, 
particularly in the training of seafarers. To reciprocate, Malaysia had offered the 
maritime institute’s collaboration with Chinese experts in order to develop a training 
hub for the region.
106 
He also announced that the port of Qinzhou on the Gulf of 
Tonkin in South China’s Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region had become a sister 
port of Kuantan (on Malaysia’s eastern seaboard), as a mark of close cooperation 
between the two countries. He stated: “the two ports will cooperate in various fields, 
including shared shipping lanes, logistics, information exchange and talent 
training.”107 Malaysia’s stronger engagement with China in the maritime    domain 
does reflect its long-term interest in the SCS, especially with regard to the disputed 
islands. 
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Since 2009, China has been involved in a series of aggressive incidents in SCS 
waters, causing concern for the Malaysian authorities. For example, in February 
2011, Chinese frigates fired on Philippines fishing boats and in the following month, 
attempted to ram a Philippines government energy research vessel. In May 2011, 
China unilaterally announced a four-month fishing ban in the northern part of the 
SCS. Steel posts and buoys were laid, and exploration cables from a Vietnamese ship 
in the SCS were cut. Chinese military vessels used guns to threaten the crews of 
Vietnamese fishing boats. In 2012, several Vietnamese fishermen in the Paracel 
Islands were detained by the Chinese. Meanwhile, in December 2011, a Chinese 
civilian ship and naval vessel were seen in Philippines territorial waters, and in 2012 
Chinese fishing boats were seen around the Scarborough Shoal, an area within 
Philippines waters, causing diplomatic standoffs. These incidents have raised 
concerns in Malaysia, which is contesting the Spratly Islands with China. Hence, 
Malaysia needs to balance the maritime power involvement of China. 
Asian powers have in recent years increased their military expenditure and will 
almost certainly continue to do so in the coming decades. This increase arises from 
the need to mitigate both traditional and non-traditional security issues. The 
traditional concerns in particular are due to the need to balance the naval presence 
and developments at the EIOR. Countries like Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and 
Vietnam have extended their naval presence in this sphere. China on the other hand 
has undertaken the most rapid expansion. Although the USA factor places an 
important role behind China’s naval expansion in Asia, its neighbouring countries 
are caution in their own backyards. The power competition between China and the 
USA are growing each day and India is expected to join, leading to a triangular 
power competition between these major powers. 
While this is a concern, the safety and security from state regional autonomy are 
also dependent on three most important players that decide how security at SOM is 
to be accomplished. They are the littoral states, the client states, and shippers. The 
littoral states have the privilege of imposing rules on navigational safety and security 
and making regulations with regard to forestalling accidents. These rights are set out 
in the SOLAS, the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREG), and the 1982 UNCLOS. These provisions are constrained, 
notwithstanding, by the privileges of travel that the UNCLOS extends to the vessels 





measures to advance the safety and security of navigation through the SOM. As the 
major watchdog over the SOM, Malaysia has these privileges to ensure the safety 
and security of SOM, however as it is only a minor power, such measures are 
insufficient without the assistance of a major maritime power, such as India, in the 
EIOR. 
This scenario can be conveyed through the Malaysian National Defence Policy. 
Under this policy, Malaysian boundaries are described as vulnerable to sea threats. 
The geographical position of Peninsula Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak separated by 
SCS pushes Malaysia to give high priority to maritime defence in its policymaking. 
Any threat or disruption to the ocean and air courses there can threaten the stability 
of the two ranges and in general, of Malaysia (Mahadzir 2012). Hence, with a wide- 
range of waters to safeguard, it is easier to separate water boundaries, one to the east 
and one to the west, in order to effectively monitor the territory waters of Malaysia. 
In the eastern front in particular, India’s friendship is vital and these conditions 
shape MIMSC in the EIOR. 
While the growing maritime developments around the IOR have compelled 
many countries to establish contact and seek each other’s assistance to face maritime 
challenges and safeguard their maritime interest, the maritime relationship between 
Malaysia and India is not new. There are sufficient recorded points of reference for a 
more extensive and more profound engagement of the Indian military forces in 
Malaysia on all three divisions: land force, air force and the navy. From the navy’s 
perspective, Malaysia’s cooperation with India on the protection of the EIOR is well 
reflected through the Five Power Defence Agreements (FPDA). MIMSC has 
increased on a positive face with regular navy-navy visits, joint naval exercises, 
security dialogues and other maritime activities to strengthen the partnership. Ever 
since the Malaysia-India defence cooperation signed in 1993, the relationship has 
escalated to a great level. The list of defence and maritime activities in particular 
presented in Chapter 2 (Table 1 and 2) reflect a sign of great friendship between both 
countries and a strong sign of willingness to bring this particular relationship to a 
higher level of cooperation. 
Maritime security and cooperation between maritime forces is seen by Malaysia 
as critical, and it appears that India holds a similar view; it has assumed an urgent 
role in expanding positive maritime ties by undertaking a range of helpful measures, 





2009). However, there are cynics who claim that the ‘upgraded’ cooperation between 
Malaysia and India lacks substance (Dutta 2009). It appears that steps towards 
implementation are not being taken. Therefore, instead of observing an increase or at 
least a steady growth in the partnership, the volume of cooperation is believed to be 
at a standstill. However, as a note of caution, this situation should be addressed with 
high urgency. Maritime cooperation is a vital requirement amongst countries in the 
IOR especially with the growing maritime challenges in recent years. 
One particular shift will strengthen MIMSC in the EIOR. As a country that is 
dependent largely on SOM for trade activities and at the same time has one of the 
largest naval forces in the IOR, it is natural to seek partnership with vital powers at 
this juncture. However, it is important to respect Malaysia’s predominant role in its 
own backyard. Malaysia has openly accepted and endorsed India’s help and 
assistance in providing security measures in ensuring a safe SOM. One such example 
is ensuring that the northern circle of SOM, which is adjacent to Andaman and 
Nicobar Island, is protected from the threats of transnational wrongdoings. These 
include the trafficking of weapons, people, and drugs, which have long been of 
concern to the littoral states. Since India has the authority in terms of shaping and 
imposing laws in this sphere, a strong chain of friendship is likely to prosper. Just as 
India has more liberty at the Andaman Sea and requires limited involvement from 
the Malaysian side, India on the other hand should also aim for limited involvement 
in SOM. Pioneer coastal states, especially Malaysia and Indonesia, have clearly 
stated their view that the littoral states should only seek assistance in support of 





5.3 Emerging Areas of Malaysia-India Maritime Security Cooperation in the 
Eastern Indian Ocean  Region 
 
This section will discuss the emerging areas of MIMSC in the   EIOR. 
 
 
Diagram 3: Emerging Areas of Malaysia–India Maritime Security 
Cooperation in Mitigating Traditional Security Threats in the Eastern 





Partnership in maritime resources and competence is a fundamental element in any 
cooperation. Whilst resources are tangible, competence  involves  knowledge,  skills  
and expertise, and responsibility involves attitude and core values such as integrity, 
innovation and credibility. These are vital strategies in facing environments that are 
rapidly changing, as in the maritime domain. If such a strategy is strongly exploited, a 
strong resource and foundation for competence can be built. MIMSC in the EIOR is 
cooperation that is based on this  framework. 
In the past, Malaysia and India’s defence relationship was mainly based on land 
forces. This was partly due to Malaysia’s priority to overcome the threat of 
communism, which was land-based. The Commonwealth Training System provided 
Malaysia and India with a basis on which they could work together in arms and 
military training. There were high-level meetings with both Malaysian and Indian 
Secretary Generals and annual meetings between the Chiefs of Navies, Air Forces    
and   Armies,   and  this  clearly  indicated  a   mature  relationship  between  the     two 
countries.
108   
However,  the  maritime  relationship  was  evidently  slow.  There  were 
high-level  multilateral  delegation  visits  between  the  two  countries  for     meetings, 
 










summits and events such as Lima, DEFEXPO and Aero India. There were also 
events such as the Indian Warship Goodwill Mission to Malaysia when three Indian 
naval ships, INS Ranjit, INS Rana and INS Jyoti, visited Port Klang, and the Indian 
naval ship INS Ranvijay entered the port of Sepanggar in Malaysia on August 2014 
and embarked on a three-day goodwill visit aimed at strengthening bilateral defence 
ties. Yet there was still no significant joint bilateral exercise between Malaysia and 
India. 
As previously mentioned, there have of course been multilateral exercises 
involving both Malaysia and India, such as Milan. However, India has yet to show 
Malaysia the same commitment to defence cooperation as it has with Malaysia’s 
neighbours, Singapore and Indonesia. For example, Singapore’s SIMBEX is 
designed to enhance interoperability and mutual understanding between the navies of 
India and Singapore. Since its inception in 1993, SIMBEX has grown in tactical and 
operational  complexity;  it  has  evolved  from  its  traditional  emphasis  on   anti- 
submarine warfare to more complex maritime exercises, such as air defence, air and 
surface practice firing, maritime security and SAR.
109 
CORPAT, in comparison to 
SIMBEX, is designed to enhance mutual understanding and interoperability between 
India and Indonesia, to prosecute vessels engaged in unlawful activities, to conduct 
SAR and to take measures against sea pollution.
110 
Since its inception in 2002, the 
close defence relations between India and Indonesia have grown steadily, with 




It could be argued that Malaysia, situated at the heart of Southeast Asia, should 
thus be a more strategic partner. However, in terms of naval power, Malaysia is not 
in the same league as either Singapore or Indonesia. Both Singapore and Indonesia 
have emerging blue water navies. Singapore, with its considerable qualitative 
military superiority over its neighbours, along with smart diplomacy and alliance 
building, has an almost impregnable defensive shield. Singapore is also capable of 
providing an offshore defence of sea lines, and plays a vital role in regional 
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, rendering itself a vital partner 
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in securing the IOR (Hardy 2015). Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous 
country with a coastline of 54,716.0 km (European Institutes for Asian Studies 
Briefing Seminar 2013). Reports have indicated that Indonesia is aiming to establish 
a Minimal Essential Force (MEF) and plans to acquire a blue water navy by 2024, 
thereby attaining powerful naval influence in the region (European Institutes for 
Asian Studies Briefing Seminar 2013). 
It is reasonable to expect that any country would want to work with countries 
that are as powerful or as influential as itself. Although Malaysia does not yet have a 
blue water navy, this does not mean that it lacks the experience to conduct naval 
exercises with India. Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have similar but not 
identical experiences in SAR and maritime security. Also, as Malaysia’s SOM is a 
major choke point for ships and a valuable EEZ, India should place the same 
importance on Malaysia in terms of bilateral exercises. 
In terms of bilateral and multilateral naval exercises, as mentioned, there have 
been many developments between the two nations in terms of training naval 
personnel and joint exercises with other vital maritime powers. However, in recent 
times, Malaysia has placed more importance on the SCS and China; whereas 
Malaysia’s volume of naval exercises with India, although not neglected, has not 
increased. Malaysia often shares information with regard to jungle and guerrilla 
warfare with the USA, due to shared long-standing experiences of fighting  against 
communists. Thus, a similar exchange of ideas and experiences could enhance the 
relationship between the navies of Malaysia and India.
112 
When asked what Malaysia 
could offer to engage actively with India, it was the FPDA that was in focus, where 
Australia and Singapore have a navy exchange with Malaysia. A similar cooperation 
could increase interoperability between the navies, and this could be one area of 
interest between Malaysia and India.
113
 
One of the major interests expressed by both Malaysia and India is cooperation 
relating to assets such as SUKHOI, SCORPENO Club and KILOS.
114 
Technical and 
logistics assistance can make a great deal of difference in this traditional   maritime 
security  cooperation  in  the  EIOR. 
115  
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training personnel and capacity building.
116 
Both technical and logistics assistance, 
and further personnel training, as well as information sharing between Malaysia and 
India, could improve maritime interoperability between the two in the EIOR.
117 
As 
Malaysia has been actively sending officers and men for various courses, including a 
SUKHOI expertise course, plus gunnery and submarine specialisation, the officers 
have added that other areas of possible cooperation between both nations could be in 
aviation, such as on the SUKHOI Su-30 MKM, and in joint naval exercises.
118 
Enhancing interoperability, and  improving technical and logistic     assistance  and 
continuous joint maritime exercises are major areas of cooperation that need more 
focus and practice implementation. Both countries are aware that SLOCs, especially 
the SOM, is vital for the safer navigation of ships
119 
and this is critical for both the 
Malaysian and Indian navies. 
Malaysia’s leanings towards western countries were strongly driven by the need 
to overcome the overwhelming communist threat during the Cold War period. This 
has shaped Malaysia’s mind-set and is reflected strongly in its relationship with 
India. For example, the Malaysian Air Force has over the years steadily increased its 
involvement in multilateral peacetime training exercises under the auspices of 
FPDA, Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (Carat), and Pinag-Isang 
Somahan Ng Tsuper at the Operations Nationwide (Piston) series of annual exercises 
conducted with the armed forces of the USA, Australia and some neighbouring 
countries (Chandran 2014). Malaysia needs to change this mentality, and engage 
strongly with India specifically on more mature defence cooperation, rather than 
limiting its cooperation with India to visits and attendance at training courses. Whilst 
adhering to all the principles of territorial respect, which are openly expressed,
120
if 
these areas of cooperation were to be taken up, a more comprehensive MIMSC could 
be shaped in the EIOR. 
The defence industry in particular has been a major area of interest to both 
countries, making it a vital component of cooperation for both Malaysia and India in 
shaping MIMSC in the EIOR. Also called the military industry, it covers both 
government  and  commerce  in  a  country  focusing  on  research,    development, 
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production, export and import of equipment and facilities, and also manpower. 
The interest and ambition can be seen in both countries’ annual defence 
exhibitions. In Malaysia, first staged in 1991 with over 100 exhibiting companies, 
the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA) is currently 
the most influential exhibition in Asia, with almost 500 exhibitors and 38,000 trade 
visitors in 2015. It is an exhibition of civil and commercial applications focusing on 
maritime and aerospace defence, commercial and business aviation, shipbuilding and 
ship repair. Similarly, India organises the Land, Naval & Internal Homeland Security 
Systems Exhibition (DEFEXPO) annually. First held in 1988, today it receives both 
foreign and domestic company participation with almost 232 foreign companies 
from 32 countries and 63 delegations from 58 countries. 
The defence industry is a strategic component that forms an integral part of the 
development of the nation’s defence capability. A well-developed defence industry 
contributes significantly to the availability of state-of-the-art technology, weapons 
systems and military solutions. It also provides thorough life support structures and 
services that have a bearing on the serviceability rate of the armed forces inventory 
(Malaysia Defence Industry Blueprint 2005). Defence industry collaboration, in 
addition to technical and logistics assistance, can make a significant difference    to 
traditional  maritime  security  cooperation  in  the  EIOR, 
121  
and  is  a  new  area     of 
opportunity for both Malaysia and India. In its position as a developing maritime 
nation, there is a direct need for Malaysia to have a common platform to develop a 
defence industry like that of other countries.
122 
Both Malaysia and India have long- 




One long-term feature that has been in the interests of India is Malaysia’s ship 
maintenance and repair industry. The maritime industry is a complex one that is 
highly dependent on factors such as global economic and trade development (Frost 
and Sullivan 2012). The growth of a successful shipbuilding sector has been pivotal to 
the rapid and robust economic development of most countries with long coastlines. 
Shipbuilding has the potential to increase the contribution of the industry and the 
services sector to national Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The sector has a   strong 
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impact, both direct and indirect, on most other leading industries such as steel, 
aluminum, electrical machinery and equipment, and it is hugely dependent on – hence 
there is a great call for – infrastructure and service sectors. The shipbuilding industry 
is usually characterised by a few large companies controlling the majority of market 
shares, the remaining participants being a large number of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). 
It is beneficial for both India and Malaysia to collaborate on shipbuilding and 
maintenance, which could have a positive effect on the cost-efficiency of the 
shipbuilding industry.
124 
It has been argued that no joint venture has been carried out 
so far, while great prospects lie in maintenance, repair, assets and ships.
125 
India has 
suggested that a shift could take place in shipbuilding and maintenance services.
126
 
Malaysia has good ship services skills, which India can utilise, as it is cheaper for 
India.
127 
Most Indian ships are sent to Europe for high-value services, which could 
otherwise be sent to Malaysia. 
Unbeknownst to many, Malaysia provides good maintenance services with 
much more affordable prices than India’s western counterparts. Malaysia is also 
competitive in naval equipment manufacturing, and it may seek cooperation    with 
India to boost its local industry.
128 
Malaysia’s shipbuilding or ship repairing (SBSR) 
industry is part of the marine transport sub-sector of the larger transport industry. 
This consists of enterprises involved in the design, building, construction, repair, 
maintenance, conversion and upgrading of vessels and marine equipment (Khalid 
2014). 
Over the last few years, Malaysia has been recognised as one of the most 
reputed trading partners by many countries around the world. According to the 
Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), Malaysia’s geographical proximity at the 
IOR has strongly influenced its large number of seaborne activities in SOM. In 
addition, two ports in Malaysia, Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, have emerged as 
the two largest ports in the world. These strong assets have helped Malaysia climb 
the economic ladder, among other countries on this shoreline. In the effort to provide 
the industry with the necessary tools to compete in the global arena, the Malaysian 
 
124 India Group Interview 1. 
125 India Group Interview 2. 
126 India Individual Interview 2. 
127 Malaysia Group Interview 2. 




government pledged to develop Malaysia as a center for shipbuilding and repairs 
(Entry Point Project No. 6) under the Business Services in the National Key 
Economic  Area  (NKEA),  as  part  of  the  country’s  Economic    Transformation  
Programme   (ETP). 
129   
The   Entry   Point   Project   (EPP)   focuses   on     providing 
competitive prices, enhanced facilities and increased capabilities for shipbuilding 
and the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) market, to cater to the growing 
shipbuilding and repair industry. As a result, in 2011 the turnover the industry 
generated was approximately RM7.05 billion and created about 32,500 jobs.
130 
The 
industry also attracted RM6 billion worth of investments.
131
 
The Malaysian shipping industry generated large amounts of money from the 
construction of medium-sized vessels and their export to countries in the region, as 
well as Europe, the Middle East and Australia. In this regard, the industry is still 
demonstrating strong growth, and it has been officially recognised that the potential 
to expand the export industry is enormous, especially as a result of the slowdown in 
the global demand for larger vessels. The concomitant increase in demand for 
medium-sized ships, both locally and internationally, has created a profitable 
opportunity to support Malaysia’s development as a shipbuilding and ship repair 
hub. It is evident that the Malaysian shipyards have managed to capture a huge share 
of the domestic market, as well as a share of the global market. 
It is not well known that Malaysia’s SBSR is in fact thriving, enjoys government 
support and features yards capable of producing quality products and workmanship. 
Given these advantages, the industry has the potential to gain a greater global market 
share. In acknowledgment of this, in December 2011, Malaysia launched its 
Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Industry Strategic Plan (SBSR) 2020 to provide a 
useful roadmap and to set realistic targets for the industry. Prime Minister Najib 
Razak, in a speech at Port Klang on August 2013, argued that: 
The industry would achieve more than USD6 billion profits and provide 
over 55,000 jobs by 2020 in the SBSR sector, which includes shipping, 
port operations, shipbuilding/repairing and offshore oil and gas 
exploration and production (Maierbrugger 2013). 
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Furthermore, at the 2nd National Marine Industries Forum (2NMIF) keynote 
speech in Kuala Lumpur, held on October 2012, YB Dato’ Sri Mustapa Mohamed, 
Minister of MITI, said that Malaysia has what it takes to “make a mark in the 
industry” amid intense competition from shipyards in the region.132 The SBSR 2020 
has a multilevel strategy to develop and blossom Malaysia’s defence industry to a 
standard compatible with developed countries. These involvd various different levels 
of execution, starting with establishing strong business friendships, encouraging 
active involvement within the structure, quality control of products and services, and 
a healthy, safe and effective working environment. 
At the same forum, MIMA’s Chairman, Vice Admiral Tan Sri Dato’ Seri 
Ahmad Ramli Hj. Mohd. Nor (Ret.), said that: 
By fulfilling the targets set in SBSR 2020, Malaysia has wisely focused 
on leveraging its existing strengths in building small and medium-sized 
vessels and in exploring the offshore oil and gas industry to gain a global 
share  in  this  lucrative  and  competitive  field;  therefore       enhancing 




Strategically located at SOM, Selangor’s shores are frequented by 60,000 to 
94,000 ships every year.
134 
This translates into one third of global trade carried 
through the SOM and half the global oil trade.
135 
Malaysia being located at these 
important SLOCs of international trade routes requires that there is focus on this 
particular industry for a strong and more advance maritime outlook. Approximately 
RM300 billion capital expenditure provides medium- to long-term finance for the 
maritime sector, such as the national oil company Petronas, and other Malaysian 
governmental schemes, for example the Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad. 
With such government policies and incentives, Malaysia has succeeded in this 
industry. Selangor concentrates on design, support and maintenance, repair/overhaul 
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(MRO) services, plus equipment and component manufacturing. Statistics from 2011 
show that 14 ships were built by six shipyards in Selangor, 18 in shipyards on the 
peninsula and 229 in the shipbuilding hub of East Malaysia.
136 
Port Klang, the 12
th 
busiest global container port in the world, is under the supervision of Port Klang 
Authority and is operated by two private companies, Northport and Westports.   In 
2012, both were able to boast of handling 10 million 40-foot-equivalent units 
(TEUs)
137 
and 48 per cent of Malaysia’s total container tonnage.
138 
Until mid-2013, 
Westports achieved 5.5 million TEUs, in line with Port Klang’s growth forecast.139 
India could benefit from a country that holds such vast potential in the shipbuilding 
industry. That said, there is already an abundance of opportunities for Indian 
investors and industry players to reap benefits from Malaysia’s MRO and SBSR 
industries. 
India’s SBSR industry is also gaining momentum. The Indian shipbuilding and 
ship repair industry is likely to reach Rs 9,200 crore (Rs 92 billion) from the current 
level of just over Rs 7,310 crore (approximately Rs 73 billion), according to a study 
done by the industry body, the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of 
India (ASSOCHAM).
140 
India accounts for approximately 1 per cent of the   global 
shipbuilding industry, worth about Rs 7.3 lakh crore (Rs 7.3 trillion) and is growing 
at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR)
141 
of about 8 per cent.
142 
Globally, this 
industry is growing at a CAGR of about 24 per cent, and in February 2014 was 




However, India’s port handling charges are much higher and their logistics 
systems are under-performing. A shipment from India’s port costs an average of 
USD1200 while in China and Singapore these cost USD600 and USD400 
respectively. 
144  
Furthermore,  India’s  turnaround  performance  at  1.1  days,    in 
 
136 The Outlook of Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Sector: MGCC Perspectives. Retrieved from 





140 Desai (2012) Indian ship building industry to reach Rs 9,200 crore by 2015. Retrieved from 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-04-16/news/31349922_1_shipbuilding-assocham-industry- 







144World Maritime News. 2014. India’s Shipping Logistics Costly and Inefficient (2014). Retrieved from 
http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/135351/indias-shipping-logistics-costly-and-inefficient/      (30





comparison to 12 hours in Dubai, Shanghai and Colombo, is another factor that 
hinders the development of India’s SBSR industry.145 
On the other hand, although India has lower labour costs compared to other 
nations, feeding the workforce has been a great challenge from the Indian side. As 
shipbuilding requires a proper labour base, Malaysia could be a good partner. 
Placing more emphasis on developing the SBSR industry with Malaysia could 
improve India’s port handling. This also augurs an excellent future for a Malaysia– 
India partnership to develop the maritime sectors of both countries, especially in the 
SBSR industry, as both countries have what the other lacks; that is, Malaysia has the 
expertise while India has the low labour costs. 
This could be of benefit to both Malaysia and India. Malaysia should remain 
focused on developing its ship repairing and maintenance service, as this could be 
the future success of its defence industry.
146 
There have been several attempts at 
building offshore boats between Malaysia and countries in Europe (Turkey for 
example) but with India, the cooperation is based on maintenance services (that is, 
the Indian knowhow).
147 
The SCORPENO Club is a good example, but a more 
forward outlook is needed, e.g. trust in indigenous exchange and maintenance of 
ships of the first and second line.
148 
It is therefore clear that further development in 
this area depends on both Malaysia and India’s acquisition policies. 
Another area has been research and development (R&D). R&D plays a crucial 
factor in this industry in terms of testing and developing new technologies. 
Globalisation has simplified technology transfer within countries. The global village 
concept has enabled firms to build a strong network on R&D exchange and also 
transfer the required technology to the industry. This idea has been well utilised by 
developing countries, such as Malaysia, who have invested in R&D centres and 
promoted collaboration between universities and industries. However, the links 
between research institutes, universities and the industry are often weak. This is 
usually due to the lack of trust between the different players in the fields of research, 
technology and industry, which in turn leads to the universities and industry working 
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in isolation. Therefore, the industry argues that the universities neither understand 
nor satisfy the needs of the industry, while industries are often more focused on 
short-term profits and are unwilling to invest in R&D. 
Malaysia is evidently working to counter this vicious cycle. For example, the 
Malaysia Defence Technology Park (MDSTP) situated in Sungkai, Perak, is the first 
defence hub in the ASEAN region. It is focused on developing local human capital, 
R&D, science, technology and innovation for a defence security and enforcement 
agency. 
149 
It covers vast areas such as aerospace, automotive, information and 
communication technology (ICT), weaponry, and also maritime industries. In terms 
of the latter, it focuses on design, fabrication, welding, local manufacturing, piping, 
cabling, engine repair, electronic equipment repair and training. The MDSTP is 
expected to provide facilities for human resources and a technical competency centre 
for defence-related skills and other R&D services, both local and regional, as well as 
to promote and attract a worldwide network in the defence industry. India is 
interested in investing in Su-30 aircraft, KILO class submarines, the battery industry, 
and R&D in defence technology, which could encourage healthy cooperation in the 
advancement of the defence industry and make it technologically stronger and more 
competitive.
150 
Malaysia’s innovative ideas, such as the MDSTP, could thus be used 
as one of the key offers or as a starting point in a proposal for further comprehensive 
MIMSC in the EIOR. 
India has considerable naval knowledge and Malaysian naval industries could 
benefit from this.
151 
Malaysia is interested in engaging with India in such areas as the 
production of frigates and destroyers, with capabilities such as India’s Shivakli class 
frigate, a hybrid of western and Russian technology.
152 
Malaysia also claims that 
having a stronger relationship with India could provide more positive engagement in 
areas such as missiles and aircraft training such as the Yak 130 and the M346.
153 
Malaysia’s defence industry is believed to be considerably less extensive than 
India’s, and could make good use of India’s strong capabilities, especially with 
regard to military equipment.
154 
Hence, in terms of receiving defence assistance and 
cooperation, for instance in the areas of trainings from India, Malaysia would receive 
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India’s help with open arms.
155 
On the other hand, India could also utilise Malaysia’s 
expertise in SBSR and MRO, services which could be obtained at a lower price. In 
addition, Malaysia’s active engagement and interest in R&D could also benefit India, 
an emerging maritime power keen to benefit from new innovative ideas and 
technology relating to ships. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
It is evident that both Malaysia and India have expressed concern over the safety and 
security of SLOCs, and this traditional maritime concern is shaping MIMSC in the 
EIOR in the post-Cold War era. The IOR is the heartbeat of the major global 
economy. With the large volume of international trade flowing through major choke 
points around the IOR, both Malaysia and India are seeking cooperation to ensure the 
safety of SLOCs for economic prosperity. Both countries also seek to cooperate to 
ensure that no one single regional autonomous power is present in the EIOR, 
especially with regard to China’s maritime ambitions in the region. A power balance 
is seen as essential to ensure that no power vacuum is present in this sphere of 
influence, which would indirectly implicate the safety and tranquillity of SLOCs in 
the EIOR. 
Two major emerging areas are shaping MIMSC in the EIOR. These 
collaborations will help mitigate the traditional maritime threat faced by both 
Malaysia and India in the EIOR. The first is a partnership in maritime resources and 
competence, and the second is a partnership in the defence industry. These areas of 
cooperation herald a resilient MIMSC in the EIOR. The next chapter discusses the 
























MALAYSIA-INDIA MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE 
MITIGATION OF NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS IN THE 




This chapter discusses MIMSC and the mitigation of non-traditional security threats 
in the EIOR. It has two sections: first, a discussion of the non-traditional threats faced 
by both Malaysia and India; the second section discusses the emerging areas of 
MIMSC in order to overcome these threats in the EIOR. 
 
6.2 Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats Shaping Malaysia–India 
Maritime Security Cooperation in the Eastern Indian Ocean Region 
This section discusses the common non-traditional threats that are shaping MIMSC in 
the EIOR. From a non-traditional perspective, both Malaysia and India have 
expressed concern about a) terrorism at sea, b) piracy, c) other illicit activities and d) 
natural disasters, all of which appear to be a major concern for both Malaysia and 
India in the EIOR. 
At the most fundamental level, transnational security issues can be characterised 
as non-military threats that cross national borders and damage both the political and 
social respectability of a country as well as the integrity of its residents. These can be 
termed low-power clashes. Unlike the traditional and atomic threats, which are 
utilised by states, low-power clashes are the instruments utilised by state-supported 
factions and also by non-state actors such as criminal gangs or terrorist groups who 
pay little heed to international laws and measures (Gallaghar   1992).
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The problems generated by low-power clashes include non-traditional security 
concerns, such as: marine terrorism; piracy; illicit, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing; environmental changes; common marine perils; the risks to energy security; 
and the risks to human security (that is, the need to prevent or at least minimise 
wrongdoing, destitution and malady). Many such risks have a critical marine 
component,  and  oceanic  security  has been  discussed  widely  by many countries 
 





because most trafficking is taking place at sea (Bateman & Bergin   2010). 
Traditional maritime threats are naturally of concern, but the problems  
represented by the wide spectrum of human-generated threats to maritime commerce 
are more challenging. This is because it is difficult to detect the  cause  of  such  
threats, which are mostly carried out by non-state  actors  and  interest  groups  that 
have no permanent central government. These conditions are shaping MIMSC in the 
EIOR. 
 
Diagram 4: Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats Shaping Malaysia– 




Piracy is generally viewed as hostis humani generis, Latin for ‘the adversary of the 
human race’. This is because pirate activities involve homicide, theft, loot, assault and 
many  other  cruel  and  contemptible  deeds,  with  significant  consequences for human 
activities at sea. Piracy has been problematic for many nations for centuries, but in the 
21
st 
century, globalisation has led to more of this activity occurring across boundaries, 
expanding and emerging in new areas throughout the   globe. 
Piracy is a mainstream non-traditional threat that is definitively growing in the 
EIOR. The International Chamber of Commerce  (ICC)  International  Maritime 
Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB-PRC) reported 2,626 pirates’  attacks  









issued by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in 2003, pirate attacks had tripled 
in the previous decade. The number of attacks in the first quarter of 2003 was equal 
to the total number of recorded private attacks for the whole of 1993 (Keyuan 2005). 
Piracy has become a growing and ever more extensive concern, and with the 
increasing reported and unreported incidents of piracy, this cross-boundary threat is 
a challenge to most activities and other human elements at sea, including fishermen, 
leisure seafarers, the military and cargo vessels. As indicated by the IMO Annual 
Report 2002, the SOM, the SCS and the IOR are the zones that have been most 
influenced by piracy. The IOR and its adjoining waters have long been notorious 
worldwide for pirate attacks and theft, because of the large amounts of shipping 
going through it, the low levels of maritime policing, and an environment that makes 
it easy for people to vanish without  trace.
157
 
As a consequence, in the 19
th 
century a legitimate administration was created 
because of the threats of piracy. A standard worldwide law made piracy the first 
crime, in which all states were entitled to capture wrongdoers and charge them with 
criminal activities (Khurana 2007). These improvements in local customs found their 
way into the statute books through the 20
th 
century. The 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas, and the 1982 UNCLOS both sketched out a global administration for 
the constraint of piracy. 
158 
The common goal of mitigating piracy soon grew 
momentum  and  is  accepted  by  most  countries  as  a  result  of  the  most precise 
universal law to address the issue of piracy. MIMSC in the EIOR has also developed 
in part due to this trend. 
Based on the UNCLOS definition, an incident of high seas piracy is a matter of 
concern for all countries involved. This is because the UNCLOS defines that high 
seas are a common and international water area for any country for the purpose of 
innocent passage. With no country having ownership of this area, this means that any 
country affected by a particular crime at sea has the right to seize or block 
malefactors, who should be arrested by an authorised maritime enforcement team. A 
similar right also applies in EEZs and regional waters that are more than 200 nautical 
miles away from territorial waters of a country. 
At the outset, when the UNCLOS began addressing the issue of piracy and 
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elements such as its correct definition, its components and countermeasures, almost 
all countries viewed most marine areas as high seas. This is due to the fact that the 
act of piracy was increasingly challenging for national governments. The concepts 
then slowly developed, and one outcome of these advancements is that the present- 
day law on piracy now falls into two categories: a) piracy that occurs outside 12- 
nautical miles from coastal waters, also referring to piracy at high seas which 
demarcate the limits of coastal state locality and power; and b) sea-robber acts, 
which take place in regional waters (Pandya 2011). 
In this context, piracy and sea robbery in the SOM is a particularly important 
driver to consider for Malaysia.
159 
It is contended that the major maritime concern 
from the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) point of view is  first 
piracy, which happens on the high seas, and sea robbery, which takes places within 
12 nautical miles of a country’s shoreline.160 The later classification additionally 
applies fundamentally to Malaysia, as it has sea boundaries with its neighbours, 
Singapore and Indonesia, in the Malay Archipelago in SEA waters. 
Sea robbery occurring around the territorial waters of Malaysia in the EIOR is a 
direct threat to state sovereignty, and it also has huge implications in the overall 
maritime security of the IOR. Although piracy is carried out more than 12 nautical 
miles from land, pirates have innovative ways of sneaking through busy waters and 
escaping into the waters of neighbouring states, making their crime an international 
issue requiring the attention of international law enforcement. A tactic often used by 
pirates and sea robbers is to target not fuel tankers but vessels with lower freeboard, 
which are easier to board for hijacking,
161 
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Map 10: International Boundaries of Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia in the 





In this context, the SOM has been a prime spot for piracy  for  centuries.  Map  10  
shows that Malaysia shares waters with two important neighbours, thus making 
implementation of the law an extremely difficult task. With other long-standing  
political issues between these countries, combating piracy remains a challenge. 
Statistics  provided by the IMB have shown a threefold increase over the last decade  
and nearly two thirds of these attacks have occurred in the SEA region (Bradford, 
Manicom, Simon & Neil 2010). During this time, SEA was labelled the most active 
piracy zone with seven key ‘pirate-prone’ areas, and in the year 2000 alone, piracy in 
this area represented 65 per cent of aggregate worldwide occurrences. In 2002, 
Indonesia’s waters were recognised as the world’s most   piracy-pervaded. 
The increasing piracy menace has raised concerns among ship owners, and this  
has led responsible littoral states such as Malaysia to overcome  the  problem  of  
piracy at SOM, continuing to ensure a peaceful environment  for  ship  navigations.  
The UNGA in 2008 approached all states, specifically those with districts on the 
seashore, to adopt essential and proper actions to anticipate and fight the occurrences  
of piracy and armed robbery at  sea. 
In addition to this, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, deeper concerns have arisen 
about the links between piracy and terrorism. This is because of the ease with which 





much graver outcomes (Vavro 2008). As a result, piracy has to some degree been 
associated with sea terrorism, and the two  have  subsequently  been  bracketed  
together in general communications and government explanations. The Bush 
administration, for example, regarded terrorism as shameful as piracy, the slave trade 
and genocide, and some people  believe  that sea  robbery constitutes  a serious  threat 
to world peace and security (Keyuan  2005). 
There is a definite boundary between Malaysia’s waters and those of Indonesia    
in the Singapore Strait, where the lanes of the traffic separation scheme (TSS) pass 
through the 10-mile-wide Singapore Strait between the Riau Archipelago and  the 
Malay peninsula. However, the TSS lanes also pass through the 40-mile-wide SOM 
between Sumatra and the west coast of Malaysia, and there, no EEZ boundary is 
agreed upon between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur (Bradford, Manicom, Simon & Neil 
2010.) In both locations, piracy is a huge concern for Malaysia in the   EIOR. 
 
Map 11: Pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean   Region 
 
Source: International Maritime Bureau Piracy  Centre 
 
 
This is also the case for the act of high seas piracy, which is truly a major concern for 
MIMSC in the EIOR. Most seaborne attacks, which take place at the territorial seas of   
a coastal state, makes the crime fall into the responsibility of that particular  coastal  
state (Rothwell 2009), often causing serious problems. Piracy is  believed  to  be  a 






India is located quite near to Somalian seas and this proximity 
largely influences India’s concern about Somalian pirate attacks. For Malaysia, the 
concern is more to do with the growth of the Somalian pirate networks, with their 
potential flow into the EIOR. 
Recently, however, piracy-related occurrences appear to have flowed the other 
way – westwards from the SOM and the SCS into the Bay of Bengal and towards the 
Arabian Sea. It appears that the magnitude of piracy concentration may be in the 
EIOR, a major SLOCs of Malaysia-India. There is additionally, by all accounts, a 
shift in piracy style that is happening. Previously the attacks were of the sort termed 
‘Asian piracy’, which normally meant taking comparatively unimportant resources 
from boats with little violence. The risk of this type of attack still, however, remains; 
both Malaysia and India are vulnerable to it, and accordingly it rates high in the 
moulding of MIMSC in EIOR. 
 
Table 4: Actual and Attempted Piracy Attacks 2009–2014 in the Southeast 
Asia Region and India 
 
LOCATION 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Malacca 
Straits 
2 2 1 2 1 1 
Malaysia 16 18 16 12 9 24 
Singapore 
Straits 
9 3 11 6 9 8 
Indonesia 15 40 46 81 106 100 
Thailand 2 2 - - - 2 
India 10 5 6 8 14 13 
 
Source: International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime 
Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2014 
 
It is clear that both Malaysia and India are facing a common risk in the EIOR in terms 
of this issue. Hence, India is likely to seek partnership with a littoral state with similar 
concerns. Malaysia would be an important partner for India because it is located  on 
 





the busiest routes of the SOM in SEA waters, so is bound to suffer from a high 
number of pirate attacks. 
The problem however is that, as already mentioned, pirates have various 
cunning ways of moving about within the grey area of water boundaries, making it 
challenging to identify the specific role of any country in acting against piracy and 
sea robbery. Not all countries have the competence to match the threats that are 
occurring around them at sea, and in addition to this, the different forms of law 
enforcement weaken countermeasures and at the same time allow pirate activities to 
increase continuously in the EIOR. 
This is the current situation for both Malaysia and India, and the differences 
between them are weakening the potential collaboration between them. Both 
countries have challenges in terms of carrying out arrangements and other forms of 
law enforcement, especially in view of the fact that international laws on piracy do 
not have any significant bearing on attacks within a coastal state’s own waters. Due 
to the limitations set out by the UNCLOS, it is left to the country in whose waters an 
attack is carried out to implement its own form of law enforcement. 
Global or regional collaboration is the best solution for piracy occurring on the 
high seas. The many pirate attacks in Somalian waters have gained international 
attention, and the UNSC has been addressing this issue since the early 1990s. The 
UN, for instance, worked with the Somalian Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
in order to bring law and order not only within Somalia itself, but also in relation to 
its territorial waters (Rothwell 2009). In 2008, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1816 
to address this issue directly. Encouraging global cooperation, the UNSC sought 
assistance from and collaboration by major countries, and as a result different states 
offering backing included Russia, Malaysia, India, Iran, China, Turkey, South Korea 
and Singapore (Rothwell 2009). 
In light of this progress, the EU instigated Operation Atlanta in December 2008 
to battle piracy off the coast of Somalia, with North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) handing over its counter-piracy operation, Allied Provider, to the EU as 
required by the UN in 2008 (Rothwell 2009). The range of participating countries 
shows that although this issue took place on the far western side of the IOR, it is 
genuinely accepted that acts of piracy in Somalian waters are of international 
concern, and both Malaysia and India see it that way. Another important step was 





encourage more effective law enforcement (Chalk 2009). 
This arrangement shows that both countries can escape this situation, and it is 
vital for both to seek common grounds in law enforcement to overcome these issues. 
Geography is not a limiting factor relating to pirate attacks in the IOR, and therefore 
this  must  also  be  the  case  relative  to  Malaysia  and  India  in  the      EIOR. 
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Nevertheless, under the current structure of the international framework, it is 
expected that the risks posed by this issue will remain unresolved. An organised 
structured is required, beginning with an accurate definition of piracy. This could be 
clustered based on area and water boundaries by relevant countries and a realistic 
implementation system. Although a wide range of participating countries would be 
required for this to be realised, as well as a strong change in attitude, it could help 
reduce and overcome the challenging piracy issue. 
 
6.22 Terrorism at Sea 
Terrorism at sea (TAS) is another issue closely related to piracy, and it is of 
increasing concern around the IOR. TAS incidents have various objectives, but 
fundamentally their instigators “may try to bring about human setbacks, monetary 
losses, ecological harm, or other negative effects, alone or in combination, of minor 
or significant result” (Farell 2007). 
One of the most extreme TAS areas in the world is the SEA region. Such attacks 
and activities in this region are more likely to take place in the SOM because it is 
one of the most important SLOCs for economic and military voyages. Water as a 
medium to conduct terrorist activities cannot be ignored (Khurana 2004). It is the 
cheapest means of transportation in the entire world, and the most concentrated 
medium for illegal activities, because it does not have clear water boundaries 
amongst states. This means that the littoral states around the SOM must consider 
TAS as a major part of their maritime security portfolio. India relies upon the 
consumption of 38 million barrels of oil per day, 80 per cent of which originate from 
the Gulf and come in through the IOR. India’s primary interests are therefore to 
handle TAS and piracy that take place off Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Given that India’s fuel supplies also go through the SOM, it is unsurprising that 
Indians have demonstrated as much enthusiasm as they have over yonder. Indian 
authorities have stated that it is to India’s greatest advantage to guarantee that the sea 





remains crime free. 
Currently, Muslim fundamentalist, separatist or radical groups carry out most 
TAS attempts in Indian waters. Several incidents could increase the level of intensity 
of TAS in the EIOR, requiring close cooperation between Malaysia and India; for 
example, the al-Qaeda attack on the French tanker Limburg in 2002, and the 
Lashkar-e-Taiba utilisation of a maritime methodology in its terrorist attack on 
Mumbai in 2008 (Farrell 2007). Other terrorist groups that have been active in the 
maritime domain in the IOR comprise the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
in Sri Lanka and the Al Shabaab activist gathering of southern Somalia. 
In SEA for instance, in 2000 the Filipino ferry Our Lady of the Mediatrix was 
bombed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), killing 40 individuals and 
injuring 50 more (Banlaoi 2008). In 2000, a suicide boat from Aden attacked the 
USS Cole. An Abu Sayaf Group seized various Western sightseers from resorts in 
Malaysia in 2000, and from the Philippines in 2001 (Massey 2008). While maritime 
terrorist attacks have not actually taken place in the SOM, Jemaah Islamiyah is 
known to want to attack US Navy vessels going to and through it (Storey 2008). 
Numerous security analysts point to the SOM as a potentially attractive centre for 
different terrorist groups with maritime capacities. In June 2005, taking into account 
their appraisal of the SOM, Lloyd’s Joint War Committee added it to its list of 
perilous waters (Massey 2008). 
Despite the gravity of these attacks and the potential for terrorist groups to 
continue taking advantage of the relatively less well-regulated maritime realm, the 
phenomenon of maritime terrorism remains relatively under-studied. Indeed, over 
the past decade, much of the scholarly discussion on maritime security in the IOR 
has focused on piracy and armed robbery at sea. The intensity of these issues led to 
global collaboration in constructing a more effective structure to combat these 
challenges. A better framework is important, especially in the light of 9/11 when the 
threat of TAS increased, gaining global recognition under the Bush administration. 
Another increasing concern, along with the TAS, is the abuse of flag of 
convenience (FOC) shipping by these interest groups. Al-Qaeda for example is 
known to adopt a tactical move. These groups were believed to sail under fake 
registered flag that are intractable. This allows them to smuggle illegal items such as 





TAS connections with container traffic were acknowledged after the search of a 
tanker by the USA naval force in January 2002 revealed a group of al-Qaeda 
terrorists stowed away inside a well-prepared container. This revelation provoked an 
increase in the observation of ships and container lorries leaving Afghanistan for 
Pakistani ports. However, with the intensity of ship movements each day, 
inspections were not possible for each ship. This leaves considerable room for non- 
state actors to utilise this weakness to carry illegal items without any legal problems. 
The situation threatens to pose enormous problems because this vulnerability can be 
misused in various ways, from carrying drugs to arms and ammunition. One such 
example is bin Laden’s payload vessels, which delivered supplies in Kenya for the 
suicide groups who then besieged USA international safe havens in Kenya and 
Tanzania.
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A few terrorist organisations in and around the IOR have trader armadas 
of different sorts; the vast majority of these fly the flags of the FOC ‘pan-ho-lib‘ 
nations – Panama, Honduras and Liberia – and are hard to track down, as they 
routinely change names and registry (Ghosh 2004). 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a vital step towards tackling this issue. 
However, at present the CSI does not cover any port in the IOR (Durban, South 
Africa, and Colombo, Sri Lanka, are expected to join soon, along with Kelang, 
Malaysia, and Tanjung Priok, Indonesia). Also, numerous small countries with less 
competence or financial strength find the CSI to be a hindrance to their typical trade 
and indeed a way of obstructing their trade. 
Malaysia has obvious economic enthusiasm for local maritime security given its 
reliance on seaborne exchange, especially through the SOM. In the meantime, 
Malaysia, like Indonesia, is worried about any potential infringement of its power. 
Terrorist groups are well on their way to targeting seaborne business in straits, where 
boats are obliged to moderate their speed and limit their movements as a result of 
geographical limitations and navigational dangers (Power 2008). The nature of the 
SOM, being only about 40 miles wide over the 200-mile length of its south- 
easternmost part, provides plenty of opportunities for such attacks. In addition, the 
aftermath of 9/11 reported that a significant number of terrorist groups are operating 
in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. This has turned the main focus of attention to 
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transnational issues, which soon started focussing on the SOM, bringing to the fore 
the topic of Malaysia’s influence. 
Malaysian authorities have repeatedly stated that they will neither operate joint 
patrols, nor directly enter into another state’s waters. Malaysia has also forbidden the 
representatives of other countries to operate in its own waters. Domestic sensitivities 
have a critical impact on the Malaysian government’s reaction to territorial maritime 
threats. As in Indonesia, the Malaysian administration needs to combat 
fundamentalist Islamic groups in the public eye, under standard legislative issues. 
Despite the above considerations, however, Malaysia is quick to play a proactive and 
productive part in local issues. Malaysia has been involved in a few local maritime 
security initiatives, including founding the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for 
Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), and has facilitated the IMB’s territorial piracy 
focus. The foundation of the MMEA will without a doubt help to support the 
efficacy of its maritime security endeavours. In that way, the diligent work done by 
Malaysian law enforcement organisations has reflected some positive outcome and 
has been applauded by nations such as the USA and Australia. 
 
6.23 Other Illicit Activities 
Weak government structures and a restricted ability to control maritime resources and 
domains have resulted in the burgeoning of a wide range of illicit activities in many 
parts of the IOR, such as human smuggling, weapon smuggling, drug smuggling and 
the transport of illegal immigrants. The distance between Malaysia and India may be 
a factor contributing to the fact that these illicit activities have less of an impact on 
these two countries than the effects of transnational activities between some other 
countries, given that with globalisation, all states are connected and such threats are 
present in all forms right across the IOR. 
The trafficking of illicit narcotics, weapons, and people by water is of huge 
concern in the IOR. There are a large number of reasons for such forms of transport 
in the specific countries that suffer from the negative effects of perpetual instability 
and/or corrupt authorities, resulting in a plethora of these illicit activities. While the 
trafficking of narcotics, weapons, and people continues to be of greatest concern, the 
transport of oil, cigarettes, charcoal, khat, imperilled species of animals and other 





India lies between the three biggest heroin and opium producing countries in  
world – Afghanistan, Pakistan and Myanmar – bringing about clashes  on  their  
borders where they link major drug production with transporting zones. Furthermore, 
Sri Lanka suffers greatly from the proliferation of arms; Sri Lankan guerrillas have 
penetrated deeply into the drug world, expanding its capacity to resist the Sri Lankan 
army. Added to this, the famous narcotic producing and  illicit arms trading regions     
of the ‘Golden Crescent’ and the ‘Golden Triangle’ are located in  the IOR region.  
This geographical association is further strengthened by its central location, with the 
Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal providing superb waterways for the seaborne 
supplies of both arms and narcotics (Rao  2012). 
In terms of narcotics and heroin smuggling, the ‘Golden Triangle’ countries of 
Thailand, Laos and Myanmar present a serious challenge to Malaysia. In 1952, 
Malaysia implemented an anti-drug law act, which shows that drug issues have 
immense implications for Malaysia. Even so, drug smuggling takes place on a large 
scale within Malaysia itself, triggering alarm amongst  the  Malaysian  authorities.  
Map 12 shows the drug trail between India and Myanmar, which is situated at the   
heart of the ‘Golden Triangle’, between Thailand and Laos. Malaysia, bordering 
Thailand, is directly affected. Table 5 shows drug trafficking from the ‘Golden 
Crescent’ to Malaysia via Pakistan. Both the ‘Golden Crescent’ and the ‘Golden 
Triangle’ have impacted Malaysia in enormous ways making it a serious   concern. 
 







Table 5: Drug Cases Involving Malaysia–India via Pakistan 2011-2014: 
 





































Source: Narcotics Department, Royal Malaysian Police. 
 
 
The principal drug of interest to transnational criminal groups in the IOR is heroin, 
produced from the opium poppy, which is cultivated primarily in the two above- 
mentioned regions: the ‘Golden Triangle’ and the ‘Golden Crescent’. Although the 
‘Golden Triangle’ spans three different countries, it is an area that shares common 
major attributes i.e. opium growing, remote upland territories, minority populations, 
astonishing ethnic variety, and a long history of uprising. The ‘Golden Crescent’ 
embraces Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, and it has developed as the main heroin 
producing region of the world. 
Drugs such as marijuana, too, go from Nepal to India, and from Iran-Pakistan- 
India huge amounts of methamphetamines (meth) and ketamines are smuggled into 
Malaysia. The Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) authorities argue that the ketamines in 
Malaysia mostly come from India, as a huge number of ketamines are manufactured 
there, in centres such as Chennai and New Delhi.
165 
Mumbai is also a major hub for 
the production of ketamines, having many strong connections with Indians living in 
Malaysia. Their price in India is very low, and then they are sold at a much higher 
price in Malaysia.
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One of the latest trends is arising in Nigeria, where Indian and 
Malaysians girls are exploited for the smuggling of drugs between Malaysia and 
India. 
In the mid-1990s, heroin became the main illicit opiate, and something of a 
world drug. About 80 per cent of the heroin in Europe and 20 per cent of the heroin 
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in the USA originates from the ‘Golden Emerald’. In 1996 the end of one 
particularly violent phase in the civil war in Afghanistan and the concomitant 
repatriation of refugees resulted in extended local heroin production. The expansion 
of this trade was assisted by the expanding potential for opium cultivation in central 
Asian nations such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, through their ethnic connections 
with Afghanistan. Drug trafficking (and the laundering of drug money) represents 
what is by far the most important category of illicit trade in and around the Indian 
Ocean (Chatterjee 2014). 
Small arms trafficking in the region was an unsurprising result of the Afghan 
wars, first affecting Pakistan, and now becoming a more widespread problem. In 
India for example, the proliferation of small arms is changing the character of 
insurgencies, making them more violent and less susceptible to resolution. Huge 
numbers of illicit weapons and ammunition are trafficked, sponsoring terrorist 
activities. The networks in this region range from Iran to Yemen and then extend 
from Yemen both to the eastern Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, and to Somalia in 
the Horn of Africa (Burn 2012). 
In the IOR, the most common types of weapon trafficking fall into the small 
arms and light weapons (SALW) category. Such weapons include anti-aircraft guns, 
anti-personnel mines, anti-tank guided missiles, anti-tank mines, assault rifles, C-4 
plastic explosives, hand grenades, handguns/side arms, heavy machine guns, man- 
portable air defence systems (MANPADS), rocket-propelled grenades and 
flamethrowers, sniper rifles and surface-to-surface rockets – and of course 
ammunition for all of the above. This illicit activity was, and is, a major concern 
between Malaysia and India, and requires a strong level of MIMSC in the EIOR. 
Illegal immigrants have been an issue for Malaysia for a long time. As Malaysia 
moved towards industrialisation, the need for local workers started to increase. To 
cater for the demand, the Malaysian government started to import workers from 
neighbouring nations, and this resulted in increased illegal immigration from the 
Philippines, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand. Soon a notable number of workers 
from these nations started to stream into Malaysia, such as the persecuted Rohingya 
people of Myanmar, who are hoping to escape eventually to Mindanao in the 
Philippines. 
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These   undocumented   immigrants,   known   in   Malaysia   as  PATI 
 
 





(Pendatang Tanpa Izin), are also alluded to as boat people, as they often use little 
boats to enter Malaysia unlawfully. There are huge numbers of PATI in Malaysia.
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Gradually  the  small  boat  traffic  evolved  into  much  larger  boats,  the  aim 
nevertheless being for illegal immigrants to avoid being identified. These groups of 
individuals worked out how to enter Malaysia wrongfully as well as trading in 
unlawful goods – for example, narcotics, cigarettes, liquor, weapons, and other illicit 
items – for the most part through the Sulu Sea, the SOM and the SCS. In addition, 
human smuggling has been a great challenge for Malaysia, for which two major 




Littoral states around these crucial waters need more control over these issues. 
Maritime border issues and sensitivity over touchy subjects may occur, making the 
task of securing maritime wards rather challenging. Relatively calm waters of the 
IOR, and most regions around it – south Asia, southwest Asia, the Gulf, and eastern 
Africa – continue to be zones of interminable local clashes. However, this should not 
be an obstacle for cooperation. 
 
6.24 Natural Disasters 
The risk of natural disaster is another priority area identified by both Malaysia and 
India. Marine natural disasters, a notable concern, include climate change, typhoons, 
tsunamis and other serious maritime conditions (Bateman 2015). The EIOR is 
currently specifically exposed to these problems as such disasters have become more 
frequent, and there is a lack of collaboration among countries relating to disaster 
management. Malaysia, India and other neighbouring countries should explore and 
develop suitable strategies for cooperation (Bateman 2015). 
This lack of cooperation was clearly illustrated in the aftermath of the tragic 
tsunami disaster in the upper East Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004 and the 
terrible effects of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar on 7 May 2008. The 2004 tsunami 
was one of the most dreadful disasters in recent years, killing people in 11 different 
nations around the EIOR. Maritime cooperation in the territories of catastrophe 
management needs to become of greater priority for humanitarian assistance.
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According to a Swiss Re report, in 2013 there were 150 natural catastrophes 
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generating about USD37 billion in insured losses, and 158 man-made disasters 
resulting in additional losses of about USD8 billion (Miller 2015). The major man- 
made catastrophes in 2013 included fires and explosions, maritime, rail and aviation 
disasters, and terrorism and social unrest; the rest had to do with general safety 
issues such as aviation security (Athukorala and Resosudarmo 2005). 
In December 2004, the world was shaken by the most deadly event in modern 
history. It was the most devastating natural disaster in the IOR – the tsunami which 
caused such significant damage to the coasts of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
India, the Maldives, Malaysia and Burma; a total of 240,000 people are estimated to 
have died, and over a million displaced (United Nation Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs 2006). The economic cost of the tsunami for Sri Lanka, 
India, and the Maldives totalled USD3 billion. According to the report by the 
Malaysian Drainage and Irrigation Department, the first wave that hit the Malaysian 
coast was detected in the Langkawi Islands in the coastal areas of the southern states 
of Kedah, Penang and Perak. The resulting tsunami affected 200 kilometres of the 
Malaysian coastline, from Perlis to Selangor, causing 68 deaths, 6 missing, 91 
hospitalised, 276 treated as out-patients and 10,564 people evacuated (Hussain, 
Weisaeth, and Heir 2011). The tsunami then slowly spread to the eastern coastline of 
India. 
India alone demonstrated a poor record in terms of natural disaster statistics. 
From 1974 to 2003, India ranked third in the number of disaster events worldwide, 
second in the total number of disaster victims, and fifth in the amount of economic 
damage caused by disasters. From 2006 to 2008, the region was affected by 128 
natural disasters, which resulted in 8,000 fatalities, of which the majority were 
water-related. On the other hand, Malaysia lies outside the Pacific Rim, and is thus 
relatively free from the severe ravaging and destruction caused by its natural 
disasters such as earthquakes, typhoons and volcanic eruptions (Malaysia Country 
Report 1999). However, the recent tsunami had caught Malaysia unprepared. 
Although the death toll was very much less than those of its neighbouring countries, 
the incident was very significant as it was the first time that Malaysia had ever 
suffered from a tsunami. 
Malaysia was stunned by the after-effects of the earthquake, entrapped by its 
own ignorance of the tsunami. There had been no warning issued by any authorities 





against similar events in the future, and it is therefore a priority for the country to put 
in place an integrated tsunami emergency plan for better protection of future 
generations. Consequently, the Malaysian government has undertaken several 
actions to overcome this type of challenge. The measures include amendments to 
existing acts, laws and regulations, the establishment of forecasting and early 
warning systems, a disaster alert system, mitigation structures, public awareness and 
education programmes, a national disaster relief fund, the development of standard 
operating procedures, development programmes by Town and Country Planning 
Departments and bilateral, regional and international cooperation with a range of 
nations and agencies (Khurana 2009). In 2008, the government established a 
Malaysian National Tsunami Early Warning System (MNTEWS). It can give timely 
and effective early warning to the public in the event of a tsunami occurring over the 
IOR, the SCS, the Sulu Sea or the Pacific Ocean that affects Malaysia. It is an 
integral part of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS) and the 
Northwest Pacific Advisory System (NPAS) coordinated by the Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission, and the United Nations Education, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The tsunami early warning system and 
infrastructure include 15 seismic stations, three technologically advanced deep-sea 
buoys, 16 tidal gauges, and four offshore cameras (Lauterjung, Rudloff, Münch, and 
Acksel, 2014). Deep ocean tsunami buoys in strategic locations in the seas 
surrounding Malaysia will form a network of sea-level observing stations. Coastal 
cameras have been installed at strategic locations along the Malaysian coastline to 
watch for early indications of a disaster on a 24-hour basis. 
In addition, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI) set 
up an Inter-Agency Committee for Earthquake and Tsunami Risk Management 
(IACETRM), which endorsed a comprehensive Seismic and Tsunami Hazards and 
Risk Study in Malaysia in September 2005 with an allocation of RM4 million 
(USD1.2 million) (Purohit, and Suthar 2012). There were a total of seven projects, 
conducted by a range of agencies and local universities, and one of the above 
projects was commissioned by the agency and coordinated by the Academy of 
Sciences Malaysia (ASM) (Said, Ahmadun, Mahmud and Abas 2011). This scenario 
anticipates that the maritime threat in the form of a natural disaster is slowly shaping 





The aftermath of the 2004 tsunami likewise influenced India, emphatically 
forming its maritime strategy in the EIOR. The tsunami wreaked terrible damage in 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and 
Tamil Nadu, and in the union domain of Pondicherry. It destroyed a total of 2,260 
km of Indian coastline. Tamil Nadu was the worst hit state, with more than 7,923 
people killed (Shaw 2006). Fortunately, the mangroves that still existed in 
Pichavaram and Muthupet in Tamil Nadu absorbed much of the tsunami’s energy, 
mitigating the tragedy, and saving lives and properties in those regions. However, all 
the 13 seaside areas were affected: the Nagapattinam region of Tamil Nadu lost 
6,023 individuals (Billion and Waizenegger 2007). The death tolls in the 
Kanyakumari and Cuddalore areas were 817 and 606 individuals respectively 
(Rodriguez, Wachtendorf, Kendra and Trainor 2006). 
In Andhra Pradesh, around 105 individuals lost their lives and 30 were missing 
after the tsunami-wreaked havoc along the state’s 1,000-km coastline. Many of the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands were affected by the tsunami. Of the 38 inhabited 
islands of Nicobar, 30 were damaged; the worst hit were Car Nicobar, Great Nicobar 
and the Nancowry group of islands. The satellite review reported that the level of 
flooding was by no means uniform throughout the islands. 
The effects of the tsunami were so disastrous that many of the islands underwent 
a drastic change in their flat seaside terrains due to the massive flooding of salt 
water, resulting in a change of coastline and concomitant changes in the physical and 
marine environment. This was particularly the case for the Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands and Tamil Nadu. For example, the Pulomilo Island that was once joined with 
Little Nicobar was totally submerged, apart from a small ridge, and the western 
shorelines of Great and Little Nicobars were partially submerged (Chalk and Hansen 
2012). 
The Central Nicobar island of Trinket was completely overwhelmed and divided 
into three, undergoing a complete transformation. Later studies revealed enormous 
loss of human life in all the tsunami-affected zones as well as decimation of seaside 
settlements and offices, loss of fishing boats and degradation of agrarian grounds and 
backwoods with salinisation and contamination of the freshwater supplies. 
Observations of the damage suffered by the biosphere show increased levels of 
turbidity, resulting in a loss of essential habitats, the disturbance of breeding cycles, 





significance as well as fish and fisheries in the region (Paton and Johnston   2001). 
 
 
Map 13: Areas Affected by the 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean    Region 
 
 
Source:  GraphicMaps.com 
 
 
The overall impact of the tsunami’s aftermath changed India’s approach to policies 
handling natural disasters, towards ways that  share  similar  transnational  
characteristics with human-generated maritime threats. The Malaysian case is 
comparable. Malaysia’s location apparently out of range of earthquakes and natural 
disasters was challenged by the 2004 tsunami, leading to various forms of policy 
implementation. As the impact and threat of natural disasters began to rise in  
importance for both countries, they also started shaping MIMSC in the   EIOR. 
 
6.3 Emerging Areas of Malaysia-India Maritime Security Cooperation in the 
Eastern Indian Ocean  Region 
This section will discuss the emerging areas of MIMSC in the EIOR. It is conceivable 
that  the conflated  pressures of terrorism at sea, illicit trafficking of all kinds, and  
piracy and vessel hijacking will outweigh the international and regional community’s 
ability to effectively respond to these issues in a sustained fashion. Decision makers 





Diagram 5: Emerging Areas of Malaysia-India Maritime Security 






The  major IOR countries, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and    
the extra-regional powers with interests in the region, such as China, Japan and the 
USA, have afforded huge importance to combating non-traditional threats  to  the  
region. Enforcing  security in the SOM and other crucial areas such as the Andaman  
and Nicobar Islands has been an interest common to Malaysia and India in shaping 
stronger MIMSC in the  EIOR. 
New areas of cooperation could  be in non-controversial areas, such as  search   
and rescue 
171 
a genuine form of cooperation without any political intention. In 
combating non-traditional threats in the EIOR, Malaysia has affirmed that it would 
receive India’s help with open arms, and has even suggested that an SAR exercise in 
the IOR would be most welcome. 
172 
SAR, through the Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium (IONS), is active in this region, but there is no specific area of  
cooperation. 
Other  areas  for   potential  collaboration   include   disaster  management. 
173  
For 
example, in 2008, Australia and Indonesia agreed to establish  the  Australia–  
Indonesia Disaster Reduction Facility (AIFDR) to overcome the challenges posed by 
natural disasters.  This includes information  sharing as  well as developing training  
and planning centres across the region through partnerships with the APEC, ASEAN 
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and the UN. There is potential for India to be included in the work of the AIFDR. 
Singapore also intends to establish a  centre  to  coordinate  humanitarian  assistance 
and disaster relief coordination across the region, to be based in its Maritime  
Command and Control Centre at Changi Naval Base. Although there is no MOU 
between  Malaysia  and  India,  there  is  a  strong  understanding  between  them     for 
cooperation  on  areas  like  SAR  and  surveillance,  and  ship  escorts  in  the   IOR.
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Moreover, opportunities are seen relating to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,  as  
they adjoin the SOM and are India’s territory in  SAR. 
 
Map 14: Indian Search and Rescue  Region 
 
Source: Indian Coast Guard 
 
 
Map 15: Malaysia’s Search and Rescue  Region 
 
Source: Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, Kuala   Lumpur 
 
 





The initiative would involve mutual intelligence gathering, and joint patrolling 
of the strait if a decision was made to do so. However, while Singapore welcomed 
this initiative in its entirety, Indonesia and Malaysia vetoed the presence of any 
foreign troops in their territorial waters, resulting in difficulties. There is not much 
mutual cooperation between Malaysia and India on maritime security, but taking into 
consideration the threats posed in the EIOR, such cooperation – to include expertise 
in peacekeeping operations, collective training and security initiatives – is vital.
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The MH370 incident showed up the shortfalls in Malaysia’s surveillance and 
search-and-locate capabilities, particularly in maritime patrol aircraft (which are 
largely focused on the SCS – and even there the tiny maritime patrol fleet of the 
Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) is stretched over the wide expanse of the 
Malaysian Maritime Zone).
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The MH370 incident opened up a potential avenue for 
closer bilateral cooperation, such as information sharing and provisions for mutual 
assistance, in the area of maritime SAR. There would be prospects, as mentioned 
earlier, for India to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), and 
SAR for a variety of reasons: as a net security provider using its comparatively 
larger resource capacity as it did for the tsunami HADR and the MH370 SAR 
mission. Disaster management and SAR could trigger a need for more effective 
collaboration after MH370 incident.
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India also greatly assisted the IOR countries, 
including Indonesia, in the post-tsunami HADR, thus demonstrating its capacity as a 
security provider in this regard – another positive indicator for bilateral cooperation. 
Another important aspect is enhancing the policing role between Malaysia and 
India in the EIOR. Describing the policing role of the navies in his classic work, 
Navies and Foreign Policy, Ken Booth (Booth 1983) confidently stated the role of 
police, border guards and coast guards in ensuring the safety and security of a 
country from maritime threats. The constabulary roles of these groups are 
fundamental for a stable environment at sea. 
Although transnational activities such as smuggling, poaching and piracy were 
by no means new maritime activities in the Cold War period, they have continued to 
grow and at present the guardians of maritime borders face more challenges. The 
multifaceted quality of present-day maritime threats has, however, required changes 
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in the policing element of maritime forces. The increase in the volume and 
recurrence of non-traditional maritime threats, their innovative nature and the refined 
systems of administration used by criminals of different types and subnational 
radical groups, have propelled affected countries to pay extra attention to these 
issues. In fact, these forces, typically occupied with directing the vigil and watching 
capacities in regional waters, are today undergoing serious difficulties in upholding 
maritime laws. The extensions of the sovereign maritime zones specified by the 
UNCLOS have also to a great extent expanded the security obligations of the coastal 
police forces. 
Protecting the SLOCs and guaranteeing security at sea poses extreme difficulties 
for the maritime security powers. Given the complexity of the IOR in terms of facing 
maritime threats, this sphere of influence requires special attention. The naval forces 
give the impression that they are moving toward Ken Booth’s threefold 
classification: diplomatic, military and policing. One fascinating point relating to 
coastal boundaries nowadays is that most big powers from other regions with stakes 
in the IOR and SLOCs are providing assistance to the development and redesign of 
coast guard forces amongst the littoral states. Japan, for instance, with its 
overwhelming reliance on the IOR’s trade and energy security, has been giving 
significant guidance to the coastguard contingents of Southeast Asian coastal states 
such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam by giving them 
budgetary and specialised help intended to upgrade their ability to curtail piracy 
attacks. 
Australia is another example. It has been providing assistance to SEA countries 
on patrolling in order for the latter to fight against poaching, smuggling, illicit 
migration of individuals and armed robbery. Likewise, Australia also consistently 
undertakes bilateral and multilateral activities with Southeast Asian naval forces. 
Australia has also set up a Joint Offshore Protection Command, as well as the Coast 
Watch, to counter terrorism and ensure the security of its offshore energy resources. 
Similar efforts should be led by India in its attempt to draw a closer relationship with 
Malaysia in the EIOR. Additional participation in multilateral maritime activities 
supported by the ARF will create more momentum in this direction. 
In light of the developing security pressures on regional waters, a few Asian 
naval forces are upgrading the power and capacity of their coast guards, as well as 





arranging its own form of a coast watch. On the other hand, the Indian government 
has chosen to set up nine coast guard stations, as well as the current 13, to bring 
under greater observation the nation’s 7,500 kms of coastline. The Indian Coast 
Guard, which has 70 ships and 30 aircrafts, is likewise approved to hire or contract 
extra vessels from the worldwide business sector. The Indian security service is also 
arranging the procurement of cutting edge equipment and interceptor boats on a 
highly optimised plan of attack basis, so that courses of action for expanding the 
security of Indian waters can be set up ahead of schedule, as can be expected under 
the circumstances. For example, the Mumbai style attack in 2008 alerted Indian 
Coast Guards to form marine police headquarters in major areas of the Indian 
coastline for quick patrolling and enforcement. 
While this is the case, it would be fair to argue that setting up circles of 
patrolling systems comprising coastal patrolling, marine police, and other types of 
patrolling groups can be challenging. With each country having different levels of 
competency, an integrated maritime setting is a task that requires time and 
considerable effort. Moreover, it is difficult to please all participants. For example, 
in the coast guard debate in Australia, Chris Barrie, a previous Royal Australian 
Navy chief of naval operations, stated: 
We (Australians) frequently don’t give careful consideration to working 
with different individuals from our maritime group for basic purposes’ 
and he thinks about how, between the naval forces and coast guard, one 
could maintain a strategic distance from ‘duplication of exertion and extra 
overheads, regardless of what sort of administration structure and 
operating frameworks were placed set up’ (Cordner 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, increasing the interoperability between the constabulary forces of both 






The Red Sea coast, the SOM and the SOH have all been favourite spots for terrorist 
attacks, and India needs to build a strong counter-terrorism system by the 
coordination of information gathering, evaluation, crisis management, training and 
exercises. Arms smuggling and drugs used to support terrorist activities are being 





Bay of Bengal, and this requires maritime observation and regular patrolling by both 
Malaysia and India. Piracy is another consistent activity, which frequently happens 
in a large number of the primary choke points, necessitating regular patrolling. 
Finally, natural disasters occur frequently, demanding viable collaboration between 
Malaysia and India in emergency situations. In order to mitigate these maritime 
threats, three major emerging areas are identified: SAR, HADR and the 
interoperability of marine police forces and coast guards. These areas of cooperation, 
if realised, would result in stronger MIMSC in the EIOR. The next chapter discusses 





















FACTORS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF MALAYSIA–INDIA 





This chapter discusses the success factors vital for shaping new areas of maritime 
collaboration identified for MIMSC in the EIOR. Whilst this thesis seeks to examine  
the potential opportunities for Malaysia and India in  the  areas  of  maritime  
partnership, the successful attainment of this objective is highly dependent upon 
identifying the factors that discourage more sustainable maritime cooperation. A 
discussion of the gaps in the relationship will elicit a more substantial answer to help 
provide strong MIMSC in the  EIOR. 
 
Diagram 6: Factors Critical to the Success of Malaysia–India Maritime 
















The IOR is recognised as a complex geographical sphere with its own 
devolved interests. Within its complexity, it appears that cooperation amongst states 
is better in the areas of economy and trade than in security. This is largely due to 
distrust, and to a lack of interstate action relating to security, which involves each 
individual state’s national and sovereignty issues. However, in this globalised world, 
many countries do now realise that there is much to be gained through inter-state 
cooperation and little through unilateralism. This is all the more so in the case of 
maritime security, because of its universality. It is clear that maritime cooperation can 
contribute much towards enhancing maritime security, managing disasters, providing 
humanitarian assistance and controlling environmental security challenges (Chatterjee 
2014). 
With the end of the Cold War, a cooperative outlook has been evolving, shaping 
positive outcomes in international relations. Hence, although some constraints will 
undoubtedly remain – most notably, interstate distrust, and acute sensitivities over 
sovereignty – cooperation should grow incrementally. 
 
7.2 Bilateral and Multilateral Commitment 
There is a need for bilateral and multilateral commitment by both Malaysia and India 
in the EIOR. 
Bilateral cooperation can be viewed as a more effective choice of 
communication than multilateral commitment, because it involves two    individual 
countries with particular interests in hand. India has already engaged in a number of 
regional maritime programs with Malaysia, and their diplomatic ties are mature.
178 
India's focus is on the EIOR, where the relationship between Malaysia and India is 
long-standing. Therefore, it is in the EIOR that both countries need to redefine their 
maritime relationship. 
179 
A vital shift in strategic thinking in the Malaysian 




Multilateral cooperation is an arrangement that takes account of the interests of 
many different countries and types of nations. This kind of arrangement can often 
become biased, because at any time a more powerful state can impose on weaker 
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states. As a result, such cooperation often meets with failure. Bilateral arrangements 
on the other hand can match the needs of both countries equally and create a match 
in all factors, such as their roles, responsibilities and interests, as well as the intended 
outcomes. In this way, cooperation can minimise disorientation and disconnect in 
relationships, and most importantly reduce distrust relating to issues and areas that 
constantly prevent more resilient cooperation. 
A bilateral arrangement is an obvious choice in the case of Malaysia–India, 
because the two countries have established a strong relationship for centuries, and 
have adopted cooperative outlooks in their overall foreign policies. 
In mitigating non-traditional threats, for instance, there are several maritime 
security initiatives in the SOM. One of the most publicised initiatives is the Malacca 
Straits Coordinated Patrol (Malsindo), established in July 2004 (Vavro 2008). It is a 
joint patrolling system amongst littoral states. However, there are huge differences 
between a joint patrolling system and combined patrolling system. Combined 
patrolling systems are usually conducted under a large umbrella of command 
structures with a singular code and conduct instructed by a sole power. Combined 
patrolling may face tricky issues, for instance in the balance of interoperability. 
Engaging with a stronger country may lead a weaker country to face domination in 
terms of command, and this can cause distrust in the partnership. A stronger country 
may also feel that it is engaging in the partnership with little or no benefits in return, 
as the weaker party will have less to offer. However, establishing joint patrolling 
between two interested parties will be more efficient, as it can create an equal 
balance of the benefits it can offer to both partners. 
The ‘Eyes in the Sky’ programme, which is part of the broader Malacca Straits 
Security Initiative (MSSI) comprising Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, faces 
similar problems to those inherent in combined patrolling. Initiated in 2005, the 
‘Eyes in the Sky’ is a programme to guard the SOM from piracy. The initiative is 
expected to be a good collaboration to curtail piracy attacks because it involves three 
major countries that have authority in the SOM. However, the programme is 
considered to be less effective because of overlapping water territories. At the same 
time, all three countries ensure that no single power dominates the arrangement. As a 
result, combined patrolling systems often meet with disappointment. In addition to 
the constraints engendered by the laws of the sea, all three countries face other 





naturally has an impact on the positive engagement between them. 
Seeking the cooperation of a stronger maritime power could therefore help 
balance maritime capabilities, and also counteract efforts to curtail maritime 
challenges in the straits. Hence whilst more openness is required from SEA 
countries, a country such as Malaysia could equally well accept friendship from an 
emerging power like India to form a similar cooperation. Malaysia, after all, does not 
have overlapping territories or disputed maritime areas with India (whereas Malaysia 
does have disputes with Singapore over Pedra Branca; the Philippines, Vietnam and 
China over the Spratly Islands; and Indonesia over Ambalat). Bilateral cooperation 
between India and Malaysia could be easily shaped, based on a mutual maritime 
interest in the security of the straits and the safety and wellbeing of its users, without 
jeopardising relations with, or indeed causing any suspicious behaviour in 
neighbouring countries. 
Although this could be the case, there may be one underlying issue that 
discourages strong MIMSC in EIOR: a lack of trust. One example is the idea of 
establishing an Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in 2001 by Japan. The Japanese-led 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
(ReCAAP) initiative has not materialised, because the three major countries – 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – that share marine boundaries all want the centre 
to be established within their own territory. This is also because all three countries are 
concerned about Japan’s maritime role, which appears to be more than one of 
securing the SLOCs and mitigating non-conventional threats. Concern remains in 
terms of Japan’s long-run interest in gaining a toehold in the region. Engaging in 
initiatives such as ReCAAP is the beginning of a direct presence and involvement in 
the larger context of maritime security in the SEA region. Except for Singapore, 
neither Malaysia nor Indonesia have endorsed. This is because Japan has mostly 
concentrated on training and resources without the involvement of any functional 
activities, which would require more openness between the countries in question. 
Malaysia’s behaviour vis-à-vis the big powers in the EIOR on the maritime front 
can also be seen in the case of the USA. In 2002, the USA placed Southeast Asia as 
an important region in focus to curtail terrorism activities, and this led the USA to 
increase its presence in the region. After the 9/11 attacks, the shift that took place 
towards focusing on the SEA region as a terrorist hub led the USA to increase its 





Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), which was viewed as a complement to the US- 
led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (Hofmeister and Rueppel 2014). However, 
the USA was denied a permanent naval presence in the SOM. 
In mitigating traditional threats, bilateral cooperation is seen as a difficult task. 
The ‘Eyes in the Sky’ initiative shows that the three states have good leadership and 
the   will   to   progress   in   the   right   direction   without   compromising  national 
sovereignty. 
181  
However,  Asian  countries  should  take  the  North  Atlantic     Treaty 
Organization (NATO) as an example. NATO has a multilateral defence programme – 
the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) – which is considered to be 
one of its crown jewels in combating and defecting enemy aircraft. The Southeast 
Asian ‘Eyes in the Sky’ programme, in comparison, focuses merely on piracy, a non- 
traditional threat. 
The  AWACS  program  involves  16  countries. 
182  
The  UK  also  has  its     own 
specific unit of E3D AWACS aircraft, which is linked to the overall NATO Airborne 
Early Warning and Control Force programme.
183 
Both of these highly successful 
programmes  show  that it  would not  be impossible for  the  IOR to  have its  own 
multilateral defence and security programme. NATO’s New Strategic Concept 
established the term ‘corporate security’, which could be easily applied to maritime 
security in the IOR. The general problem is the presence of ‘sea blindness’ which 
refers to the phenomenon that maritime security is often taken as a given and  does 
not   need  further  attention. 
184  
History  provides  clear  evidence   of  this     maritime 
blindness in both India and Malaysia. This mind-set needs to be changed in Asian 
countries. 
Indeed, participation in multilateral partnerships can be more realistic and 
meaningful. For example, India’s engagement with Malaysia through ASEAN will 
be very effective.
185 
As Malaysia is a small nation, it is better for it to engage 
multilaterally, as ASEAN is a major instrument used by Southeast Asian nations to 
project a collective decision vis-à-vis issues pertaining to the region. Collective 
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decision-making is the principal characteristic of ASEAN. It promotes a regional 
architecture of peace and security, and it is strongly reliant upon mutual confidence 
building, dialogues and transparency. 
186 
Participation in regional maritime 
institutions such as ADMM-Plus and IONS is crucial, as it helps build habits of 
cooperation, mutual understanding and confidence, and most importantly, it creates 
spill overs into bilateral relationships. 
187 
Therefore India and Malaysia’s 
participation in the multilateral regional maritime institutions complements 
Malaysia–India’s bilateral cooperation and should help to shape stronger MIMSC in 
the EIOR. 
However, the strength of the multilateral mechanism does not mean that a 
bilateral one is not possible or indeed should be overlooked in mitigating traditional 
security threats. During the Cold War, India’s habit of engaging bilaterally with 
ASEAN was driven strongly by India’s suspicious attitude towards the ASEAN 
platform. Although this mind-set is diminishing, there should be more constructive 
thinking, with a strong focus on bilateral participation.
188 
It is time to move into   a 
bilateral framework, so that both countries can share their maritime expertise directly 
with each other, a move that would be strategically valuable for both countries.
189
 
Perhaps in terms of bilateral security or defence cooperation between Malaysia 
and India, more persuasion may be required. Malaysia’s passivity towards engaging 
India plays a part in the lack of bilateral engagement. Malaysia should be more 
assertive in engaging India in terms of defence cooperation, as Malaysia is currently 
complacent about its mature and friendly relationship with India. Most importantly, 
as India, Singapore and Indonesia all seek to have a blue water navy, in the long run 
Malaysia could further engage India and learn from India’s experiences and achieve 
its ambition of becoming a blue water navy. 
In a meeting in November 2015, the Malaysian and Indian Prime Ministers 
stated that the Malaysian embassy in Delhi was one of the earliest to be established. 
However, it is unfortunate that the areas of agreement in the Malaysia–India bilateral 
relationship are confined largely to trade, not defence.
190 
The agreement focuses on 
trade relations alone, and there is no bilateral mechanism for defence or security 
 




India Group Interview 2. 
189 
India Individual Interview 1. 





cooperation except through ASEAN, ARF and ADMM Plus. A Malaysia–India 
bilateral cooperation could, however, help bolster both Malaysia and India’s 
positions in those multilateral institutions, giving more strength to MIMSC in the 
EIOR. These multilateral engagements, particularly through ASEAN, although 
welcome, should not be the only way to achieve cooperation. This is because 
although common security challenges can be discussed as agendas in these regional 
multilateral platforms, the implementation of these agendas may require a bilateral 
relationship. Perhaps to boost a Malaysia–India bilateral engagement, a discussion of 
non-conventional  threats  faced  by  the  two  countries,  with  a  focus  on relevant 
security levels, could be a good starting  point.
191
 
It is believed that India would also welcome a more proactive relationship with 
Malaysia if Malaysia were to be enthusiastic about developing a bigger maritime 
role for itself in the region. A bilateral mechanism for maritime cooperation is 
needed, and is critical for both navies in terms of talks and exercises.
192 Malaysia’s 
lack of passion towards a more resilient maritime power, unlike that of its 
neighbouring Singapore, appears to be the cause of disengagement on bilateral 
terms. 
Both bilateral and multilateral cooperation are critical components to shape 
stability in the IOR amongst affected countries. This is also the case for shaping a 
stronger MIMS in the EIOR. However, an underlying element for greater success in 
shaping this cooperation lies in the ability of both Malaysia and India to build a 
multi-layered structure comprising navies, coast guards and other related maritime 
agencies and forces. Each of these entities should set out their roles and capabilities. 
A list of issues should be written down in terms of their weapons, training, budgets, 
priorities, and types of communication and levels of commitment. This would help 
shape more effective and realistic cooperation. 
Much-needed emphasis is required from both Malaysia and India on 
transoceanic security cooperation in the EIOR. Both countries should test all levels 
of cooperation such as regional, sub-regional, inter and intra-regional, and 
cooperation with international organisations. India is considered by many to be the 
leader in the IOR, and the India’s major role in the IONS and the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association  (IORA)  initiative  is  welcomed  by  many  countries  because  of  its 
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prospects to enhance maritime security cooperation in the IOR. Ggreat potential 
exists for both the international community and regional organisations to improve 
international cooperation, to strengthen security in the region, and to create a broad- 
based Indian Ocean security strategy that is acceptable to all (Potgieter 2012). 
On the other hand, Malaysia is one of the founding members of ASEAN. As it is 
the ‘ASEAN Way’, consultation and consensus remain the basic principles of 
decision-making in ASEAN. As mentioned in Article 20, Charter ASEAN, the Kuala 
Lumpur Declaration of the ASEAN Charter also stands to uphold key interests, 
among which are: 
The promotion of regional solidarity and cooperation; mutual respect for 
the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national 
identity of all nations; renunciation of nuclear weapons and other weapons 
of mass destruction and avoidance of arms race; renunciation of the use of 
force and threat to use of force; non-aggression and exclusive reliance on 
peaceful means for the settlement of differences or disputes and 
enhancing beneficial relations between ASEAN and its friends and 
partners (Kuala Lumpur Declaration 2005). 
 
As both Malaysia and India support this system, an investment in both a bilateral and 
a multilateral network is by no means discouraging, and this element shapes the 
structure of MIMSC in the EIOR. 
 
7.3 Informal Networks of Bilateral and Multilateral Maritime Cooperation 
As discussed earlier, bilateral and multilateral commitments are believed to be 
difficult to achieve, though not impossible. Hence, states can begin with informal 
bilateral and multilateral networks, increasing trust and understanding between all 
their members. Such networks can also reduce the costs of building further 
cooperative relationships if a certain level of understanding fails to be achieved and a 
decision is made to dissolve a partnership. The network begins with an informal 
platform with ad hoc groupings that may gradually be formalised towards a more 
mature and structured grouping, similar to other established bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements. This informal network is flexible but this does not mean that it has no 
essence in framework or objective. The idea draws upon the American ‘hub-and- 
spokes’ strategy of alliance building in Asia but, as is characteristic of networks, it 
does not necessarily require a ‘hub’ (Bradford 2005). Simply increasing the number 





regional states more thoroughly into ever-greater cooperation (ibid). In short, it is a 
kind of connecting bridge towards a more profound and refined cooperation amongst 
countries. 
The annual Cobra Gold military exercise held in Thailand is one such model 
established in 1982 as a bilateral maritime warfare exercise between Thailand and 
the USA (Bradford 2005). In 1999, Singapore joined in because of its good 
relationship with the USA. It has been receiving more participation ever since and 
has attracted countries such as Mongolia, Philippines, China and Japan. A similar 
type of leadership role is required in the case of India shaping its maritime 
relationship with Malaysia in the EIOR. Today, Cobra Gold can be recognised as 
one of those groupings which followed an informal structure and later grew into the 
region’s most established formal multilateral cooperation network. In 2014, more 
than 13,000 service members from the USA, Thailand, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and South Korea participated, with China taking part in humanitarian 
projects, and other nations including Myanmar sending observers (Parameswaran 
2015). 
Another example of a network which strove as a strong patrolling grouping is 
the trilateral SOM patrols (involving Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia). For more 
than a decade, the trilateral patrols conducted by all three states provided an 
opportunity for bilateral cooperation. A further example is the IMO’s comprehensive 
ISPS Code in July 2004. Through the ISPS, most ports and shippers of Southeast 
Asian states made substantial progress towards ratifying the efforts. Singapore 
especially took individual steps for early preparation and developed a clear roadmap 
of execution plans. 
Nonetheless, despite earlier preparation, Singapore was unable to achieve a 
positive outcome. This implies that a partnership with regional powers is seen as 
vital to achieve positive implementation. Hence an external partner is required for 
much-organised cooperation, as in other mature maritime partnerships. Such an 
opportunity is what India is looking forward to, and should be utilised by both 
Malaysia and India. 
The network involving Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines is another example. 
Japanese maritime interests in the region can be seen through the Japanese coast 
guard partnership with the members of SEA states. While Malaysia is a vital power 





these two countries on two different issues: antipiracy training with the Philippines 
Coast Guard, and reorganising the maritime security force structure of Malaysia (and 
Indonesia) and establishing a coast guard (Parameswaran 2015). Bilateral 
relationships with Japan are growing stronger, and as they mature they will naturally 
proliferate into a network through which the Malaysian and Philippine coastguards 
will develop greater trust in and understanding of each other through their common 
involvement with the Japanese (Parameswaran 2015). As India has a wide range of 
maritime capabilities and profound knowledge, it would do well to emulate Japan’s 
performance, shaping a better MIMSC network in the IOR. 
However, certain issues remain. Countries that form arrangements of informal 
cooperation also seek long-run benefits from each other. Although informal 
arrangements can be dissolved at little cost, the efforts taken to establish cooperation 
would be wasted without an effective plan for its execution. A proper study into the 
history of relative relationships, capabilities, and roles is essential to create a strong 
foundation for an informal arrangement before it is converted into a formal bilateral 
or multilateral cooperation. In mitigating non-traditional issues, cooperation is more 
easily shaped and the costs are low in contrast to dealing with traditional issues, 
which demand a higher cost. With sovereignty as a major issue for countries, the 
potential for cooperation in dealing with traditional issues remains low. 
Although this is the case, table talks are common amongst countries. These 
entail platforms where countries have the liberty to express their needs on certain 
issues, especially when matters involve two specific countries. As a sovereign state, 
distrust may be present in dialogues, yet it is important to acknowledge that a lack of 
trust is not an obstacle to cooperation. Maritime security cooperation is one such 
type of issue and with globalisation, maritime security is one particular genre that 
requires a stronger push for further cooperation amongst countries. 
When countries are able to identify the interests and factors that stop their own 
aims from being achieved, then both formal and informal arrangements have 
potential. There is a strong requirement to reanalyse Malaysia’s foreign policy with 
India.
193 
Exploring different types of maritime clustering would be a good start. Let 
us take the sub-regional link in the Bay of Bengal. The Bay of Bengal links the 
Andaman Sea with east-central India. It also abuts Myanmar. It is an common   for 
 





both Malaysia and India in the EIOR. The entire area of the Malacca Strait and the 
Andaman Sea comprises the territorial sea and the EEZs/continental-shelf of the 
littoral states (Singh nd). This should act as an incentive for promoting regional 
maritime cooperation. The overlapping structure means that no single state can truly 
dominate, and so cooperation should be easy. 
Another cluster could be formed by separating high-intensity issues involving 
arms, drugs and human smuggling, which have a direct impact on national security, 
from low-intensity issues such as illegal fishing, pollution and ecological damage. 
Other clusters could be around ad-hoc cooperation in response to emergency events 
or conflicts such as natural disasters. These clusters could slowly grow towards 
intraregional, interregional and mid-level cooperation, on a multilateral, trilateral or 
bilateral level, and finally form a strategic cooperation. These are the kind of 
inventions needed to shape MIMSC in the EIOR. 
In the end, a clear direction of maritime purpose would solve the 
implementation of MIMSC in the EIOR. The structure should focus on specific 
elements, such as a state’s quality and capability, its geographical location during 
crisis and peacetime, its influence on specific issues, its historical relationships with 
friends and foe, its current geopolitical scenario, and its domestic condition. A clear 
grasp of these elements would help both Malaysia and India to understand each 
other’s maritime interests and shape stronger MIMSC in the EIOR. 
For example, India spends more on its defence budget than does Germany – but 
Germany has better equipment, infrastructures and allies. Similarly, Singapore has 
more advanced maritime power than Malaysia. The level of importance given to a 
certain issue at a certain time, area or interest or geographical locality also conveys 
meaning. It can also denote a state’s ability to cope with issues or conflict 
inadequately, partially or comprehensively. For example, India’s assistance during 
the 2008 tsunami projected India’s expression of soft power – a particular type of 
maritime capability – whilst Malaysia was completely unprepared for such an 
incident. As these are ratified, both states can come out of their comfort zones and 
shape comprehensive MIMSC in the EIOR. 
 
7.4 Overcoming Bureaucracy and Statutory Bottlenecks 
On the other hand, bureaucracy is an inherent feature of both countries. For better 





strangleholds of their bureaucratic and statutory bottlenecks. Their very systems are 
believed to be hindering progress.
194 
Their turgid systems, it seems, are holding back 
strategic thinking, and they are prevalent throughout top government circles in both 
countries.
195
The bureaucratic constraints in the relationship between the two countries 
are a matter of serious concern, as they keep the number of collaborations between 
Malaysia and India very low. 
This is evident if one looks at the naval structure of both countries at a basic 
level. For example, the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) separated 
from the Royal Malaysia Navy (RMN) in 2005 in order to boost efficiency in 
curbing maritime challenges to Malaysia and littoral states around Malaysian or 
international  waters. 
196  
However,  whilst  the  MMEA  is  one  of  34  bodies  in    the 
Malaysian Prime Minister’s department, the Indian Coast Guard is under India’s 
Secretary of Defence. Hence, while issues pertaining to defence are dealt with 
directly, the Malaysian Prime Minister’s department also deals with the economic 
planning unit, Islamic affairs and many more departments. Therefore the 




Law enforcement is another dimension in this issue. This is particularly 
prevalent in SOM. It is a territory shared by three important maritime countries in 
SEA (Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore). Although all three countries are 
responsible and work together for the safety of SOM, each country ensures no single 
power is dominant in this area. Therefore, law enforcement is a difficult task 
especially with three different countries concerned over sensitive subjects such as 
competition over territorial claims as well as resources. 
The distortions of law enforcement within SEA countries are affecting the role 
of bigger powers in the region, even though they may seek cooperation in good faith. 
In fact cooperation is more difficult, because it involves stronger and more dominant 
powers. It is important for Malaysia to set clear sea laws in order to secure its 
position in its own territory, and so that at the same time it can open up with 
confidence to big powers like India. 
Piracy is a type of transnational crime that is increasing in recent years, and 
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more tactical moves are being conducted by pirates to escape law enforcements. 
SOM is one particular area that faces this challenge. Therefore it is important to have 
a well-defined definition of piracy. The standard definition of piracy is often taken 
from the 1982 UNCLOS which defines piracy as any: 
Illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private 
aircraft, and directed on the high seas against another ship or aircraft,  or 




The IMB on the other hand has created its own definition of piracy: 
An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to 
commit theft or any other crime with the intent or capability to use force 
in furtherance of that act (Young and Valencia 2003). 
 
A standard as well as an all rounded definition in addressing piracy is not present. 
This is the downfall for many countries addressing the piracy issue and hoping to 
shape a more refined law enforcement policy. It is more prevalent in the case of 
curtailing piracy at SOM, since the UNCLOS definition only discusses piracy that 
happens at high sea. The IMB has a refined definition, but it is still difficult for 
countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia to tackle this threat. The SOM are 
shared by three overlapping countries and requires a more clearly defined role of the 
coastguard and other law enforcement agencies in tackling tactical moves of pirates 
that escape to neighbouring water territories. A clear definition of maritime rule and 
laws is obviously required. 
Other than this, it is also vital for countries in SEA to take responsibility and 
recognise this as a universal threat. Besides Singapore, many other SEA countries 
have not addressed this issue adequately. Piracy attacks in the SOM, both actual and 
attempted, vary from year to year. More than half of the piracy attacks worldwide are 
concentrated in SEA especially at SOM, affecting Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. 
At the height of the attacks in 2003 there were a total of 154 and in 2006 there were a 
total of 71 (ICC International Maritime Bureau 2007). Therefore, it is also up to 
Malaysia to accept responsibility and recognise these issues in order to shape resilient 




198 United Nations, “Part VII,” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 






7.5 Shared Cost Benefit 
Cost benefit is also a factor in the lack of collaboration of MIMSC in the EIOR.
199 
This scenario can be seen in the collaboration of the defence industry. Out of the six 
clusters in Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), the maritime cluster stands out.
200 
India 
should be a major focus for Malaysia’s commercial defence industry, as India is a 
high-consuming state that could greatly benefit the Malaysian naval industries.
201 
Malaysia argues that buying or obtaining new technology from a new country/partner 
will involve high cost, especially in terms of training personnel and adapting to the 
new technology.
202 
This is the very reason why the Malaysian navy, as well as the 
armed forces, prefer to use familiar technology.
203 
This attitude presents a drawback 
in the relationship. 
In addition, it is Malaysia’s development within the technology industry that 
will pique India’s interest in collaboration, rather than the exchange of commodities 
such as palm oil for heavy weaponry and artillery. 
204 
The most important 
determinant of a country’s export or selling capability is the share cost and extent of 
loss. 
205 
As such, when a win–win situation is projected by Malaysia, avoiding 
defence procurement through barter trade should lead to a strong commitment to 
defence cooperation with India. Also, as both Malaysia and India have a long- 
standing diplomatic relationship, this can be used to enable cooperation in the 
Malaysia–India defence industry. As the Malaysian industry is focused on local 
consumption, it is expected that sales will be low, thus lacking the consumption 
volume to spur the growth of this industry. Malaysia’s lack of execution plan is 
impaired furthe, due to Malaysia’s limited defence budget as well as its lack of 
knowledgeable and confident salesmen. In comparison, Malaysia’s neighbour, 
Singapore,  is  top  in  defence  in  ASEAN,  and  attributes  its  success  to     good 
salesmanship. 
206  
Thus,   it  is   proposed   that  Malaysia   need   not  focus   solely  on 
government-to-government sales, but should also explore business-to-business sales, 
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The development of the defence industry in Malaysia is still at a very early stage 
compared to some of its neighbouring countries. Singapore, which began its 
expansion drive in the early 1980s, currently has the largest maintenance, repair and 
operations (MRO) facilities in the Asia–Pacific region. This should be seen as an 
opportunity for Malaysia to harness its MRO potential (Malaysian Defense Industry 
Blueprint 2005). The case is the same for SBSR, an incredibly competitive industry 
– and so Malaysia should offer more than just transportation services, embarking on 
the marketing of value-added products in the industry such as specialised cargo 
transportation and logistics and ship management. 
It is necessary for countries like Malaysia to focus on value-added maritime 
services, because Malaysia does not have the ability to compete with a country that 
has greater potential to provide low-cost services, such as the cheap labour offered 
by India. Investing in low-cost maritime services will not enhance Malaysia’s 
defence or shipping industry. It is important to understand their capability and skills 
and focus on the most lucrative services for better returns. Thus, Malaysia should 
concentrate on high-end services in order to deliver the best outcomes in engaging 
with India. The shared cost-benefit amongst these countries may thus provide more 
enhanced partnership in this industry. 
A good starting point could be R&D collaboration. As stated earlier, it is 
beneficial for both Malaysia and India to collaborate on both R&D and shipbuilding 




Malaysia thus urgently needs to realign its maritime industry. A well-organised 
framework should be in place. An encouraging environment promoting R&D and 
innovation, entrepreneurship and risk-taking, as well as incentives for public–private 
partnership should be constructed (Maierbrugger 2013). The potential India 
possesses as a shipbuilding nation and the economic benefits of a robust shipbuilding 
industry, means that a conducive policy framework and institutional support systems 
would go a long way towards India’s endeavour to emerge as a vibrant shipbuilding 
nation (Maierbrugger 2013). It would be better for India to build its partnership 
along these lines. 
However, it all comes down to the financial capital of a state. Setting targets and 
 
 





achieving them, especially for military equipment, requires a high budget. 
Examining the financial budget and setting a realistic allocation could set the tone 
for the future of the Malaysian defence industry and elicit stronger and more positive 
commitments from the Indian defence industry, settling the issue in an amicable 
manner. 
 
7.6 Change in Maritime Strategic Thinking 
Malaysia and India’s commitment towards bilateral and multilateral cooperation, 
whether formal or informal, require a dramatic change in maritime strategic thinking, 
as do any steps towards overcoming bureaucratic and statutory bottlenecks, 
strengthening law enforcement, and sharing costs and benefits. 
There is a vital need for a breakthrough in the maritime relationship between 
Malaysia and India. Malaysia should engage with India in a more proactive manner, 
as it is clear to both nations that the relationship between Malaysia and India needs 
more  focus. 
209  
The  opinion  prevalent  in  the  top  echelons  of  the    Malaysian 
government is that the relationship between Malaysia and India is mature and thus 
only requires maintenance; and that as Malaysia has been actively sending officers 
and  men  for  various  courses,  including  for  SUKHOI  expertise,  gunnery   and 
submarine specialisation,
210 
this is satisfactory. However, it has been stated that 
Malaysia’s Secretary General has reminded bureaucrats to ‘not forget India’.211 He 
has reemphasised that India is incredibly important to Malaysia, and remarked that it 
is unfortunate that Malaysia’s positive relationship with India is not common 
knowledge. 
212 
Thus, it is indeed time for a vital shift in strategic thinking in 
Malaysia, to ensure a more sound and pronounced maritime relationship with India. 
The reconstruction of Malaysia’s strategy and new elements within this strategy, for 
example the Maritime Axis Doctrine, must be well thought out.
213
 
It is evident that India has already shown great interest in the SEA region 
through its LEP, while Malaysia’s reaction to and engagement with India speaks 
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Malaysia is reacting and engaging is where most answers lie.
214 
The way Malaysia 
views the IOR and the Asia–Pacific region will affect its overall view of India’s role 
in the wider context of the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, Malaysia should show more 
commitment to recognising India as a major and crucial power, creating a new 
power structure in the EIOR. Therefore, to proactively manage such an ambitious 
player, Malaysia needs to proactively engage with India. Hypothetically, if the 
scenario of Malaysia’s power projection in the EIOR is contingent on Kuala 
Lumpur’s change of security focus, then a role for further, deepened Malaysia–India 
maritime security cooperation can certainly be foreseen. For such a situation to 
materialise, serious proactive engagement is required. 
The maritime relationship between Malaysia and India is currently stalled, and 
needs an overhaul to suit the changing environment in the IOR.
215 
Political will is a 
vital driver in any relationship, and there is no exception when it comes to MIMSC 
in the EIOR. There is significant potential for MIMSC, particularly in the SOM.
216 
Therefore, there is a strong recommendation to reanalyse Malaysia’s foreign policy 
with India. Given that Malaysia and India have such a long-standing and mature 
relationship, there is a need to evolve and redefine it, particularly in the maritime 
domain of the EIOR. 
With this in mind, Malaysia should first position itself and gain leverage for the 
specific purpose of sustainability before establishing an engagement with India. For 
example, Malaysian navies lack equipment, and this must first be addressed, as a 
focus on navy logistics is vital to create a shift in the relationship where India is 
viewed as a necessary partner. 
217 
If Malaysia were able to offer technical and 
logistics assistance, this could be a game-changer in its assertion of its need for 
cooperation in maritime security in the EIOR. More such manoeuvres can be 
foreseen only with changes in the overall mind-set. 
India’s position in the SEA region is unique. India can balance equally between 
India and China. The balancing factor is dependent on Malaysia and what it can offer 
to attract India to engage in a better balance of power in the region.
218 
Therefore, as 
Malaysia is located at the border of both the IOR and the Asia–Pacific region, 
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India’s engagement with Malaysia will depend on how India views Malaysia in the 
IOR and the Indo-Pacific region. 
India might seem to be a country preoccupied with internal and regional politics 
and war with Pakistan, and thus demurring from outreach engagement. It is asserted 
that this potential attitude should not, however, be seen as a deterrent to other 
countries, particularly Malaysia. If India is engaged with Malaysia, India will 
definitely reciprocate and form stronger relations in maritime cooperation with 
Malaysia, especially in the areas of energy cooperation, shipbuilding and 
maintenance, and the safety of the SOM, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the 
Bay of Bengal. 
In addition, there must be strong convergence of mutual interest vital to any 
cooperation or relationship. 
219 
However, in the case of MIMSC, the need for 
cooperation does not seem to be solid or convincing enough for either party to 
initiate proceedings. There is a need for maritime security issues to fill the space in 
the Indian LEP for Malaysia, especially with the current issues and disputes 
regarding the SCS and the SOM. The SCS’s waters are crucially important to 
Malaysia, and thus Malaysia would tend to be friendlier towards India than China. 
Malaysia lost Pedra Branca to Singapore, hence Malaysia will try its best to defend 
the Spratly Islands, and this will have an influence on its policy with China. India too 
needs to show an equal amount of commitment in order to gain Malaysia’s trust. 
India should continue to maintain that any diplomatic cooperation is sought only for 
the safety and security of the SLOCs in the SOM and not to dominate or project 
power in these areas.
220 As such, India’s maritime effort being focused eastward will 
have greater imperative. Malaysia is certainly a natural close partner for India where 
the security of SLOCs is concerned.
221 
In the case of international SLOCs security 
and safety, a joint effort is easier because of common concerns relating to freedom of 
navigation.
222 
Focusing on mutual interest is indeed a great beginning to a better 
maritime relationship. 
In terms of Malaysia choosing or not choosing China over India, Prime Minister 
Najib Tun Razak stated clearly in Singapore that Malaysia’s foreign policy is more 
issue-oriented than capability-oriented. Therefore, Malaysia is neutral, as illustrated 
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by its commitment in ZOPFAN and NAM. As Malaysia’s foreign policy is principle- 
based, it can be critical of both friend and foe, and is consistent on this matter to 
prevent any hegemony. 
223 
Malaysia acknowledges India as a regional power. 
Therefore, in terms of balancing its relations with India and China, it is vital for 
Malaysia to remain ‘moderate’. Democratic and moderate values are a similar 
driving factor in both Malaysia and India.
224 
Both countries should understand and 
acknowledge this condition for a better breakthrough in their maritime relationship. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
It is evident that a successful MIMSC is highly dependent on major factors such as 
bilateral and multilateral commitments, informal networks of bilateral and 
multilateral maritime cooperation, shared cost-benefits, and the overcoming of 
bureaucratic and statutory bottlenecks. However, a fundamental change in maritime 
strategic thinking is the key to this relationship. It requires Malaysia to change its 
mind and be more forward thinking and ambitious.
225 
The current MIMSC is stalled 
and needs more proactive engagement by both partners. With regard to all the above 
arguments, it is evident that the emerging areas of maritime cooperation between 
Malaysia and India can only be achieved if both countries recognise these critical 
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THE SHAPING OF MALAYSIA–INDIA MARITIME SECURITY 
COOPERATION IN THE EASTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION 
 
As the focus of economic activity shifted during the 20
th 
century from Europe to the 
Asia–Pacific region, Asian maritime thinking was accompanied by the debates 
conveyed by Julian Robert Corbett and Alfred Thayar Mahan, especially Mahan’s 
interpretation that ‘whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia’. His statement 
substantiated that ‘the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters in the   21st 
century’ (Mahan 1987). This is evident in the case of Malaysia and India in the EIOR. 
India’s continuing interest in ensuring the stability of the IOR’s waters reflects 
Mahan’s thoughts about the inter-relationship for a rising power between its global 
interests and its maritime strategy. Malaysia, located at the vital choke point of the 
SOM, is in a similar situation. Located on the busiest of sea routes, it also sees its 
global interests shaping its maritime strategy in the IOR. 
As the two countries work towards drawing up their own individual maritime 
policies in the IOR, a cooperative framework is shaping the maritime relationship 
between Malaysia and India in the EIOR. Although reasons such as economic 
imperatives and the defence against security threats in the EIOR, both traditional and 
non-traditional, are global factors shaping the framework, domestic considerations 
are more significant in influencing the relationship. Domestic weakness, especially 
in economic development, restricts both countries to adopting a comparatively 
independent role in shaping their maritime policies. Thus, seeking cooperation and 
interdependency will help them face and overcome the external challenges that they 
cannot resolve alone. An emerging global power like India is the vital partner 
Malaysia needs to secure in order to overcome its maritime challenges – and India 
in turn needs the friendship of littoral states like Malaysia in the EIOR. 
Historically, both countries have evidently strong maritime bonds. The valuable 
historical understanding, which was required in earlier stage of the thesis, was 




order to understand the bilateral relationship between Malaysia and India. This 
covered the pre-colonial period, during the early kingdoms of India (from the 10
th 
century to the 15
th
). It also covered the unbreakable maritime bond between 
Malaysia-India during the arrival of European powers in the 15
th 
century, which 
lasted until the 19
th 
century. The occupation by the European powers did not weaken 
the maritime relationship between Malaya and India. Philip Curtin’s concept of the 
merchants’ diaspora to explain the functioning of cross-cultural trade over the 
centuries was true in the case of Malaya and India’s continuous and strong maritime 
bond in the EIOR. The similar situation is presented during Cold War. Despite this 
temporary drift, both Malaysia and India showed their commitment to ensuring the 
safety and security of the EIOR through their strong and active involvement in the 
NAM, which had been initiated by India. 
This demonstrated the high significance of the IOR and more importantly the 
appreciation that both countries had of each other as important maritime partners in 
the EIOR. The detailed discussion on the historical background of Malaysia and 
India and its social-cultural influences shows that this aspect is fundamental in 
shaping MIMSC in the EIOR. It is factual and will show continuity in future 
interaction of both countries. 
The moot point was however the urgent need to deliberate on the ‘credible 
commitments’ of both Malaysia and India on maritime issues in the EIOR. Both 
countries have had a strong engagement over the past three decades, projected 
through their commitments in joint naval exercises, defence and military exchanges, 
joint defence projects and other related forms of cooperation in mitigating traditional 
and non-traditional maritime threats. However, their relationship lacks robustness 
and no official agreements have been made. For nations that have commemorated 50 
years of diplomatic relations, the maritime relationship between the two is rather a 
subdued one. In 1993, a major development was witnessed in the SEA region when 
India signed its first ever defence agreement with Malaysia, marking a major 
milestone compared to other SEA states in the region. Yet absurdly, developments 
still remain limited. 
This implies that MIMSC in the EIOR is a missed opportunity and it is vital for 
both to examine the potential opportunities for Malaysia and India in the area of 
maritime cooperation/partnership and to identify the factors discouraging more 





To begin, the thesis proposed the vital need to examine the macro and micro 
level of maritime issues spanning across the IOR and its implications towards the 
bilateral relations between Malaysia and India. The primary data collection at both 
countries involving important key players in policy-making have identified the 
common grounds that drive MIMSC in the EIOR in the context of the post-Cold War 
era. It was argued that, geography plays a key role in their relationship. The two 
regions are both situated in an important position in the world, connecting major 
SLOC. India in the South Asia Region and Malaysia in the SEA Region both act as a 
bridge between the eastern and western worlds. Historical evidence has underlined 
this natural occurrence, and it remains an important driving factor of MIMSC in the 
EIOR in the post-Cold War era. 
Another traditional pull factor, which is influenced due to historical reasons, are 
the commonality in terms of economic partnership. The sea provides the easiest, 
oldest and cheapest method of transportation for trade. More than half of Malaysia’s 
GDP is generated through maritime foreign trade from China, South Korea, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. The Americans, Australians and New Zealanders also utilise the 
SOM as their preferred route. In addition to maritime trade, strong interest is visible 
for resources such as gas and oil. Malaysia has several areas with huge oil resources 
such as Layang-Layang Island, Miri and Bintulu, which contributes hugely in terms 
of oil revenue towards Malaysia’s economic growth. For India, the Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands, situated very near the SOM, have high-value minerals that could 
benefit the region’s population and make changes to its energy policy. Meanwhile, 
any disruption along the SLOSs, even temporarily, can lead to substantial increases 
in energy costs. The global demand for oil is growing annually and it provides an 
avenue for great power. 
The common urge for both Malaysia and India to reform their economy and 
narrow down their social inequality will thus contribute a significance amount of 
weightage in its bilateral relationship in the region. After more than a century of 
colonisation, independence meant that both countries had to struggle to update their 
economies, and most importantly, to reduce poverty levels. There is an urgent need 
for security cooperation between Malaysia and India in the EIOR, especially related 
to gaining access to resources in the IOR. Resource scarcity is an increasing concern, 
and securing the SLOCs is vital for peaceful and continuing economic activity. 





will continue remain a core interest in this bilateral relationship. 
Whilst the geographical and economic factor is detected to be a direct and 
natural force for many years now, the geopolitical scenario in the EIOR needs 
greater attention from both countries. Maritime issues in the region will evolve 
concurrently in time and considering both Malaysia and India as a key player in 
ensuring the safety and security of IOR, a few pull factors require concentrations. 
One of the most dominant factors that drew both countries for a better 
cooperation in the region has been the China factor. China is extending its 
diplomatic, economic and military forays in the IOR to overcome and ameliorate its 
Malacca Dilemma, but is doing so with more than a naval, military or regional 
strategy. China’s move represents the manifestation of its rising geopolitical 
influence through its efforts to increase access from the SCS through the SOM and 
across the entire IOR. China’s expansionist behaviour shows that it no longer accepts 
IOR as just an Indian ocean. 
Although China increasing access to the SOM and other parts of the IOR is 
recognised by both countries, India is more anxious in comparison to Malaysia in this 
case. Whilst Malaysia has strictly expressed that the safety and security of SOM is a 
major responsibility of her together with Indonesia and Singapore, Malaysia perceives 
China as an important partner in the region and this is not purely because of 
abundance of natural resources in the disputed area. Rather, China’s contribution in 
terms of economy to Malaysia plays vital role. Areas with ample resources such as 
gas, fish and minerals are China’s ‘traditional playground’, which has huge 
implications for Malaysia’s economic wealth. 
Hence, the government will continue to balance in dealing with issues related 
with China. As a small power vis-à-vis China, Malaysia will match its power by focus 
on protecting its sovereignty and economic interests as well as maintaining positive 
relations with other states. Besides, China’s historical and socio-cultural links with 
Malaysia puts both countries in a positive relation. With the second largest population 
represented by the Chinese in Malaysia, whom also contributes hugely to the 
country’s economy, Malaysia’s policy towards China will reflect a more neutral 
stand. 
The rivalry is perhaps lies more dominant in the case of India. Both countries 
are concurrently a rising power in the region. In the case of maritime projection in 





of pearls’ strategy is often debated, but is essentially seen as a form of power 
maximisation. The discussion with the interviewees suggested that China would 
remain a dominant factor for India during its engagement with any SEA region and 
not just Malaysia. However, India perceives Malaysia as a great power balance in the 
region because of its major role in SOM, which is an important choke point for 
China. 
Hence, as much as both countries has the common interest in ensuring a 
maritime power balance in the EIOR and seek new opportunities for a 
comprehensive framework of MIMSC in the EIOR in the case of China, the different 
position Malaysia and India has with China could draw gap in relation as much as it 
drives as a key element. This difference in behaviour will remain core in both 
countries in shaping its bilateral relations in the region. 
Whilst pull factors such as geography, economic partnership and China factor 
determines  the  bilateral  relationship, another  major  element  that strongly  needs 
attention by both countries at an equal level is the realisation of maritime power and 
the desire for maritime power. Until the end of the 20
th 
century, the IOR was an 
active playground for western maritime rivalries. Indian maritime blindness in   the 
past was the cause of western maritime settlement in India. Similarly, Malaysia’s 
open policies led to European powers flocking into the waters of SEA over centuries. 
The thesis discovered that both countries projected low desire to acquire maritime 
power and this indirectly affects the bilateral relationship. This sea blindness is 
however not similar as it was during the past. Both countries are independently 
shaping its maritime policies and are against any form of intrusion from external 
power. But in the current context, the sea blindness are more associated to the lack 
of proactive engagement in engaging with key players on key issues that are 
evolving in the area of maritime security. 
India for instance has trouble engaging with Malaysia on maritime issues 
although there is many areas of cooperation require high level of attention from both 
countries. This gap was questioned several times during the field trip and it was 
comprehended that the level of cooperation did not reach the expected level because 
Malaysia lack in enthusiasm. The similar response was comprehended from the 
Malaysian who believes India should take early initiatives in engaging Malaysia. In 





This scenario shows that the element of sea blindness is still present, thus 
affecting the opportunities that could be used by both countries. Therefore, it is vital 
to for both countries to remain mindful of this particular behaviour of reluctance and 
hesitancy but in contrast should grab any potential positive engagement for a more 
comprehensive  bilateral relationship. 
The thesis was also keen in identifying the potential traditional and non- 
traditional security and the emerging areas of maritime collaboration. The thesis set 
out the arguments into two divisions: a) the traditional and b) the non-traditional 
threats in the EIOR. These were presented in Chapters 5 and 6, to elicit more in- 
depth answers. From a traditional perspective, securing the safety and security of 
SLOCs for economic prosperity, and from state practice over regional autonomy are 
the factors driving MIMSC in EIOR. Two major emerging areas are in strong focus. 
First is partnership in maritime resources and competence. This is evident in the case 
of joint bilateral naval exercises and programmes between the two states. India has 
yet to show bilateral commitment with Malaysia in comparison to other littoral states 
such as Singapore and Indonesia, which have SIMBEX and CORPAT respectively. 
This scenario could be related again to the issue of lack of proactive engagement 
that was pointed out earlier. The outcome of interviews suggested that Malaysia’s 
neighbouring country such as Singapore and Indonesia seek to engage positively 
with India on maritime issues. It is hence important for Malaysia to be more 
proactive partners in order to advance more bilateral commitment on maritime areas 
in IOR. 
One of the most prominent areas that showed high level of interest in both 
countries is the interest in defense industry collaboration. Great potential lies in the 
areas of SBSR and MRO, especially where shared costs and benefits in the areas of 
shipbuilding, ship repair and maintenance are concerned. R&D is also another 
emerging area, and Malaysia’s MDSTP is a good example of such an outlook. As a 
nation with blue water navy ambitions, R&D is a vital component to shape a resilient 
MIMSC in the EIOR. The detailed explanations in Chapter 5 are the outcome of 
interviews, which presented this particular interest. Thus, the area of defense 
industry should be a major focus for both countries. 
From a non-traditional perspective, it was evident that the continuous problems 
of piracy, terrorism at sea, natural disasters and illicit activities such as drug 





the major underlying concerns. Whilst piracy is a major concern for both countries 
especially Malaysia, considerable effort has been adopted to overcome this issue and 
the level of piracy attacks has reduced by each year. Nevertheless, the issue of 
terrorism remains as a prominent factor for both countries in terms of non-traditional 
perspective. 
The issue of terrorism, which took a dramatic shift in policies of many countries 
after the 9/11 incident has also impacted both countries subsequently. For India, it 
has directly affected its security, as it borders on both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Attacks such as the 2003 Mumbai bombing, Delhi bombing in 2005 and many more 
which took place throughout major cities is a huge concern for India. For Malaysia, 
the war on terror after 9/11 had made the situation more volatile, especially with the 
presence of terrorist groups such ASG, Al Qaeda, KMM and JI, which have shifted 
much of its focus towards the SEA region. 
With the development of science and technology, more non-state actors are 
expected to hack and threat the stability of state. Hence, the issue of terrorism will be 
in great focus in both Malaysia and India’s policy. A strong MIMSC network is 
required in order to protect both Malaysia and India’s maritime interests in the 
EIOR. The cross-boundary nature of this threat requires a more disciplined and 
uniformed management approach. 
In terms of area of cooperation, both countries expressed that search and rescue 
operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, are two major 
potential areas of cooperation to mitigate non-traditional threats. The disappearance 
of flight MH370 and the 2004 tsunami were classic examples of a lack of 
preparedness by Malaysia and India to handle emergencies. There is a vital need for 
them to improve in the areas of crisis and disaster management. While many other 
regional powers are contributing to this trajectory and at the same time receive help 
from other countries with open arms, both Malaysia and India have yet to adopt 
these initiatives. India has great potential in relation to this emerging area, and it 
could also be taken up wisely by Malaysia. 
Another important aspect is enhancing the policing roles by Malaysia and India 
in the EIOR. Most non-traditional threats occur in territorial waters, leaving the law 
enforcement agencies in need of reinforcement. In response to the complexity of 
contemporary maritime threats and their sophisticated networks, the policing 





This could be achieved by engaging with an extra-regional power that has the 
resources and competence available, as well as the financial aid required. Japan, the 
USA and Australia are among the few regional powers contributing to the SEA 
countries, and this could be attempted by Malaysia and India in the EIOR. It requires 
a strong integrated maritime strategy from the bottom to the very top level. 
The last section of the thesis (Chapter 7) aimed at examining the critical success 
factors. The purpose of this analysis was driven by the rational that recognising the 
major pull factors as well as identifying the potential traditional and non-traditional 
threats are not sufficient enough in shaping the bilateral relationship between two 
countries. It is vital to understand the aim of a particular state interaction and shape 
strategies based on the level of interaction and further improve the bilateral 
relationship. This will direct countries towards better decision-making process. 
The potential opportunities identified are not achievable without understanding 
the critical success factors that directly contribute to the shaping of MIMSC in the 
EIOR. The first is the bilateral and multilateral commitments – but both Malaysia 
and India have yet to make any meaningful efforts in that regard. NATO has 
provided a good example of a multilateral defence programme, which could take 
shape in the EIOR. The ASEAN, ARF, ADMM-PLUS, IONS and IORA are all good 
stepping-stones towards a more complex maritime security institution. Nevertheless, 
an in-depth maritime axis policy must be well thought out. 
A bilateral mechanism is equally important, as it means direct engagement 
between two countries that is more strategic in nature. For combating non-traditional 
threats, the ‘Eyes in the Sky’ programme is an example of a possible multilateral 
commitment. Others include the ReCAAP initiative led by Japan, and the USA-led 
PSI. However, these multilateral programmes tend to meet with failure due to the 
lack of trust that exists between the various littoral states. Therefore, as it is difficult 
for bilateral commitments to take shape in overcoming traditional threats, both 
Malaysia and India could focus on non-conventional threats, and draw up some 
informal bilateral commitments as a launch pad for a more formal and integrated 
bilateral relationship in the EIOR to generate stronger trust between each other. 
Other factors entail overcoming the bureaucratic and statutory bottlenecks, and 
sharing costs and benefits. Both Malaysia and India need to reshuffle their law and 
order at sea by first setting their own house in order, and only then entering into 





another major obstacle requiring serious planning for successful MIMSC in the 
EIOR. 
One of the most important finding of the thesis, which requires great change in 
both governments for better policy implementation, is change in maritime strategic 
thinking in Malaysia and India. It should begin with a critical shift in strategic 
thinking to ensure a more sound and pronounced maritime relationship between 
Malaysia and India. Both countries have recognised the importance of a strategic 
partnership, and have adopted considerable effects. These elements have been 
projected since the post-Cold War period with the establishment of LEP I and LEP 
II. However, after almost two decades of a mature and long-standing relationship, it 
is only expected that both will advance in the relationship. For such a situation to 
occur, understanding the culture of both countries is required in a more serious 
manner. 
In relating these thoughts in understanding the strategic culture of both 
countries, the thesis founds that different cultural thinking between the two are one 
of the major contributing factor towards the success and failure of the bilateral 
relationship. Culture has been a major characteristic in the study of social sciences. 
In the field of international study, this aspect has been embedded strongly especially 
in understanding state interaction that composes two different cultures. Similarly, in 
analysing national security policy, cultural aspect plays a prominent role because its 
different cultural background impacts a state’s foreign policy behaviour or outcome 
inversely. 
In relation these thoughts in understanding the maritime strategic thinking, the 
distinctive thinking could be due to different generation gaps between the 
governmental organisations. The many different generations as well as level of 
commitment towards the organisation impacts the outcome of MIMSC. This is a 
vital point for both countries to remain attentive of in the future. 
It is suggested that both Malaysia and India should shift from the current stage 
of immobility and make changes. As an emerging power in the IOR, India needs to 
project a more resilient role in the region. Seeking a strong partnership with 
Malaysia would not be a difficult task if India could draw a clear line between its 
role in projecting leadership and responsibility on the one hand, and its desire to 
secure its maritime interests in the EIOR on the other. A distinction must be made 





stakes in the EIOR. India, after all, does not have any maritime disputes with 
Malaysia, while Malaysia is facing up to China in the SCS. Hence it is up to India to 
redefine its maritime relationship with Malaysia. This scenario, if fitted closely with 
a well-planned maritime strategy vis-à-vis Malaysia, would project the realistic goal 
of India’s foreign policy shift from India’s LEP to Modi’s current act east policy. 
As for Malaysia, a similar proactive attitude is also required. It should 
acknowledge and react positively towards India’s proposal on the maritime front in 
order to create a better maritime relationship. However, a clear mind-set needs to be 
attained in Malaysia. The country should position itself carefully, gain leverage and 
maintain sustainability before establishing engagement with India. One of the major 
aspects will be the shaping of it’s own version of the Indian Ocean policy. As it is 
strategically located between east and west, it should draw up clear maritime policies 
to command the vast EIOR waters. Like India, which has command over both east 
and west in the IOR, Malaysia should draw up a discrete policy relating to India as 
well as China. Just as India is taking a turn towards ‘Act East’, so should Malaysia 
begin to ‘Look West’ and ‘Act West’ towards India. 
The three major sub-questions asked in the early stage of the research were well 
examined with sufficient evidences to answer the problem statement. It has open up 
to new and in-depth understanding of the present and future direction of the bilateral 
relationship between Malaysia and India. MIMSC in the EIOR has indeed provided 
promising opportunities, but has lacked the real opportunities for further 
collaboration. The puzzling question in the literature review has been cross- 
examined well with great details in the subsequent chapters. This is the reason 
behind the literature review of the thesis suggested the bilateral relationship between 
two countries is a ‘missed opportunity’. 
Studying the dynamics of MIMSC and its evolution since the end of the Cold 
War has suggested diverse and new areas of maritime cooperation that require 
immediate action in order to overcome the growing maritime threats in the EIOR. 
This answers the significance of the study where suggested that although both 
countries recognises the importance of cooperation, it is important to continue to 
assess the bilateral relationship with the concurrent changes happening in the region 
in order to shape more effective policies. 
It also provided support that there is no single universal definition of maritime 





that cause confusion amongst policy-making whom at time comes up with their own 
definition to fit their own interest and the geopolitical environment of its country. 
The findings in the thesis has provided ample of examples to contemplate the 
necessity to shape a clear definition at a global, regional and national level especially 
developing countries like Malaysia in order to draw a more well defined maritime 
security framework. These guidelines will then guide the shaping of inter-state 
maritime security cooperation like the MIMSC in EIOR. 
The thesis also opened up more revenues for policy-makers to ponder on the 
pressing need for the further appreciation of maritime policies. The issue of ‘sea 
blindness’, which was discussed above, is one particular aspect that requires high 
attention at any cost of shaping policies on maritime matters. The evidences 
collected at various maritime departments and naval officers, academic think tanks 
and researchers confirmed this situation. 
In sum, analysing the bilateral relationship between Malaysia and India in the 
relations to all the questions proposed in the thesis, it is concluded that both 
countries failed to draw up effective policies despites the potential to do so and this 
is due to the lack of ‘credible commitment’. This element is essential in shaping of a 
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INFORMATION  SHEET  FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
REC  Reference Number: REP-H/12/13-42 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION   SHEET 
 
 
EMERGING SECURITY PARADIGM IN THE EASTERN INDIAN OCEAN 




We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate (PhD) research project. 
You should only participate if you want to. Choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way. If you agree to take part you will be asked whether you 
are happy to be contacted about participation in future studies. Your  participation  in 
this study will not be affected should you choose not to be re-contacted. A decision to 
withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect the standard of care 
you receive. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to 
keep and be asked to sign a consent  form. 
 
Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. 
Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would    like more information. 
 
 
Aim of the Research 
 
This research is aimed to ultimately produce an academic thesis for the purpose of my 
PhD qualification. My research question  asks: 
 
Research Problem Statement 
 
The central question of the thesis seeks to  examine  the  ‘potential  opportunity’ for  
both Malaysia and India in the area of maritime cooperation/partnership, and  the  




1. What are the drivers of MIMSC in the  EIOR? 
 
2. What are the emerging areas of maritime collaboration to be considered by 






3. What are the critical success factors/enablers of MIMSC for mitigating 
maritime security threats in the EIOR? 
 
 
Possible Benefits to the Study 
 
It is hoped that the outcome of the research will create awareness amongst Malaysian 
policy makers in shaping future defence/maritime policies. The participants being part 
of Malaysia’s policymaking process could utilise the knowledge gained during a 
stimulating dialogue session for future policy processes. On the other hand, the group 
interviews may help you build your own set of networks or friendships for your own 
work or research purposes. During the thesis write up, I will cite your work where 





The Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE), Malaysia, sponsors the entire PhD 




The choice of my participants includes policy makers from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and various policy implementers such as Malaysia 
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and Southeast Asia Regional Centre For 
Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) Indian High Commissioner to Malaysia, Malaysian 
Commissioner to India, Indian Defense Advisor to Malaysia and Malaysian Defense 
Advisor to India, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and The United 
Service Institution of India (USI). 
 
Venue, Time and Duration 
 
A tentative time, duration of the interviews as well as the venue will be provided. 
However, an accurate place, time and duration will be determined by you and your 
leverage to offer sufficient and effective responses in the timeframe of the fieldwork. 
The interviews will be conducted at your workplace such as your office room or a 
meeting room. Your involvement is expected to last until the end of the data 
collection period, i.e. March 2015. This is because there may be times where you will 




You may at times during the interview face difficulty in providing certain information 
pertaining to the research since it involves the study of foreign policy making. For 
example, if you are a navy officer, you may not be in a position to disclose certain 
naval activities of your country due to national security issues. In this case, it is 
stressed that you will only face minimal levels of risk in terms of providing 
information. You can choose whether to share this information or not.I will cite and 






All interviews and data collection will be conducted at your work place such as an 
institute, centre or foundation, and mostly interviews will take place in a private 
room, meeting room or office. Hence, you will not face risks in terms of travelling to 
a particular place. In addition, information will be restricted between you and me. If 
an interview is conducted in a group, a prior letter will be distributed to each of you 
involved about the general background of other participants to ensure you are 
comfortable with each other. If any one of you does not agree, a new arrangement or 
reshuffling of interview groups will be done. It is stressed here that you need not 
worry about disclosing information or being uncomfortable in the presence of another 
participant, as each participant will have detailed information prior to the interview 
and each activity will be explained clearly from the beginning of the interview until 
the end of the interview. 
 
However, recording of the interview may take place to ensure the accuracy of the 
information obtained from the various participants. It is purely your decision whether 
to allow a recording to be made. I have no authority in this matter and prior to the 
interview, I will propose the interest to conduct a recording and it is subject to your 
permission. On the day of the interview, you will be reminded about this to ensure 
you are well aware of this attempt. However, it is stressed here that if you have agreed 
for this attempt, all recordings of interviews will be deleted upon transcription. I will 
also make manual field notes such as analytical memo field notes while conducting 
the interview. All the information written will be encrypted after the study is 
completed. 
 
In the time period of this research, you and I will not discuss the information obtained 
with a stranger or even a person who is in a similar field if they are not involved as a 
participant in the research. This is for the purpose of confidentiality for yourself as 
well as the privacy of my data collection for the purpose of the thesis. 
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
 
Although this research is purely for academic purposes, you can choose to be 
anonymous if you feel your information will be sensitive to other readers or a 
particular individual. It is stressed here that all your information provided to me will 
be entirely academic. Nevertheless you can seek other forms of confidentiality which 
are necessary or required of your position. Fictitious names can be used if you want to 
protect your privacy. If in either case you choose to be fully anonymous, it will not be 
possible to identify you in any publications. 
 
Anticipated  Plans For Dissemination/Publication 
 
Any information that is obtained during the data collection period will be used for 
academic writing to obtain a PhD qualification from King’s College London. The 
information will also be used for the purposes of articles, journal publication or 
seminar/conference presentations during the PhD programme where relevant. Your 
contribution to the knowledge obtained will be acknowledged and you will own 
copyright of your information. You have complete freedom to disapprove of the use 





It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. If you decide to take part you are 
still free to withdraw from the study at any time and without giving a reason. You 
may also withdraw any data/information you have already provided up until it is 
transcribed for use in the final write up by 5 March 2016. 
 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact 
the researcher using the following contact details: 
 
 
Name and Full Contact Details of the Researcher 
 
Name: Tharishini Krishnan (Student Id: 1167643) 
Home Address in Malaysia: No 9, Hala Tambun Permai 1, 
Kpg Tersusun Batu 4 Tambun, 
31400 Ipoh, Perak Darul Ridzuan, 
Malaysia. 
Home Address in United Kingdom:  Flat 6, Bank House, 
209 Merton Road, SW19 1EE, 
South Wimbledon, London, 
United Kingdom. 
Email Address: tharishini.krishnan@kcl.ac.uk (preferable email 
address) 
tharrychris@gmail.com (in case of emergency) 
Mobile Number (UK): +0044 02 07 553115236 
Mobile Number (Malaysia): +60124536894 
 
 
If this study has harmed you in any way, you can contact King's College London 
using the details below for further advice and information: 
 
 
Name and Full Contact Details of the Supervisor 
 
Name: Prof. Dr. Harsh V. Pant 
Email Address: harsh.pant@kcl.ac.uk 









Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the   research. 
 
 
Title of Study:    
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee  Ref:    
 
Thank  you for considering  taking part in this research. The  person organising  
the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you 
have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already 
given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You 




● I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no 
longer wish to participate in this project, I can notify the 
researcherinvolved and withdraw from it immediately without giving any 
reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be  able  to withdraw  my  
data up to the point of publication (5
th 
of March  2016). 
● I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes 
explained to me. I understand that such information will be handled in 
accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection Act   1998.
226
 
● I agree to be contacted in the future by  King’s  College  London 
researchers who would like to invite me to participate in follow up studies  
to this project, or in future studies of a similar  nature. 
 
● I consent to my interview being audio/video   recorded. 
 
● I understand that if I choose full confidentiality and anonymity, 
it will not be possible to identify me in any  publications. 
 













226 The Data Protection Act, 1998 classifies sensitive personal data as consisting of information as to ‘(a) the racial or ethnic 
origin of the data subject, (b) his† political opinions, (c) his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature, (d) whether he 
is a member of a trade union (within the meaning of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992), (e) his 
physical or mental health or condition, (f) his sexual life, (g) the commission    or alleged commission by him of any offence, or 
(h) any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed by him, the disposal of such proceedings or 
the sentence of any court in such proceedings’ (http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980029.htm). †  ‘His’ 
should also be taken to include ‘her’. 
















it will be possible to identify me in certain publications. However, this 
is dependent upon the significance of the work and the type of write 
up/publication involved. 
● I agree to be contacted in the future by King’s College London 
researchers who would like to invite me to participate in follow up 
studies to this project, or in future studies of a similar nature. 
● I agree that the researcher may use my data for future research and 
understand that any such use of identifiable data would be reviewed 








agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my 
satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes 
written above and the Information Sheet about the project, and understand what 







I    
confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable 




















Agreement to Participate in  Research 
 
Topic of Research: Emerging Security Paradigm in the Eastern Indian Ocean 
Region (EIOR): A Blue Ocean of  Malaysia-India  Maritime  Security  
Cooperation. 
 
Primary Researcher: Tharishini Krishnan (PhD Student) 
First Supervisor: Prof. Harsh V. Pant 
Second Supervisor: Prof. Sunil  Khilnani 
 
I (name  of  the  participant)  understand  that  this  research is for the 
purpose of a PhD thesis. I have fully understood the aims, objectives, and nature of     
the study which have been explained clearly to me by the primary researcher. I 
understand that I have full freedom to withdraw from this project at any time up to the 
time of thesis compilation (5
th 
of March  2016). 
 
I understand that the information obtained by the researcher through me will be kept 
confidential and is by no means to be used    or published without my full consent. 
 




Signature: _    
 
Date:    
 
Further information, please contact: 
Tharishini Krishnan 
Email: tharishini.krishnan@kcl.ac.uk. 








Resources: 32-items checklist of Consolidated Criteria for reporting qualitative 
















Date of Interview: 24
th 
November 2014 
Time: 10.00 hours 
Duration: 1 hour 50 minutes 
Location: Maritime Department, Ministry  of Foreign 
Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia  (MOFA) 
Number of interview sessions:          1 
Method of transcription: Diary  notes and later transcribed to   typed in 
Microsoft Words 
 
Contextual  Information  (Researcher’s Memo): 
 
It is a normal sunny day and I have driven my car to reach 15 minutes before the 
appointment to his office in Putrajaya. The meeting has been scheduled on my 
request via email to his Personal Assistant (PA). Upon arrival, the  PA  has  
received me to take me to the meeting room upstairs. The  interview  started a  
little late by 10 minutes. The meeting room is quiet, cool and comfortable. The     
PA has told me that Mr. A has already scheduled his office work to spare 1.5 
hours. The informant is looking fresh and has greeted me  warmly.  I  am  
surprised to see that he has the hard copy of the interview question sheet that I 
emailed to his PA two weeks before the meeting. He seems well prepared. No tea  
or coffee served yet, but I have my water bottle with me to keep my throat wet 
enough to ask many  questions. 
 
He has a degree in law from a European country and he has impressed me with   
his knowledge about maritime studies because of his long experience and his 
current important position as a secretary. No abnormal interruption happened 
during the interview except a few brief interruptions by the PA informing him 
about his next schedule. I took 20 additional minutes from the allotted time. His 
reflections on traditional maritime security threats were brief yet he  spoke  in 
detail about non-traditional maritime security issues. The interview ended with a 







Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 




Field of Expertise: Maritime Policy Making 
Professional Experience: Civil Service Officer 
Years of Experience: 12 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Disclosure of Information 
The informant had been provided with the King’s College London information 
sheet and consent form disclosing the research topic, purpose, risks, benefits and 





A. Malaysia’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional 
maritime security threats in the EIOR). 
 
1. What are the external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
The officer began by saying that the South China Sea is in the interest of 
Malaysia as it has overlapping issues compared to the Indian Ocean Region 
(IOR). The IOR is an area that is free and peaceful from conflict. It is driven 
strongly from the fact that both Malaysia and India are far apart 
geographically. This could be the reason behind Malaysia’s consistent focus on 
China factors rather than India, as India reflects benign maritime behavior. He 
stressed that this does not mean that India will only be noticed if it projects 
coercive behavior. Both Malaysia and India have had a good relationship for 
many years now and geographical distance causes both Malaysia and India to 
be lacking in maritime engagement. 
 
In discussing the external drivers, SLOCs is a fundamental area of concern 
especially the Straits of Malacca. India and China are believed to be contesting 
in the larger context of IOR and this situation can jeopardize the safety of 
SOM. For Malaysia, securing the safety and security of SOM is vital at all 
times. Malaysia’s involvements in the IOR are based on the principles of 
respect against territory and sovereignty and strongly driven by the policy of 
issue-based action. Safety of SLOCs especially SOM is vital for Malaysia as 
it’s the busiest trade route in the world. Economic development of the country 
is dependent on these routes as at the EEZ areas where ship movements are 
free without any restrictions. 
 
The informant then speaks about China. He argues that China’s ambitions or 





Malaysia does not see China as a threat but like any other power involved in 
the region, China causes anxiety. India is a natural friend for us and taking into 
consideration India and China’s contest in the IOR, a stronger relationship with 
India could be shaped especially concerning maritime interests, as India has a 
sense of universality compared to any other armed forces. On the other hand, 
neither Malaysia nor India have any disputes, compared to China which 
Malaysia is contesting with for the claims for Spratly Islands. He argued that 
Malaysia lost Pedra Branca to Singapore which hit the nation hard. Malaysia 
will try her level best to defend Spratly Islands and this can influence her 
policy with China. 
 
2. What are the internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
He began by arguing that Malaysia-India have a good historical maritime 
relationship connected through these (EIOR) traditional trade routes. He argued 
that as early as the 16
th 
century, one can see Indian traders sailing to Malaysia 
for business purposes. He focused on trade by arguing that Malaysia is the third 
largest trading partner for India within ASEAN and on the other hand, India is 
the largest trading partner for Malaysia and many other countries in the region. 
This suggested to the researcher that Malaysia-India bilateral areas are 
confined largely to trade and not defence areas. He quoted a few more 
economic relationships. E.g. The Malaysia-India Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (CECA) covering goods and services as well as 
investment. Others are the Revised Double Taxation in 2012 and MOU on 
Field of Customs in 2013. These further suggested that defense areas were not 
a major focus, although he did not dismiss the importance of defense from his 
mind. 
 
He further argued that the demographics of Malaysia represent multiple 
ethnicities, of which Indians, though smallest in number, represent at least 7 
percent, covering languages such as Tamil, Malayalam, Kannada, Punjabi and 
many more. The process of assimilation has led to inter-marriages between 
religions and there are huge numbers of Tamil Muslims in Malaysia. These are 




3. How is Malaysia going to rebalance her overall power and maritime power 
vis-à-vis India and China in the EIOR in the context of the above factors? 
 
In discussing what sort of power Malaysia is, the officer argued that Malaysia 
is a maritime power in the SEA region and big powers cannot ignore the 
importance of Malaysia at the SOM. Malaysia fiercely defends the interests of 
their territories. In questioning India, the informant believed that India has a 
desire to be a great power and he quoted his own experiences during a 
conference last October 2014 at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in 
Honolulu. He argued that the the Indian navy officers expressed their desire to 







A. Malaysia’s commitment to Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation 
in the EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
On the issue of bilateral relations, the officer believed that India’s engagement 
with Malaysia is through ASEAN, which he believes to be more effective. As a 
small nation, multilateral fora will be the key. ASEAN is a major instrument in 
engaging with the region on any issue as it projects collective behavior. India’s 
proactive engagement in ASEAN will be welcomed as India is not just a vital 
regional power but a great power balancer vis-à-vis other major powers in the 
region. However, he stressed that bilateral relations should also be based upon 
confidence building, dialogues and transparency. 
 
In November 2015 during a meeting, Prime Minister Dato Najib Mohamad and 
Prime Minister Modi expressed that the Malaysian embassy in Delhi was the 
first of all embassies to be established in Delhi. He believed that although such 
recognition existed, there has been no bilateral mechanism except through 
ASEAN – ARF – ADMM Plus. 
 
He suggested that India ought to look towards China as an example in 
formulating its foreign policy with Malaysia. I felt that the way the officer 
explained his position and made comparisons between the countries shows that 
China has been active in its power projection vis-à-vis India. E.g. China’s 
engagement in ARF where China was actively engaged in dialogue on the oil 
spill and search and rescue operation. He stressed that China is very much 
engaged and loyal. 
 
However, the officer concluded by arguing that India is less active due to 
geographical constraint and the power projection includes immediate vanity, 
though this should not be a reason for not seeking proactive engagement. 
 
 
B. Malaysia’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence 
on mitigating traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats in 
the EIOR. 
 
Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may bring Malaysia and 
India to work together? 
 
The officer again spoke on Straits of Malacca. He argued that Malaysia is 
sensitive towards extra-regional power involvement especially military 
activities at the Straits of Malacca. Any diplomatic cooperation is sought only 
for the safety and security of SLOCs in SOM and not to dominate or project 





these areas, as India is a natural partner in the IOR. Areas can be on training 
and logistics assistance and also training of personnel as well as information 
sharing. 
 
Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
 
1. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may concern 
Malaysia and India to work together? 
 
Less focus can be said between India and Malaysia, besides the piracy issue at 
Somalia. Energy cooperation is reduced because of geographical limitations. 
There is no specific area of cooperation for search and rescue operation. New 
areas of cooperation could be non-controversial, such as search and rescues, or 







Malaysia Interview 2  (MI-2) 
 
 
Date of Interview: 10
th 
October 2014 
Time: 14.00 hours 
Duration: 1 hour 20 minutes 
Location: Ministry of Defence, Jalan  Padang Tembak, 
50634 Kuala Lumpur. 
Number of interview sessions:          1 
Method of transcription: Diary notes and later transcript  to typed 
words 
 
Contextual  Information  (Researcher’s Memo): 
 
It was a pleasant rainy day and I had driven my car to reach 15 minutes before   
the appointment to his office at Jalan Padang  Tembak.  This  meeting  was 
actually a continuation of a focus group discussion I had previously held. The 
informant and I decided to meet again where  we  met previously,  and have a  
more detailed discussion. The meeting was been scheduled on my request, for 
which he gave his permission. On the day of the meeting I went straight to his  
office upstairs. The interview started on time. The meeting room was quiet, cool 
and comfortable. 
 
The informant was looking fresh and greeted me warmly. He was well prepared 
because he had already been part of the group discussion, hence we immediately 
started  the discussion.  His response  to my every question was excellent. He was  
in charge of non-traditional activities but he had a sound knowledge on the  
defense industry. This is perhaps the reason why his colleague  referred  me  to 
him. He gave me some very useful articles, books, reports and some other related 
data, including one article written by him as  well. 
 
No abnormal interruption happened during the interview except few brief 
interruptions by some official related to routine office work. It was a short but   
very comprehensive meeting. I didn’t take any additional time  because  we  
covered almost every aspect of the questionnaire. His reflections on  non- 
traditional maritime security threats were very detailed, yet  he  spoke  and  
covered the defense industry part as well. The  interview ended  with  huge smile  











Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Ministry of Defense 
 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Defense industry 
Professional Experience: Civil Service Officer 
Years of Experience: 18 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Disclosure of Information 
The informant had been provided with King’s College London information sheet 
and consent form disclosing the research topic, purpose, risks, benefits and 





A. Malaysia’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional 
maritime security threats in the EIOR). 
 
1. What are the external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
China’s maritime behavior in the SCS could be one reason for understanding 
Malaysia-India’s maritime security cooperation. Its claims at the Spratly 
Islands project China’s maritime ambitions in the IOR. Moreover 
geographically, India and Malaysia are widely exposed to threats from the sea 
both on the eastern side and at the western channel of the Indian Ocean. So 
geographical proximity plays a vital part. 
 
2. What are the internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
India is a large market in the East Indian region so the diverse diplomatic 
maritime commitment is one of the potential internal drivers, which is 
influencing Malaysia-India security cooperation. Plus there are bureaucratic 
influences. 
 
3. How is Malaysia going to rebalance her overall power and maritime power 
vis-à-vis India and China in the EIOR in the context of the above factors? 
 
On questioning Malaysia’s interest in engaging with China in relation to the 
defense industry, the officer believed that Malaysia’s engagement with China 
is still immature/new. The relationships may show more positive engagement 
on areas such as missiles or training aircraft such as Yak 130 and M346. The 
technical and logistics assistance and support in the defense industry among 
both nations can influence the area of interoperability and joint maritime 
training programs. The coastguard ships from China, in contrast to India’s 





B. Malaysia’s commitment to Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation 
in the EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
The researcher questioned Malaysia’s priority list in the region and found out 
that after ASEAN and ADMM-Plus, it is secondly India, China and Turkey, 
and thirdly Pakistan and America that are ranked in order of priority. The 
researcher further interrogated the lack of engagement between Malaysia and 
India which is due to a lapse in or absence of bilateral mechanisms for 
maritime cooperation. The officer stressed that Malaysia’s engagement is 
based on a barter system. The researcher then asks ‘What could Malaysia offer 
to engage actively with India’? The officer quoted the Five Power Defense 
Agreement (FPDA) where Australia and Singapore have navy exchange with 
Malaysia and vice versa. They believe it could increase interoperability 
between navies and this could be one area that Malaysia and India could focus 
on. 
 
C. Malaysia’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence 
on mitigating traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats in 
the EIOR. 
 
Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may cause Malaysia 
and India to work together? 
 
The researcher questioned again the area of possible maritime security 
cooperation between Malaysia-India at the EIOR. This question was based 
on the previous findings where Malaysia was described as showing 
interest in engaging with India on the cooperation of defense industry 
areas. For example, with respect to India’s Shivakli Class Frigate, which is 
a hybrid of western and Russian technology. Malaysia is interested in 
engaging with India on such areas to produce frigates and destroyers with 
strong capabilities. 
 
Other areas of possible cooperation could be on aviation such as SUKHOI 
SU 30 MKM, joint exercises, maintenance, and the ship building industry, 
if India is also willing to offer its expertise. 
 
The officers feel that it is India’s role that will determine stronger relations 
on maritime cooperation with Malaysia, such as in the area of disaster 
management, energy cooperation, shipbuilding and maintenance etc. It 
was believed that India’s military strengthening is more for her domestic 
requirements. Also, India champions world peace, thus it limits Malaysia’s 
engagement with India. The Pakistan factor also deters India from 
projecting a coercive outlook in the region. The officers believe that 
buying or obtaining new technology from a new country/partner will 





navies. It is always better to use familiar technology. This was one of the 
reasons for such drawback in the relationship. 
 
The officers further explained that Malaysia often shares information on 
jungle and guerilla warfare with the United States due to their long 
standing experience fighting against communists. Similar exchanges of 
ideas and experience can enhance better relationships between the navies 
of Malaysia and India. Others could be an exchange of investment, palm 
oil, NATURAL gas for supersonic and SUKHOI. 
 
Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may cause 
Malaysia and India to work together? 
 
He stressed on SAR as it is a genuine area of cooperation without any 
political intentions. Others are disaster management, which could be a 
potential area of collaboration. Terrorism at sea, human and drug 
trafficking, and the issue of illegal immigrants are also some major 











Malaysia Interview 3  (MI-3) 
 
 
Date of Interview: 18
th 
November 2014 
Time: 11.00 hours 
Duration: 2 hours and 15 minutes 
Location: Malaysian  Maritime Enforcement Agency, 
Prime Minister’s Malaysia Department, 
Level 4-11, One IOI Square, IOI Resort, 
62502 Putrajaya. 
Number of interview sessions:          1 
Method of transcription: Diary notes and later transcribed  to typed 
words 
 
Contextual  Information  (Researcher’s Memo): 
 
It was a pleasant day and I drove my car and reached exactly at the given time at 
his office in Putrajaya. Previously I was supposed to meet the Director General  
but he was not available, so he appointed his Assistant Director  General  to  
deliver responses on his behalf. It was a really nice experience to meet the ADG 
because he was quite professional, focused and an expert  in  his  field.  The  
meeting had been scheduled and I found him on time wearing naval uniform, a 
very impressive, smart middle-aged person who seemed to be well prepared. He 
had read my questionnaire and was already prepared to give responses to all my 
questions and also give his expert opinion  on the  issues, as  he was  an expert  in 
the non-traditional and traditional maritime issues in the  EIOR.  He  also  had 
good knowledge on maritime disaster management and search and rescue 
activities. 
 
I  met him at his office, and the interview started on time. The office was quiet,  
cool and comfortable. He later told me that he had postponed some  of  his  
meetings to give me time, and I was really obliged to have such a welcoming 
response from a senior naval official. He gave me more than 2 hours, which were 
indeed worth a great deal  to me. The  informant was  looking fresh and greeted  
me warmly. I felt his positive response by seeing that he had the printouts of the 
interview question sheets that I emailed to the PA of the   department. 
 
During the interview I preferred to avoid tentative questions  and  rather  ask  
more probing questions to gain more detailed responses. During the interview we 





because both of us got some time to relax and discuss related but more informal 
issues which enriched my interview a lot. 
 
No abnormal interruption happened during the interview, it was straight to the 
point and informative. I took 15 additional minutes from the allotted time. His 
reflections on both traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats 
were in depth and detailed. The interview ended with a pleasant smile giving a 




Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Assistant Director General (MMEA) 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Non-Traditional Issues 
Professional Experience: Naval Officer 
Years of Experience: Middle Age 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Disclosure of Information 
The informant had been provided with a King’s College London information 
sheet and consent form disclosing the research topic, purpose, risks, benefits and 





A. Malaysia’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional 
maritime security threats in the EIOR). 
 
1. What are the external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
The intrusion of state sovereignty at the SOM by government vessels (custom 
officers) who stop vessels or fisheries boats and seek ransom from the 
government is a major concern. SOM is vital and sensitive for Malaysia and 
ship or vessel intrusion is intolerable. It is the responsibility of Malaysia- 
Singapore and Indonesia to make major maritime decisions in the SOM and 
other ship or vessel movements carrying a military mission should seek 
Malaysia’s permission. I also see regional maritime disputes such as claims 
over Spratly Islands, James Shoal Islands etc. The war on terror after 9/11 has 
made the situation more volatile for Malaysia and we want to keep the EIOR 
away from terrorist activities and movement. To me, India’s iron curtain policy 
sounds similar to Malaysian maritime ambitions to counter any possible 
Chinese ambitions. India is a more natural partner for Malaysia for maritime 
cooperation in the IOR to balance China’s power. The maritime relationship 
between Malaysia and India is currently stalled, I must say, and needs an 
overhaul to suit the changing environment in the IOR. I recently heard of PM 





maritime cooperation. India is a large market and Malaysia can improve its 
export performance through strengthening maritime connections. 
 
2. What are the internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
The collaboration between India and Malaysia is very little due to the hurdles 
of bureaucracy and also costs. MMEA is one body out of 34 departments under 
the Prime Minister’s Department, and therefore cost is a huge problem leading 
to less capability building efforts. We have a large Indian origin population and 
there is a lot of historical commonality between the two countries through IOR. 
India has large need of naval equipment and Malaysian naval industries can 
benefit. 
 
3. How is Malaysia going to rebalance her overall and maritime power vis-à-vis 
India and China in the EIOR in the context of the above factors? 
 
SCS is crucial water for Malaysia, and Malaysia would have the tendency to 
lean more towards engaging with China vis-à-vis India. India is genuinely a 
benign power and free from conflict or dispute with Malaysia, hence this could 
utilize or simplify balancing efforts against China, which could be achieved 
through confidence building, non-traditional issues. 
 
B. Malaysia’s commitment on Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation 
in the EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR through bilateral and/or regional mechanisms? 
 
The officer first explained that the MMEA is under the Prime Minister’s 
Office while the Indian Coast Guard is under the Secretary of Defense. The 
difference in bureaucratic arrangement is one of the major downfalls for both 
nations to collaborate. The function of MMEA is all-rounded. They are 
involved in investigation and prosecution acts while the Indian coastguard will 
hand in investigations to the police. 
 
Regionally, Malaysia has adopted the regional plan for action, with Australia, 
New Zealand and Indonesia under the Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
(IUU). Similarly, India has also adopted plans with its regional partners like 
Maldives and Mauritius in South Asia. However, there is no collaboration 
between India and Malaysia on these issues as they are not included in the 
same regional pact. The only collaboration that exists between the two 
countries is through the World Food Program by the United Nations. 
 
Both countries have maritime collaboration through regional collaboration 
only. There is no bilateral and multilateral collaboration on IUU for Indonesia 
whilst no MOU on human trafficking for Thai, Cambodia, and Australia. 
IMB-KL, RECaaP – Singapore. Malaysia needs to have a bilateral mechanism 





In light of understanding the separation of MMEA with the RMN, the decision 
to divorce from the RMN in 2005 was to encourage efficiency to curtail 
maritime challenges as a major key player in the region. The RMN is purely 
an aspect of defense while the MMEA is an act of enforcement. Although 
there is no MOU between the two, there is strong understanding for 
cooperation on areas like SAR and surveillance, and ship escorts in the IOR. It 
was stressed that in the event of war or crisis, both the RMN and MMEA have 
a strong understanding to protect Malaysia’s territories. However, in normal 
circumstances, both bodies have separate roles because the MMEA is not 
equipped with missiles or any war technology, but only small guns and 
weapons. Even in training personnel, MMEA has its own training academy 
and system. 
 
In questioning the CSI (Container Security Initiative) effort, the officer 
stressed the CSI and Container Control Program (CCP). It was argued that 
They are focused on areas like Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas. However, it is 
hard to execute because the MMEA officer works on targeting based on risk 
management only, while the percentage of solved cases is less than 1%. Most 
ships were believed to escape or gone undetected. 
 
 
C. Malaysia’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence 
on mitigating traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats in 
the EIOR. 
 
Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may cause Malaysia and 
India to work together? 
 
The second is the intrusion of state sovereignty at the SOM by government 
vessels (for example the custom officers) that stop other vessels or fisheries 
boats and seek ransom from the government. Malaysia is competitive in naval 
equipment manufacturing and may seek cooperation with India to boost its 
local industry. 
 
Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
 
1. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may cause 
Malaysia and India to work together? 
 
It was argued that the major maritime concern from the MMEA perspective is 
firstly piracy, which takes place at high sea, and secondly sea robbery, which 
takes places 12 nautical miles from land. Third is the smuggling of weapons 
and drugs. However these threats come from countries like Thailand and the 
Philippines. Fourth are fisheries. The Malaysian ships have been visiting the 





Fifth are controlled elements like sugar, oil, cigarettes and marine pollution. 
After the ROHINYA issue, collaboration with India on human smuggling has 
reduced. This means that the MMEA’s collaboration with the Indian 
coastguard is based on such issues. The sixth is terrorism by sea. Particularly 
on the issue of WMD, PSI and STA were signed with the US, Japan and 
Australia to counter terrorism activities. For example, Chinese weapons were 
brought through the IOR to Iran. Of course, the MMEA is also involved in 
port security and vessel movements in places like Port Klang and Tanjung 
Pelepas but in the larger context, this is the work of the RMN. 
 
However, opportunities are seen in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, which 
are adjunct with SOM and consists of India’s territory – SAR areas and 
procedures of boarding. Currently there is no relationship between SEA and 
South Asia. There are opportunities to curtail drugs – between the Golden 
Crescent and Golden Triangle – with India as a mediator. 
 
Areas: 
1. SLOCs – only on SOM; EEZ – none. 
2. Arms Trafficking – Andaman and Nicobar 
3. China – WMD through IOR – Nicobar and Andaman to reach Iran 







Malaysia Email Interview 4  (MI-4) 
 
Date of Interview: 11
th 
March 2015 
Time: Email received 15.00  hours 
Duration: 5 days 
Location: RSIS, Singapore. 
Number of interview sessions:  1 
Method of transcription: Emails  answers (not transcribed) 
Contextual  Information  (Researcher’s Memo): 
Commander Abhijit Singh (Research Fellow  &  Serving  Naval  Officer  in 
Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses) introduced me to the informant. The 
informant is an expert in naval affairs, especially modernization efforts and 
technologies in the Indo-Pacific region focusing on Southeast Asia in particular, 
including the naval arms issue. He also taught defense and strategic studies at 
various Singapore Armed Forces professional military education and training 
courses in RSIS (S. Rajaratnam School of International   Studies). 
 
The informant gave a very positive and detailed answer to my questions and he 
covered each and every aspect of the questions   fully. 
 
Informant Details: 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Collin Koh 
Designation: Associate   Research  Fellow,  Maritime 
Security Programme, RSIS 
 
Age: 33 years old 
Field of Expertise: Naval Affairs 
Professional Experience: Research 
Years of Experience: 5 years 
Anonymity Required: No 
 
 
Disclosure of Information 
 
The informant had been provided with a King’s College  London  information 










A. Malaysia’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional 
maritime security threats in the EIOR). 
 
1. What are the external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
The informant responded as follows: I don’t see bilateral maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR as being driven just by energy, among the earlier 4 
proposed drivers. Generally, energy security is subsumed under sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs) security through the Malacca Strait in particular. Pirates 
and sea robbers don’t typically target energy tankers but vessels with lower 
freeboard that enables greater ease to board for hijack. Hence, I’ll say piracy and 
sea robbery in the Malacca Strait is one particularly important driver to consider. 
 
The other has to do with general safety issues that are also related to maritime 
security, for example aviation security and also, natural disasters. The MH370 
incident shows the shortfalls in Malaysia’s surveillance and search-and-locate 
capabilities, particularly maritime patrol aircraft (which is largely focused on the 
South China Sea, and this stretches the tiny MPA fleet of the RMAF over such a 
wide expanse of the Malaysian Maritime Zone). In January 2005, India also greatly 
assisted the IOR countries, including Indonesia, in the post-tsunami HADR. 
Therefore, India has demonstrated its capacity as a security provider in this regard, 
and it will be another plus point for bilateral cooperation. 
 
I’ll rank these four in the following order: 
1. Changing international geopolitical scenario in Asia 
2. Energy 
3. Rising Chinese maritime power and presence 
4. War on terror 
 
2. What are the potential internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime 
security cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
I’ll rank the internal drivers as such: 
1. Geographical proximity 
2. Cultural diaspora 
3. Democratic values 
 
Possibly the change of administration in the Indian Government which switches 
focus from “Act East” to one that is more westward looking or with an exclusive 
focus on the western IOR. 
 
If anything, the changing regional geopolitical context including China’s rise, the 
myriad of security challenges as well as geographical proximity form a crucial 
part of the explicit understanding. There is economic and political 
interdependence between India and Malaysia when seen in the overall context of 
all these issues brought together. 
 
3. How is Malaysia going to rebalance her overall and maritime power vis-à-vis 






a. Changing international geopolitical scenario in Asia 
 
Foreseeable changes in the international geopolitical scenario in Asia would 
encompass the following: questions about U.S. commitment to its espoused 
Asia-Pacific “pivot” or “rebalancing”, as well as growing forays by other 
interested extra-regional powers in the region such as Japan. These may 
provide potential opportunities for India to seek a bigger role – diplomatic, 
economic and security – which means avenues for India to utilize its maritime 
power. For now, as I mentioned earlier, naval power remains the dominant 
sector where holistic maritime power is concerned, and India is certainly 
leveraging on it. The recent Indian Navy deployments and resource allocations 
appear to give greater emphasis on the Eastern Naval Command, and this 
testifies to the readiness of New Delhi to implement a greater maritime role in 
the EIOR. Malaysia and China are all potential partners in this regard, but the 
closest of all would still be Malaysia thanks to natural geographical proximity. 
 
b. Rising Chinese maritime power and presence 
 
The evidently growing Chinese focus on the EIOR, or the broader IOR in 
general, has strongly to do with its security concerns, first and foremost its 
continued access to energy sourced from the Middle East and African 
continent. The Malacca Strait, according to mainstream Chinese writings, 
constitutes the “soft underbelly” of Beijing, thereby raising what was touted 
the “Malacca Dilemma” for the Chinese Government. That’s why we have 
been seeing China extending its diplomatic, economic and military forays into 
the IOR, and the overland energy pipeline as well as port projects with various 
IOR littoral states are designed to ameliorate the “Malacca Dilemma” by 
providing alternative energy routes to China by reducing the need for Beijing 
to channel energy supplies through the Malacca Strait. It is still keen on the 
Kra Isthmus canal project in Thailand, though this is not making progress thus 
far. Moreover, because India has a resident military advantage in the IOR, this 
compounds China’s security problem. As such, China in the foreseeable future 
will expand its naval forays into the IOR. With this development, I’ll foresee 
also that India will focus its naval forces more with ENC, and where maritime 
power holistically is concerned, India will expand such security provisions to 
other IOR states, as we can see the new marsec linkages with Maldives, 
Mauritius and Sri Lanka, as well as the recent supply of patrol vessel to 
Mauritius, amongst other initiatives. 
 
c. War on Terror 
 
The threat posed by Islamic State (IS) is spreading from the Middle East south 
and eastwards, towards IOR and Southeast Asia (where a significant Muslim 
population resides), and this is an especially potential area for further 
Malaysia-India military and security cooperation. But the same would not 







India has significant investments in Russia Far East oil and gas fields, 
especially in Sakhalin. The state-owned ONGC Videsh Ltd is one of the key 
companies involved in those projects. This means that India has an energy 
dependence on the Western Pacific, since the Russian energy supplies have to 
come down via the sea route. As such, India’s maritime effort being focused 
eastward will have greater imperative. Malaysia is certainly a natural close 
partner where SLOC security is concerned. However, with China this is more 
questionable. Still, SLOC security is an area of common interest these two 
Asian giants can explore for further security cooperation, though I’ll say that 
this is contingent on New Delhi and Beijing being first able to adequately 
address persistent bilateral problems that have so far created mutual 
insecurities, suspicions and unease which beset further prospects for 
cooperation. 
 
Based on the hypothetical scenario of Malaysia’s power projection in EIOR, 
which is contingent on Kuala Lumpur’s change of security focus, then 
certainly a role for further deepened Malaysia-India MARSEC cooperation 
can be foreseen. But as it stands, Malaysia’s focus on EIOR is primarily 
concerned with Malacca Strait security. The MH370 incident may have 
opened up possibilities for Malaysia to look more seriously into maritime 
power projection into EIOR so that future similar incidents can be handled 
more effectively. But I foresee that the MH370 incident has opened up a 
potential avenue for closer bilateral cooperation, such as information sharing 
and provisions for mutual assistance in the area of maritime SAR. So far, 
based on foreseeable security developments to date, it is more plausible to see 
the Malaysian Government remaining more focused on issues in the South 
China Sea in particular, and of course, the militant intrusion in eastern Sabah 
in 2013 and persistent non-state threats in that region will continue to be a 
preoccupation. 
 
Thus far counter-piracy is a major focus, especially when Malaysia is also 
involved in the mission off Somalia. There would be prospects, as mentioned 
earlier, for HA/DR and SAR for instance. But as I also mentioned earlier, 
Malaysia’s maritime power projection is primarily focused on the South China 
Sea, not EIOR. 
 
 
A. Malaysia’s commitment to Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation 
in the EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in EIOR through bilateral and/or regional mechanisms? 
 
India’s maritime influence is strongest when it comes to partnership with the other 
countries within its immediate IOR neighbourhood, for example with Maldives, 
Mauritius and Sri Lanka, etc. and strongest also where those initiatives were 
established by New Delhi. IONS is one such example, and so is the case of 





other instance where India can exert stronger influence because of its “local 
advantage” in the IOR. However, if we look at institutions eastwards, India’s 
influence wanes. In the case of ASEAN-centric institutions, India is a dialogue 
partner and a valuable one at that, because of ASEAN’s philosophy of inclusivity 
and most importantly, to ensure that no one particular extra-regional power 
becomes dominant. Therefore, India’s influence is moderated by this constraint. 
However, I must stress, India’s role has great, persisting potential because it is 
regarded as an indispensable partner of ASEAN, for a variety of reasons: as a net 
security provider using its comparatively larger resource capacity as it has done 
for the tsunami HA/DR and MH370 search-and-locate mission, not to forget being 
a valuable Maritime Security (MARSEC) partner in the Malacca Strait. Also, 
India’s role as a counterweight to China’s rising clout and influence is 
considerable, and already at least two ASEAN countries have openly voiced 
urgency for India to play a greater role in response to recent tensions in the South 
China Sea. 
 
Participation in regional maritime institutions helps build habits of cooperation, 
mutual understanding and confidence. Multilateral institutions such as ADMM- 
Plus and IONS for example will certainly have spillovers into the bilateral sphere. 
For example, cooperation against common security challenges could be discussed 
as agenda items in these regional multilateral platforms, but implementation may 
be necessary at the bilateral level since implementation on a much wider 
multilateral basis would be complicated, and too complex taking into 
consideration differing national contexts and commitments. So I’ll say that 
multilateral regional maritime institutions and the Malaysia-India bilateral 
cooperation are mutually complementary. The multilateral platform allows for 
more inclusive sharing of ideas about common security issues with a larger pool 
of concerned parties, yet at the same time facilitates bilateral implementation of 
joint solutions. Looked at in reverse, bilateral cooperation also helps bolster India 
and Malaysia’s positions in those multilateral institutions. 
 
B. Malaysia’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence 




Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may cause Malaysia and 
India to work together? 
 
While it is clear that SLOC (if that’s what you mean, especially in the case of 
international SLOCs) security and safety can be a joint effort because of common 
concerns about freedom of navigation, EEZ is a sensitive issue because of the 
jurisdictional rights of individual coastal states. If EEZs are not overlapping or 
adjacent, it might be less conceivable to foresee cooperation where EEZs are 
concerned. 
 
I’ll still encourage you to define the scope of “other regional maritime powers” 





about potential partners who are willing or may be in a position to contain China, 
and adding another associated layer of complexity to this would be whether any of 
these other regional maritime powers necessarily view China as aggressive, or 
whether they view Chinese aggression in the EIOR as necessarily impinging upon 
their national interests to necessitate them to act. 
 
 
Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
 
2. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may cause 
Malaysia and India to work together? 
 
Disaster management and SAR could be one, which triggered a need for more 







MALAYSIA  GROUP INTERVIEWS 
Malaysia Group Interview 1  (MG-1) 
 
Date of Interview: 3
rd 
October 2014 
Time: 10.00 hours 
Duration: 2 hour 30 minutes 
Location: Ministry  of  Defence,  Jalan  Padang Tembak, 
50634 Kuala Lumpur 
Number of interview sessions:          1 
Method of transcription: Diary   notes  and  later  transcribed   to  typed 
words 
 
Contextual  Information  (Researcher’s Memo): 
 
It was a nice sunny day and after 15 minutes’ drive I reached Jalan Padang 
Tembak, 10 minutes before the appointment. This meeting was a focus group 
discussion. All of the informants were already in the office and we all gathered in   
a big conference room. The room was comfortable and well equipped. They had 
organized the meeting in a formal way having all the IT facilities along with 
refreshments. So we all greeted each other and sat in the conference room. The 
interview started exactly on  time. 
 
All informants were looking fresh and responded warmly. They were well 
prepared as all of them had received the questionnaire two weeks before the date  
of meeting. Their response to my questions was excellent. All of the  five  
informants were from the same defense ministry but working in different 
departments so the session became diverse and rich,  full of useful  information  
and knowledge. 
 
No abnormal interruption happened during the interview. It was a detailed and 
very comprehensive group discussion. I took an  additional  30  minutes  because 
the informants and I were having a very positive and in-depth discussion. Their 
reflections on traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats were 




Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 






Field of Expertise: Bilateral  Defense  Cooperation  (Asia 
(Middle & South), Africa and Middle 
East) 
Professional Experience: Ministry of Defense 
Years of Experience: 18 years 




Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Principal Assistant Secretary 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Policy and Strategic Planning Division 
Professional Experience: Ministry of Defense 
Years of Experience: 24 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Informant Details: 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Principal Assistant Secretary 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: International Organization and Local 
(Maritime Security) 
Professional Experience: Royal  Malaysian  Navy and Ministry 
of Defense 
Years of Experience: 28 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Informant Details: 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Principal Assistant Secretary 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Policy and Strategic Planning Division 
(Non-Traditional Issues) 
 
Professional Experience: Ministry of Defense 
Years of Experience: 18 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Informant Details: 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Staff Officer 1 (Operation) 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Navy  Headquarters  Operations  and 
Exercise Division 
Professional Experience: Ministry of Defense 
Years of Experience: 30 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 





The informant had been provided with a King’s College London information 
sheet and consent form disclosing the research topic, purpose, risks, benefits and 
confidentiality  guidelines. 
 
 
A. Malaysia’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional 
maritime security threats in the EIOR). 
 
1. What are the potential external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime 
security cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
The officers believe that one of the driving factors in the India-Malaysia 
maritime relationship is the need to explore new areas of joint venture 
including extra regional maritime intervention. There is also a need to have a 
common platform to develop a defense industry, as our foreign policy is to 
‘prosper the neighbor’. There is also a need for strategic partnership between 
Malaysia and China, India and the US. 
 
They observed that India doesn’t seem to have the spirit of outreach 
engagement, as perhaps they may be preoccupied with internal political issues 
and the war with Pakistan. The Pakistan factor has thus influenced India’s 
internal and external political infrastructure and impacted maritime cooperation 
between other countries including Malaysia. The officers reiterated that India’s 
most immediate threat is terrorism, i.e. the Mumbai Bombing. 
 
2. What are the potential internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime 
security cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
In terms of the PIO, the officers agree that that could be used as a leverage, 
since culture is one of the pillars of ASEAN. They reiterated that cultural 
awareness is key. The officers also stated that China is very culture-based and 
although there is a Chinese diaspora in Malaysia, Malaysia only actively 
engaged China in 2005. The officers also suggested that the researcher looks 
at the realpolitik of China-Malaysia before comparing with India-Malaysia 
and reemphasized that our FP is issues-based. 
 
3. How is Malaysia going to rebalance her overall and maritime power vis-à-vis 
India and China in the EIOR in the context of the above factors? 
 
The researcher posits that in comparison, China’s relationship with Malaysia 
is complex, unlike India which is benign. Also, according to the literature, 
defense cooperation between India and Malaysia is not very significant. Thus 
the researcher questions the inconsistency. 
 
In terms of Malaysia choosing/not choosing China over India, the officers 
informed me that the PM has mandated very clearly in Singapore that 
Malaysia’s FP is more issues oriented rather than capability oriented. 





NAM. As our FP is principle based, we can be critical of both friend and foe – 
and our FP is consistent in this matter to prevent any hegemony. 
 
Side note: They also suggested that the researcher expand the research to 
cover ASEAN and its role and to look at ADMM as well. One official stated 
that ADMM is unique as this defense ministers’ platform is the first and only 
one in the world. 
 
They also stated that although Malaysia is aligned with the ASEAN 
perspective, both India and China are still important to them. Economically, it 
is in Malaysia’s best interests to provide a conducive environment via defense 
and security for economic prosperity. He stated that Malaysia acknowledges 
India as a regional power. Therefore, in terms of balancing both relations with 
India and China, the right thing to do is to be ‘moderate’. 
 
In terms of our power positioning, they stated that although we are a small 
power, we are very strong in diplomatic relations and we are able to manage 
crises diplomatically. As ASEAN cannot match the military power of both 
China and India, we became very good at hedging. ASEAN is also a part of 
the regional architecture that does the balancing for Malaysia. Therefore, with 
regards to the previous examples, one informant opined that Malaysia is 
indeed doing very well. 
 
 
B. Malaysia’s commitment to Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation 
in the EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
The members of the group questioned the assumption of the researcher. They 
viewed the relationship between India and Malaysia as matured. They stated 
that although they are unsure about trade and economics, it is business as 
usual for both navies in terms of talks, exercises, IONS – much like 
Malaysia’s engagements with other countries. 
 
The officers rebutted the alleged lack of defence cooperation and insisted that 
defense cooperation between India and Malaysia is active. One stated that 
Malaysia has been actively sending officers and men for various courses, 
including SUKHOI expertise course, gunnery and submarine specialization. 
 
The officers stated that joint maritime training programs like MILAN are a 
very important exercise for Malaysia and emphasised that India is Malaysia’s 
very important traditional partner – in comparison to China, no policies have 
been implemented. Between India-Malaysia, there were high-level meetings 
with both Secretary Generals of the respective countries, annual meetings 
between Chief of Navies, Air Force and Army and they stated that Malaysia’s 
Secretary General has reminded the bureaucrats to not forget India. They 





remarked that it is unfortunate that our relationship with India is not well 
marketed. 
 
In terms of receiving defence assistance/training/cooperation from India, the 
officers affirmed that they will receive India’s help with open arms and even 
posited that an SAR exercise in the IOR would be most welcome. 
 
The officers explained that Malaysia’s DP is capability based and not threat 
based, therefore we tend to engage in a passive way – but that doesn’t mean 
that it is contributing to national security. They stated that Malaysia is very 
particular about projecting the professionalism of the armed forces. The 
rebalancing of power or power projection is a major concern of Malaysia as 
well as India. 
 
The officers suggested looking at the IONS as they view it as peculiar – it is 
modelled after the WPNS, but its co-founder (India) is not a permanent 
member. This shows India’s passivity. However, they found it to be peculiar 




a. Read Henry Kissinger’s World Order in terms of US engagement with 
India. 
b. Study lessons learned on how Malaysia and India are using the 
SUKHOIS and what we could learn from each other. 
c. As the ASEAN Chair - how will Malaysia project its power 
d. India’s national policy from past to present 
e. Why should India take more ownership in IONS 
f. Why should India’s defense industry capitalise on the quality of human 
capital of ASEAN 
g. How should Malaysia leverage MDCP? 
 
C. Malaysia’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence 




Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may cause Malaysia and 
India to work together? 
 
In terms of Maritime Territory, Security of SLOCs and the EEZ, the officers 
suggested that the researcher define them in terms of State Actors 
(Traditional) and Non-state Actors (Non-Traditional). Side note: However, as 
the security of Selat Melaka is vital, they stated that it must be protected at all 
times. Defense industry collaboration and technical and logistics assistance 







Although SCS is a red zone, the officers claimed that it is not properly 
managed. As there are more NTS issues in the SCS, it is unsurprising that 
China is promoting NTS cooperation. 
 
In terms of the Maritime Industrial Complex, for Malaysia, defense 
procurement is done by barter trade (SUKHOI for palm oil) and that cost is 
always the deciding factor. 
 
 
Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
 
2. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may cause 
Malaysia and India to work together? 
 
In their opinion, what is deemed most hurtful to Malaysia is categorised as pre-2005 
and post 2005. Pre-2005, before the launch of the ‘Eye in the Sky’, it was piracy. 
Now, as the number of piracy attacks has decreased dramatically, the issue that is a 
security threat is human smuggling and trafficking – PATI, Rohingyas, Mindanao. 
One officer remarked that the PATI in Malaysia is innumerable. They also stated that 
the NSC has identified the current threats for Malaysia as PATI, trafficking and 
NGOs. The officers also stated that Malaysia is no longer a transit point, but a 
destination point for PATI. They remarked that perhaps they need to adopt a military 










Malaysia Group Interview 2  (MG-2) 
 
 
Date of Interview: 25
th 
November 2014 
Time: 14.00 hours 
Duration: 1 hour and 40 minutes 
Location: Ministry of Defense 2,  Wangsa Maju, 
Ampang Selangor. 
Number of interview sessions: 1 
Method of transcription: Diary notes and later transcribed  to typed 
words 
 
Contextual  Information  (Researcher’s Memo): 
 
This interview was arranged after the group meeting at MINDEF. The officers in 
MINDEF suggested that I meet the officers at MINDEF 2 to get a more in-depth 
understanding of the defense industry, which is believed to be an important    
factor in understanding shifts in Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation. 
Thus, the outcome of the interview is not based on tentative questions like other 
interviews. 
 
It was a pleasant but warm sunny day and I drove 15 minutes  by  car  and  
reached exactly at the given time at the office in Selangor. The meeting had been 
scheduled on my request via email to the PA. Upon arrival, the PA had received  
me to take me to the office of the Under Secretary, which was upstairs. He was 
already in the office greeting me and after a short while both of the Principal 
Assistant Secretaries also joined us. They were all very nice and pleasant to me. 
The interview started a little late by 15 minutes. They had already read my 
questionnaire and were prepared to give responses to all my questions and also 
their expert opinion on the issues. The Under Secretary was a middle-aged civil 
servant and had a very mature and professional appearance. He has a  good  
handle on the defense industry, as he was serving for the last 20 years and had a   
lot of points to discuss. The other two ladies were also very keenly interested in    
my topic and gave there reviews and answered the   questions. 
 
After reaching his office directly, the interview started on time. The office was 
quiet, big and comfortable. Their attitude was very welcoming and I found them 
and especially the Under Secretary to be very friendly, open minded and honest 
about his work. The PA told me that he had already scheduled his office work to 
spare 1.30 hours but he gave me an additional 10 minutes. The informants were 





response when I saw that he had the printouts of the interview question sheet 
that I emailed his PA. 
 
During the interview I preferred to avoid the usual tentative questions, rather I 
preferred to ask more probing questions to have a more detailed response, which 
was indeed given. No abnormal interruptions happened during the interview, it 
was straight to the point and informative. I took 10 additional minutes from the 
allotted time. Their reflections on defense industry policies of Malaysia and the 
EIOR were in depth and detailed. The Under Secretary replied to all of my 
questions in detail and the response was very literary which proofs him to be 
very knowledgeable person but I was surprise to know that at the same time he is 






Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Under Secretary 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Defense Industry 
Professional Experience: Civil servant 
Years of Experience: 20+ years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Principal Assistant Secretary 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Defense Industry 
Professional Experience: Civil servant 
Years of Experience: 17 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Principal Assistant Secretary 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Defense Industry 
Professional Experience: Civil Servant 
Years of Experience: 14 years 




Disclosure of Information 
The informant had been provided with a King’s College London information 
sheet and consent form disclosing the research topic, purpose, risks, benefits and 








The conversation started with an argument that the local industry is not ready and is 
fully dependent on the government. India is a country that is situated next to an 
unstable state: Pakistan. Thus, internal consumption is high and India does not want to 
sell to outside countries. India has the capability to sell but it refuses because the 
priority remains for internal usage. The Hindustani aerospace has been exporting but 
only for services. The main factor underlying this scenario is because most companies 
are state owned companies and therefore selling equipment is difficult. Most 
companies only explain what they want and need and there is no comprehensive 
execution plan. They have the capacity to produce – such as shipbuilding and training 
ships – but external sales skills are low or rather not utilised well. 
 
There are 6 clusters in MINDEF and the best cluster is maritime. It has all the 
capability to build but the current design is for commercial and not for defense 
purpose. There are several attempts on offshore boats between Malaysia and Europe 
(Turkey for example) but with India, it is based on maintenance services (know how 
to maintain). 
 
The officer explained that Malaysia is still focusing on outputs and not outcomes. 
Malaysia’s defense industry is focused more to sell within Malaysia. Malaysia’s 
consumption is not high since it’s not a war country, yet selling is low due to money 
constraints and lack of execution plans. He believed that there is no good salesman in 
Malaysia and they do not have confidence. He compared Singapore which is top in 
ASEAN; good salesman skills are the reason behind their success. He also related 
cultural strategic thinking as one of the factors for Malaysia’s defense industry 
drawback. 
 
Malaysia has good ship services skills, which India can utilize. Most Indian ships are 
sent to Europe for services with high expenses, which could otherwise send to 
Malaysia and benefit both Malaysia and India. (The Defense Advisor of India also 
said this to Malaysia – Col Praveen Chabbra). 
 
In discussion in the future, he stressed that India should be a major plan for Malaysia. 
India is a high consuming state and Malaysia could be an important market. The 
government could be poor but engagement between business to business has a good 
future. Malaysia should remain the focus and develop ship repairing and maintenance 








Malaysia Group Interview 3  (MG-3) 
 
Date of Interview: 27
th 
December 2014 
Time: 14.00 hours 
Duration: 1 hour 40 minutes 
Location: Police Headquarters, Bukit Aman 
50560 Kuala  Lumpur, Malaysia 
Number of interview sessions:          1 
Method of transcription: Diary notes and later transcribed  to typed 
words 
 
Contextual  Information  (Researcher’s Memo): 
 
It was a hot sunny afternoon and after a 40 minutes’  drive  I  reached  Bukit 
Aman, 15 minutes before the appointment. The Police Headquarters is a high 
security area so they stopped me at the gate and then a police car dropped me to 
my required office. This meeting was a focused group discussion; both of my 
informants were police officers. I went straight to the ACP’s PA office and she 
guided me towards the meeting room where I waited for a while. After 10 to 15 
minutes both of the informants came and we  all gathered in a big conference  
room. The room was very comfortable and very well equipped. They had  
organized the meeting in a formal way with all the IT facilities along with 
refreshments, delicious sandwiches and hot coffee. We  all greet each other  and  
sat down. The interview started exactly on  time. 
Both of the informants were looking fresh and responded warmly. They were  
quite prepared as they had received the questionnaire two weeks before the date   
of meeting. As they were experts in the area of drug trafficking  and narcotics,  
their responses to my questions related to their field were excellent. Both of the 
informants  were from the same office and departments  so the session become  
rich and answers were in depth full of useful information and   knowledge. 
No abnormal interruption happened during the interview except  some  phone  
calls. It was a detailed and very comprehensive discussion. I took an additional     
10 minutes’ time because the informants and I were having a very positive and in-
depth discussion. There reflections on drug trafficking, human smuggling and 
weapon smuggling gave me some very useful insights. Also they provided some 
good data, which were original cases, and some other  useful  reports.  The 











Field of Expertise: Intelligence/International  Liaison 
Narcotics Crime Investigation 
Department (NCID) 
Professional Experience: Royal Malaysian Police 
Years of Experience: 32 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Informant Details: 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Assistant Director 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Intelligence/International  Liaison 
Narcotics Crime Investigation 
Department (NCID) 
Professional Experience: Royal Malaysian Police 
Years of Experience: 28 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
 
Disclosure of Information 
The informant had been provided with a King’s College London information 
sheet and consent form disclosing the research topic, purpose, risks, benefits and 
confidentiality  guidelines. 
 
A. Malaysia’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional 
maritime security threats in the EIOR). 
 
 
1. What are the external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
The China Factor makes a big difference as China is seen as an important 
determining driver, especially if one see its maritime ambition in the IOR in a 
boarder aspect, e.g. in relation to Sri Lanka and Myanmar. There is a changing 
political environment, for instance China is using water as a medium to 
smuggle drugs to countries like New Zealand and Australia. At the same time 
some other non-traditional security threats like the arms trade and human 
trafficking in the Indian Ocean Region also influences Malaysia-India maritime 
security cooperation. 
 
2. What are the potential internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime 
security cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
Democratic values could be one determining factor but the way democracy is 
administrated could differ. Cultural diaspora plays an important role in 
understanding the relationship. Also bureaucratic influences, the Look East 






3. How is Malaysia going to rebalance her overall and maritime power vis-à-vis 
India and China in EIOR in the context of the above factors? 
 
There are various determining factors which are influencing the rebalancing of 
overall and maritime power, for instance in India’s perspective India’s desire 
for maritime power and India’s maritime significance to Malaysia. On the other 
hand from Malaysia’s point of view, Malaysia’s desire for maritime power and 
Malaysia’s maritime significance to India are some of the factors. 
 
B. Malaysia’s commitment on Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation in 
the EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the through bilateral and/or regional mechanisms? 
 
There is not much mutual cooperation between Malaysia and India on maritime 
security in the EIOR but there should be, like in technical and logistics assistance, 
expertise in peace-keeping operations, collective trainings and security initiatives. 
So there is a need for a breakthrough in maritime relationships on both the 
Malaysian and Indian side. A bilateral mechanism for maritime cooperation is a 
need of the hour. 
 
C. Malaysia’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence on 
mitigating traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats in the 
EIOR. 
 
Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may cause Malaysia and 
India to work together? 
 
No comment was given because informant has no knowledge of this area. 
 
Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
2. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may cause 
Malaysia and India to work together? 
 
In discussing on the drug trafficking issue, it was argued that there are 
generally three major networks throughout the Indian Ocean Region – 
Golden Emerald (South America), Golden Crescent (Iran-Afghanistan- 
Pakistan-India), and Golden Triangle (North Myanmar-Thailand-Laos- 
Yunan). 
 
The discussion focused on the Golden Triangle, as it was believed to be a 
major concern for most of the Southeast Asia Region. At the North 
Myanmar provision, it was argued that the cultivation of opium is famous 
and a similar scenario could be seen at Laos where marijuana is cultivated 
openly and is secured by private military troops. The United Nations 





regarding the open cultivation of drugs. Malaysia being the neighboring 
country, it is highly affected by this scenario where drugs such as 
methamphetamine, heroine, yaaba pills become available. 
 
Drugs in the Yunan province, particularly synthetic drugs, were believed 
to be coming from the Golden Triangle. These new networks were 
believed to be a lucrative business at the east coast of China. When asked 
if these drugs were smuggled at the waters adjacent to China, the RMP 
officers argued that several ports often used in China are believed to be 
smuggling drugs to Australia and New Zealand. When asked if there is an 
official policy, the RMP officers mentioned that in 2013, there was an 
MoU signed by current Defence Minister Hishamuddin at the International 
Summit on Transnational Crime, as both Malaysia and China recognized 
the issue. 
 
In discussion on the issue of death sentences in Malaysia, the RMP 
officers argued that it is effective although there are only convictions but 
no actions taken. (The last one was in 1989.) 
 
When discussing the drug network between Malaysia and India, the RMP 
officers discussed in-depth the Modus Operandi. Poor Indians in Malaysia 
were working with the Chinese syndicate especially in the 1960s, which 
was soon taken over by the Indians themselves who travel to India and 
bring back drugs to Malaysia. 
 
Some drugs to India are coming from Nepal, such as Marijuana. Some also 
come from Iran-Pakistan-India where huge amounts of methamphetamine 
and ketamine are being brought to Malaysia. The RMP authorities argued 
that it is obvious that ketamine in Malaysia is coming from India, as a 
huge number of ketamine is being cultivated in India, places such as 
Chennai and New Delhi. Mumbai is indeed a major hub for the production 
of ketamine and has strong connections with local Malaysian Indians. The 
price in India is much cheaper, and it is sold at double the price (1 kilo is 
RM1000 in India, sold in Malaysia for RM40,000). One of the newest 
trends is now the Nigerians exploiting Indian Malaysians girls for the 
smuggling of drugs between Malaysia and India. 
 
In questioning the policy between Malaysia and India, Malaysian 
authorities expressed disappointment as they argued that the Indian 
authorities are not very effective – such as the division between north and 
south India. 
 
The RMP authorities confirmed that weapons found during drug 









INDIA  INVIDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS 
 
 
India Individual 1 (II-1) 
 
Date of Interview: 1
st 
December 2014 
Time: 14.00 hours 
Duration: 2 hours 
Location: High Commission of India, Level  28, Menara 
1 Mon't Kiara, No.1, Jalan Mon't Kiara, 
50480, Kuala Lumpur 
Number of interview sessions:          1 
Method of transcription: Diary notes and later transcribed  to typed 
words 
 
Contextual  Information  (Researcher’s Memo): 
 
Interview with the honorable informant was made possible by  a  very  close  
friend, Kesavan, who was a member of  the Perak  India chamber. He  made  all  
the arrangements for my meeting with him, but I personally delivered the 
questionnaires via email to the informant. Due to the informant’s busy  schedule  
he was not able to read it, but he was very welcoming and serious about the topic  
of discussion. I went to his office directly where I meet his PA. He made me sit     
for a while and after almost 20 minutes he allowed me  to  enter his office.  He  
made  me feel very comfortable. We both sitting on the sofa in his office and  
started talking about India-Malaysia relations and future directions and 
opportunities in general. It was a very healthy informal discussion. We talked in 
our native language Tamil, which was the best thing I experienced in the whole 
meeting. Coffee along with nice refreshments were a great   addition. 
 
The interview was held in his office and the room was very comfortable.  At the  
end of an informal session with refreshments - delicious sandwiches  and  hot  
coffee - he started the formal session. The informant was very bold and open in 
explaining India-Malaysia relations, and responded to my each and every  
question, giving me deep insights on the  issues. 
 
. It was a detailed and very comprehensive discussion. In the end he gave me the 
valuable contact of Col. Praveen Chhabra, defense advisor of India  to Malaysia,   
to whom I am thankful for arranging my later interviews in India. After that the 







Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: High Commissioner 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: High Commissioner of India to 
Malaysia 
Professional  Experience: 
Years of Experience: 25+ 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Disclosure of Information 
The informant had been provided with a King’s College London information 
sheet and consent form disclosing the research topic, purpose, risks, benefits and 





A. India’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional maritime 
security threats in the EIOR). 
 
1. What are the external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
China is a crucial factor especially China’s maritime ambition in the IOR. As a 
rising power in the Asia-Pacific region, China is a significant driver in 
Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation. China’s maritime development 
around the IOR shows its interest in ensuring that its position as a maritime 
power is recognized. However, China is not a threat to India as it is 
geographically situated far from the EIOR and its focus remains at SCS. India 
shares its policy narrative on the IOR with USA and EU concerning its defense 
strategy in the IOR. Malaysia’s development in the technology industry is 
where India takes interest in collaboration with Malaysia. 
 
2. What are the potential internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime 
security cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
Cultural diaspora is an important element. As a serving officer, he argued that 
cultural elements play an important role in shaping India’s foreign policy 
towards Malaysia. Our Iron Curtain Policy aims at ensuring Asian maritime 
security by countering any possible ambitious activity on disputed islands. PM 
Modi has announced the Act East Policy to accelerate diplomatic commitments 
into strategic economic and security partnerships. 
 
3. How is India going to rebalance her overall and maritime power vis-à-vis 
India and China in the EIOR in the context of the above factors? 
 
India’s position in the SEA region is a unique case and it can balance equally 
between India and China. The balancing factor is dependent on Malaysia and 





region. Malaysia should be able to recognize India as a security protector in the 
IOR. Perhaps that will create a shift in the balance of power vis-à-vis China. 
 
B. India’s commitment on Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation 
in the EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR through bilateral and/or regional mechanisms? 
 
The level of commitment is positive but Malaysia’s lack of engagement or 
moderate attitude leads to a lack of cooperation between Malaysia and India. 
Malaysia needs to show more active involvement and interest in India, and it 
should recognized India’s role as a leader in ensuring maritime interest in the 
EIOR and accept India’s involvement in maritime issues. Malaysia cannot 
support that India exchanges commodities such as oil palm over heavy 
military weapons. Both need to project a win-win situation to develop a more 
pronounced commitment. India is already engaged through a number of 
regional maritime programs with Malaysia, and diplomatic ties are maturing. I 
believe it’s time to move towards a bilateral framework so that both countries 
can share their maritime expertise directly with each other. I consider it more 
strategic for both countries. 
 
C. India’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence 




Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may cause Malaysia and 
India to work together? 
 
SLOC is an important element in understanding traditional maritime 
security threats. As it does not know boundaries, territorial disputes can 
occur at areas of overlapping territory waters. India is consciously looking 
at China’s String of Pearls strategy and its intrusive engagement in the 
IOR through Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma. 
 
Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
2. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may cause 
Malaysia and India to work together? 
 
He prioritizes these as: Piracy, disaster management, SAR, and drug 
trafficking. Human smuggling is not so much of a concern between 
Malaysia and India. Maritime cooperation in the areas of disaster 
management can be more crucial for human assistance. Both countries can 
do a lot more together in many non-traditional areas of maritime security, 













India Individual 2 (II-2) 
 
 
Date of Interview: 12
th 
December 2015 
Time: 14.00 hours 
Duration: 4 hours and 20 minutes 
Location: Level 28, Menara 1 Mon’t Kiara,  Jaln Kiara, 
50480 Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan, 
Kuala Lumpur 
 
Number of interview sessions:  2 
Method of transcription: Diary notes and later transcribed to typed words 
Contextual  Information  (Researcher’s Memo): 
 
As promised by the High Commissioner, I finally met Col Praveen  Chabbra. It  
was a pleasant sunny day and I drove my car and reached exactly at  the given  
time to his office in the High Commission of India at Malaysia. He gave me his 
precious time and it was a really nice experience to meet him, as he was quite 
professional, focused and an expert in his field. Although he is not working  in 
naval services, he has deep insights and profound knowledge about maritime 
security cooperation. I found him to arrive in time, a very impressive and smart 
middle-aged person. He had read my questionnaire and was already prepared to 
give responses to all my    questions and also give his expert opinion on the issues. 
 
I went to his office accompanied by his PA. The interview started on time. The 
office was quiet, cool and comfortable. He later told me that he had postponed 
some of his meetings to give me time, and I was really obliged to have such a 
welcoming response from a senior official. He gave me more than 4 hours, which 
were indeed worthwhile. The informant was looking fresh and greeted  me  
warmly. 
 
During the interview I preferred to avoid tentative questions;  rather,  I  asked 
more probing questions to guage more detailed responses. During the interview,   
we took a break of 10 minutes in which tea was served, another pleasant addition 
because both of us got some time to relax and discuss the related but more  
informal issues, which enriched my interview. He even referred to his map 






No abnormal interruption happened during the interview, it was straight to the 
point and informative. I took 15 additional minutes from the allotted time. His 
reflections on both traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats 
were in depth and detailed. The interview ended with a pleasant smile giving a 
friendly and welcoming gesture. 
 
Informant Details 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Praveen Chabbra 
Designation: Defense Attache 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Military Officer 
Professional Experience: Defense Advisor 
Years of Experience: 30 years 
Anonymity Required: No 
 
Disclosure of Information 
The informant had been provided with a King’s College London information 
sheet and consent form disclosing the research topic, purpose, risks, benefits and 





A. India’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional maritime 
security threats in the EIOR). 
 
1. What are the external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
He argued China is a crucial driving factor. James Shoal is a disputed area in 
the SCS and it is form of power projection for the Chinese in the area. SCS is a 
disputed area and the focus is more there compared to the EIOR, where the 
relationship between Malaysia and India is very mature and long standing. 
 
Another driver is the ever-changing geopolitical scenario in the EIOR such as 
the rivalry between USA and China, in filling the power vacuum in the region. 




2. What are the potential internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime 
security cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
He spoke about the cultural diaspora and geographical proximity, but most 
importantly he stressed on democratic and moderate values, which are similar 
driving factors in both Malaysia and India. 
 
3. How can Malaysia work with India to rebalance her overall and maritime 
power vis-à-vis India and China in the EIOR in the context of the 






Malaysia should show more commitment in recognizing India as a major and 
crucial power to create a new power vacuum in the EIOR region. Malaysia’s 
failure to do so could be a drawback in the imbalance of power in the EIOR, 
with a stronger leaning towards China. 
 
B. India’s commitment on Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation 
in the EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR through bilateral and/or regional mechanisms? 
 
India is willing to cooperate with Malaysia on any issue. He highlighted the 
day the MH370 incident occurred. India was the first navy to dispatch SAR 
group to help find the victims. However, more can be done. Rather than just 
navy-to-navy talks and annual handshaking, a more proactive engagement 
should be encouraged, e.g. confidence building, 
 
He suggested a shift could take place in shipbuilding and maintenance 
services. Malaysia has good services in this area, which is cheaper for India to 
utilize. 
 
C. India’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence 




Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may cause Malaysia 
and India to work together? 
 
SLOC is a vital traditional threat. Major economic commodities of the world 
run through these waters. The safety of SOM is crucial because they are the 
home waters for Malaysia. The rising Chinese maritime power can be misused 
in case of any ambitious government there, or in any of her ally countries in 
Asia. India understands its responsibility as the major maritime power in the 
IOR yet other countries like Malaysia need to engage with India to proactively 
manage any such ambitious player. 
 
Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may cause 
Malaysia and India to work together? 
 
Piracy is believed to be a major concern – giving referencing to India’s 
involvement with the piracy attack in Somalia. Geographical limitation is 
not a factor for curbing piracy attacks around the IOR and therefore this 





Disaster Management in SAR is also one area of concern. Referring to 










India Individual 3 (II-3) 
 
Date of Interview: 2
nd 
March 2015 
Time: 11.00 hours 
Duration: 2 hours and 15 minutes 
Location: Institute for Defense Studies and  Analyses, 1, 
Development Enclave, (near  USI), 
New Delhi, 110010, India. 
 
Number of interview sessions:  1 
Method of transcription: Diary notes and later transcribed to  typed words 
Contextual  Information  (Researcher’s Memo): 
 
This informant was the only research officer who was doing  research  on  
maritime and littoral security in IDSA. He was initially busy and could not meet 
me, however he managed to find time and insisted on helping and guiding me in  
my research. I truly admire his level of commitment to    his job and my thesis. 
 
It was a beautiful morning and I was very excited to meet him. He welcomed me 
with such warmth that I got comfortable immediately. I was in his office room 
sitting on the couch and then we began. He was so enthusiastic during the  
interview session that I listened to each detail with admiration and   interest. 
 
The informant is an expert in naval affairs, especially on the Indo-Pacific region 
and also focusing on Southeast Asia. The informant gave very positive  and  
detailed answers to my questions and he covered each and every aspect of the 
questions fully. There were no pastries or coffee served but that was not an issue   
as I was already engaging so strongly in the interview that  I  was  only  busy  
jotting down notes. He was kind enough to introduce me to Mr. Collin Koh from 
Singapore  to help further  my research at the end of our  interview session. He  





Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Research Fellow & Serving Naval 
Officer 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Navy Officer 
Professional Experience: Navy officer 





Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
A. India’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional maritime 
security threats in the EIOR). 
 
1. What are the external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
One country should first position itself and gain leverage for specific purposes 
(sustainability) before establishing engagement with another country. The 
question of who, what, why and how should be addressed in an explicit 
manner; no sentimental thoughts (Pakistan) should be affecting the 
relationship. Differences should be set aside. 
 
China’s engagement in the IOR can dilute India’s power projection in the IOR, 
therefore posing a potential threat. Yet at the moment, China’s interest is only 
on trade in the IOR security scenario. 
 
 
2. What are the potential internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime 
security cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
The cultural diaspora is a major driving internal force. Both India and Malaysia 
have a long standing relationship and it has strong influence in shaping India’s 
foreign policy with Malaysia. 
 
3. How is Malaysia going to rebalance her overall and maritime power vis-à-vis 
India and China in the EIOR in the context of the above factors? 
 
I believe this question must be answered by the Malaysian authorities, yet based on 
my experience and research in this area I can offer some insights. Malaysia's 
maritime strategy options are tied to engagement with India in addressing any 
excessive Chinese activity in SCS over disputed islands. The same is true for 
India's Iron curtain policy for which she needs close maritime cooperation with 
East Asian littoral states. The potentials for Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation is more in SOM. But it would be unjust to limit cooperation to 
traditional security issues; non-traditional issues need more cooperation. Any 
power play in the IOR would be more an interplay between US, China and India. 
In this context, Malaysia-India maritime collaboration is more plausible with US 
support to counterbalance possible Chinese over ambitions. Both nations agree to 




B. India’s commitment to Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation in the 
EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 





Malaysia has cooperation with India on SUKHOI, SCORPENO CLUB, KILO but it 
is generally on training personnel and capacity building, and there is not much high 
level cooperation. Malaysia is believed not to be innovative in policy making, 
compared to its neighboring countries, like Indonesia. President Joko Widodo had a 
vision on Indonesia’s maritime policy since he took over the administration. 
MALSINDO was active for three years but then it seemed to become static. The 
Malaysian navies are lacking in equipment and focus on logistics is vital to create a 
shift in the relationship. Malaysia requires both capability and strategic interest for a 
more proactive engagement, and needs to increase it guts on security matters and 
draw a broader vision like its neighboring country Indonesia. The maritime domain is 
flexible and cooperation is easier and hence should be used as an opportunity for M-I 
maritime cooperation. Malaysia should consider the frontier concept versus near 
abroad concept in engaging with India. Malaysia is seen to be focused more on 
commerce and trade but in defense there is a lack. It is high time for Malaysia to 
reconstruct its strategic thought, and new element should be thought through e.g. the 
Maritime Axis Doctrine, the question of what, who, when, why. On the question of 
constructing axes, alliances, adversaries, a more detailed grouping and framework 
should be drawn up. The change in strategic thought is believed to come through 
successfully if a stronger leadership role is projected by India (think tanks are a first 
step). One interesting fact given was the innovative idea of Malaysia e.g. the Malaysia 
Defense Security and Technology Park (military and consumer product in Asia). Both 
India and Malaysia have long diplomatic relationships and these can be used to enable 
cooperation in the defense industry. Engagement can only occur if both parties can 
offer balanced technology and resources, which all comes down to the development 
of strategic thinking. The question lies in the cost-benefit factor. 
 
A comprehensive framework is needed – low level to high level, e.g. ADMM Plus 
and India’s role in IONS. Different levels of discussion and engagement should be 
initiated – material resources, (research)-tactical cooperation, (HADR)-midlevel 
cooperation, regional cooperation (West Bengal), bilateral cooperation, strategic 
cooperation. Other ways of thinking about levels are the political, bureaucratic, – 
administrative. Another fact is communication – not just knowing about but also 
knowing how, e.g. HADR procedure, how are both countries conducting the process. 
Working on dissimilarities will increase efficiency in engagement. 
 
 
In questioning ASEAN, India supports the framework and Malaysia’s decision to 
engage through the ASEAN platform but it would only limit itself on a political level. 
E.g. ARF, EAS, East Asia Maritime Forum (EAMF). The ADMM Plus is a collective 
measure (my opinion - ADMM Plus track two). Bilateral cooperation is the need of 
the hour yet it would be welcomed only if Malaysia is enthusiastic in engaging or 
projecting a bigger role, in other words a proactive engagement. India declares its 
blue water navy strategy and it is in the hands of SEA nations to seek opportunities 
and create collective engagement in ensuring maritime security in the IOR. 
 
C. India’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence on 






Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may cause Malaysia and 
India to work together? 
 
Traditional cooperation needs more focus because India does not show threats, it 
represents benign behavior, and is willing to abide by principles, e.g. SLOC, 
safety navigations. India has openly expressed its blue water ambitions unlike the 
Chinese, which shows India’s benign behavior. 
 
 
Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
2. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may cause 
Malaysia and India to work together? 
 
The discussion began by stating that Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation is 
more focused on NT security issues due to both nations adopting cooperative 
behavior, e.g. HADR and SAR, piracy etc.; MILAN for the purpose of HADR. In the 






INDIA GROUP  INTERVIEWS 
 
India Group 1 (IG-1) 
 
 
Date of Interview: 24
th 
March 2015 
Time: 10.00 hours 
Duration: 2 hour 40 minutes 
Location: The  United  Service  of  India,  Rao Tula Ram 
Marg, Opposite Signal  Enclave,  Vasant  
Vihar, New Delhi, 110057,  India 
Number of interview sessions:          1 




Col Praveen Chabbara, the Defense Attache in Malayasia, organized the meeting 
with the United Service of India(USI). It was a quiet morning and it took me one 
hour and 30 minutes to reach USI with a rented car in  New  Delhi.  Upon  
reaching, I met Dr. Roshan who was the person in charge of the meeting. After 
about 10 minutes, I walked towards a small discussion room where I met the 
informants. They were all excited and waiting to deliver their response. It was a 
warm room with no air-conditioning. After a brief introduction, the interview 
began. 
 
All informants were looking fresh and responded warmly. They were well 
prepared as all of them had questionnaires two weeks before the date of meeting. 
Their response to my questions was excellent. All of the five informants are of 
military background and had good knowledge on international relations and 
defense studies. One was a serving officer who could not comment much due to 
restrictions but the other officer was seen dominating the conversation due to 
seniority and also due to the fact that he was a retired   officer. 
 
No abnormal interruption happened during the interview. It was a detailed and 
very comprehensive group discussion. I took additional 30 minutes since we were 
having a very positive and in-depth discussion. Reflections were very vast on all 
areas of the interview. Coffee and tea was served. The interview ended with huge 
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Designation: The United Services of  India 
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Professional Experience: Retired Naval Officer 
Years of Experience: 28 years 
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Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: The United Services of India 
 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Maritime 
Professional Experience: Serving Naval Offier 
Years of Experience: 28 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
 
Disclosure of Information 
The informant had been provided with a King’s College London information 
sheet and consent form disclosing the research topic, purpose, risks, benefits and 
confidentiality  guidelines. 
 
A. India’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional maritime 
security threats in the EIOR). 
 
 
1. What are the external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
The USI representative started the explanation by commenting that Malaysia 
shifted her policy by leaning towards Pakistan in 1970 during the Cold War. 
The first informant suggested that this could be the possible drawback of 
Malaysia-India international relations. The second informant further argued 
that the possible act of Malaysia’s equation in the Indo-Pakistan war in 
formulating its foreign policy with India might seem unfair to India. The 
‘Question of Pakistan’ is believed to be a vital factor and a drawback in 
bringing forward a mature relationship between Malaysia and India, unlike 
India’s relationship with Singapore and Indonesia. 
 
In discussing the China factor, China is seen as a potential threat rather than a 
real threat. China’s power projection in the IOR, if not militarized, is not a 
threat to India. India is a benign power and benign engagement by China is not 
a threat and China is rather seen as a strategic partner in the IOR. 
 
The first informant argued that geographical limitation could be a factor in 
determining Malaysia-India maritime cooperation. However he felt that 
geographical distance is and should not be a major factor. He felt that if 
geographical proximity is a concern then many provinces within India would 
not be connected with one another, taking into consideration the fact that India 
comprises a huge land mass. 
 
2. What are the internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 






Cultural diaspora plays an important role. Since Raja Chola’s era, Malaysia has 
received Indian sea voyages for trading purposes. However, these trading 
activities soon led to local settlements at major trading ports. He says that these 
local settlements spread culture, religion and languages, leading to a diverse 
Malaysia today. 
 
3. How is Malaysia going to rebalance her overall and maritime power vis-à-vis 
India and China in the EIOR in the context of the above factors? 
 
In discussing India’s maritime desire and ambitions to strive as a blue water 
navy or a global maritime power in the Indian Ocean, a rather surprising 
response was received. The idea that the Indian Ocean is India’s ocean is a 
misconception. The 9 dotted lines at the Indian Ocean are also another untrue 
statement. India is one emerging maritime power in the Indian Ocean that does 
not have any maritime dispute with its neighbors and littoral states. It can be 
seen through India’s involvement in Maldives and Sri Lanka in ensuring peace 
despite its strong NAM policy. It is only right to say that the Indian Ocean is 
India’s underbelly and that maritime security and the safety and peaceful 
environment of the IOR is vital for its national interest to be preserved. Any 
disability in the IOR is a direct threat to India’s national interest and 
sovereignty but there is no claim that India owns the Indian Ocean. India is a 
vital power in the Indian Ocean and one cannot ignore India’s involvement 
when it comes to the Indian Ocean. Malaysia as a vital power at the SOM 
cannot ignore India’s role as a defender or protector in ensuring a power 
balance in the EIOR. 
 
 
B. India’s commitment on Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation in the 
EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR through bilateral and/or regional mechanisms? 
 
In response to the research question, the informants suggested that Malaysia’s 
defense industry is believed to be less capable and could utilize the vast 
capability of India, especially on military equipment. The SCORPENO CLUB 
is one good explanation but a more forward outlook is needed, e.g. trust in 
indigenous exchange and the maintenance of ships of the first and second line. 
Others are the SU30s, KILO class, training, batteries industries that could be 
more costly. It was argued that the cost factor is a vital one; a more 
comprehensive framework is required in order to produce a more pronounced 
defense industry relationship. The question of who can share costs is vital, as 
is considering the extent of the losses. This requires a change in mindset. 
 
In questioning the role of India in ASEAN, the opinion was that using a 
mediator can be a drawback in the relationship, although ASEAN is 
welcomed. It was argued - is ASEAN the only way? Bilateral mechanisms can 





It is believed that Malaysia lacks in enthusiasm, causing a lack of engagement 
with India. 
 
In conclusion, it was argued that convergence of interest and mutual interest is 
vital, but do not seem to be convincing between Malaysia and India. The sea is 
one area of easy cooperation due to the fact that there is no governance in the 
sea. Political will is a vital driver in any relationship and Malaysia-India 
maritime cooperation is no exception. It is vital for Malaysia to throw away 
the old baggage of the ‘Question of Pakistan’ in shaping its foreign policy. A 
global warning could be one paradigm shift in the relationship. A shift in 
strategic thinking in Malaysia is vital to ensure a more sound and pronounced 
maritime relationship with India (either win-win or be selfish). The role of 
think tankers is vital in the case of Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation, which could later be uplifted into a higher level of cooperation. It 
was argued that the time has come for Malaysia to Look West to India, while 




C. India’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence on 
mitigating traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats in the 
EIOR. 
 
Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may cause Malaysia and 
India to work together? 
 
India has great interest in engaging with Malaysia due to its strategic location 
at the Straits of Malacca. It is a busiest trade route and it is vital for India’s 
maritime interest. As a sovereign country, Malaysia’s territories are respected 
and India is a strong follower of NAM, and stay neutral has always been the 
cornerstone of its foreign policy. Malaysia should engage India in a more 
proactive manner. It is believed that it is due to this mentality and also 
Malaysia’s lack of enthusiasm in engaging that is causing the disjointed 
appearance of the relationship. 
 
 
Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
 
2. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may cause 
Malaysia and India to work together? 
 
In discussing the NTI, which is believed to be the potential area of cooperation 
between Malaysia and India, amendment of law is crucial in projecting more 
positive cooperation because maritime areas have no boundaries. It is vital that 
a more clear and accurate maritime law is shaped to create not just confidence 





However, in the case of cooperating to curtail illicit activities, it is first 
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Location: Institute for Defense Studies and   Analyses, 1, 
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110010, India. 
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Col Praveen Chabbara, the Defense Attache in Malayasia, organized the meeting 
with the IDSA. It was a quiet morning and it took me 1 hour and 30 minutes to 
reach IDSA with a rented car in New Delhi. Upon reaching, I met Dr. Jaganath 
Panda who was the person in charge for the meeting. After about 10 minutes, I 
walked towards a big discussion room where  I met the informants (10).  They  
were all excited and waiting to deliver their responses. It was a warm room with  
no air-conditioning. After a brief introduction, the interview   began. 
 
All informants were looking fresh and responded warmly. They were well 
prepared as all of them had received the questionnaire two weeks before the date  
of meeting.  Their responses to my  questions were excellent.  All informants  were 
a mix of military and civilian backgrounds, hence I manage to receive good 
knowledge and information on my interview questions. One was a serving officer 
who could not comment much due to restrictions  but the others could converse  
and debate openly. At some point, heated debate was seen between informants, 
which was interesting for my interview  outcome. 
 
No abnormal interruption happened during the interview. It was a detailed and 
very comprehensive group discussion. I took an additional 10 minutes of time 
because all informants and I were also having very positive and in-depth 
discussions. Reflections were very vast on all areas listed in the interview  
questions. Coffee and tea was served to me. The interview ended with huge smile 
on all our faces and we departed with a friendly   gesture. 
 
 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Former Financial Advisor  & Current 
Distinguished Fellow 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Defense Industry 
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Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Senior Fellow 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Military 
Professional Experience: Serving Military Officer 
Years of Experience: 30 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Senior Research Fellow 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: Southeast Asia Region 
Professional Experience: Civilian 
Years of Experience: 30 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
Name of Informant/ Interviewee: Confidential 
Designation: Research fellow 
Age: Middle-aged 
Field of Expertise: East Asia 
Professional Experience: Civilian 
Years of Experience: 6 years 
Anonymity Required: Yes 
 
 
Disclosure of Information 
The informants had been provided with the King’s College London information 
sheet and consent form disclosing the research topic, purpose, risks, benefits and 
confidentiality  guidelines. 
 
A. India’s maritime security outlook (traditional and non-traditional maritime 
security threats in the EIOR). 
 
 
1. What are the external drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
India is one country that no international polity can avoid including Malaysia. 
There is a strong requirement to reanalyse Malaysia’s foreign policy with 
India. First of all, Malaysia’s relationship with China is vital to be examined in 
order to understand Malaysia’s level of engagement with India on the maritime 
domain. Malaysia’s stand in the South China Sea vis-à-vis China e.g. the James 
Shoal case is one good example in understanding Malaysia’s maritime 
behavior in the EIOR. It could be affecting its position on maritime issues in 
the EIOR, especially on traditional threats – a possibility of a hostile naval is 





relationship will be one determining factor in understanding the Malaysia-India 
relationship. 
 
In questioning the China factor, China is seen as an emerging power and a vital 
maritime power in the IOR, but it has not yet arrived to the expected level of 
power. The India-China relationship is still peaceful and will be so for the next 
decade, since for instance trade and global governance both entail good 
cooperation. Perhaps the relationship between China and Pakistan may cause a 
little irritation, but this is still manageable. It is important to examine India’s 
engagement with China on three levels – regional, partnership and as a 
neighbor. China is not a threat to India’s assets of any kind. China has other 
internal and external concerns, e.g. SCS. If China seeks militarization only then 
it may cause concern. A political context will give a clearer assessment on 
whether China is presently a concern for India. 
 
 
2. What are the internal drivers influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR? 
 
Various internal factors are influencing Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation, such as a cultural diaspora, bureaucratic framework of both 
countries, maritime policies, and the historical maritime relationships. 
 
3. How is Malaysia going to rebalance her overall and maritime power vis-à-vis 
India and China in the EIOR in the context of the above factors? 
 
B. India’s commitment on Malaysia-India maritime security cooperation in the 
EIOR. 
 
1. What is the level of commitment towards Malaysia-India maritime security 
cooperation in the EIOR through bilateral and/or regional mechanisms? 
 
India’s position in the IORA, Shangri la dialogue and Malaysia’s stand and 
reaction are vital to examine for understanding Malaysia’s acceptance of India 
at the multilateral level of cooperation. India has already shown great interest 
in the SEA region through its LEP policy. How Malaysia is reacting and 
engaging is where most of the answers lie. For example, the defense industry 
is one significant area of cooperation. However, no joint venture has been 
done so far, while great prospects lie in maintenance, repair, assets and ships. 
It all depends on Malaysia’s acquisition policy. An interesting point was 
raised - does Malaysia have its own Indian Ocean policy, which is reflected on 
any white paper? How Malaysia views the IOR and the Asia Pacific will affect 
its overall view of India’s role in the larger context of the Indo-Pacific region, 
and vice versa of India’s engagement with Malaysia, given that Malaysia sits 
at the border of both the IOR and Asia Pacific. 
 
It was argued that interaction should begin at a think tank level both consisting 
of TRACK 1 and TRACK 2. India’s LEP has been almost one decade and the 
new policy is Act East Policy. It should not just involve engagement but also 





levels. There is a great deal of understanding in what both countries sell to 
each other, e.g. BRAHMOS to Vietnam by the Indians. 
 
In discussing India’s involvement in the form of a multilateral institution, it 
was stated that India has a leading role in the IORA. At an economic level, it 
has two models, one on regional partnership and another on transnational 
partnership, like the trans-pacific partnership (TTP) and Asia-Europe 
Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP). Most ASEAN countries see India as a 
leading power, e.g. Singapore and Indonesia show great signs of India’s 
positive in the region. 
 
 
C. India’s perspective on maritime security cooperation and its influence on 




Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
1. What are the traditional maritime security threats that may cause Malaysia and 
India to work together? 
 
In strengthening the relationship between Malaysia and India, it is vital to seek 
common interests between both nations, such as safety and security of 
SLOC’s and safety of EEZs. One area of cooperation could be ensuring the 
safety navigation of the Straits of Malacca. Malaysia needs India as an 
emerging power in ensuring the safety of waters. On the other hand, India 
needs Malaysia, as India has no power in the SOM. A proactive engagement 
will lead to a stronger maritime relation in the SOM between Malaysia and 
India. 
 
In discussing Indian maritime power and its ambitions in the IOR, India was 
seen as a stable and responsible power but one that does not show dominance. 
It has never shown or projected maritime conflict with any country. It shows 
good maritime governance capability and India will soon lead, as it is a 
responsible power. It has not been to the Atlantic. It has the capability to 
project maritime power in the IOR, but globally it has no need to go across the 
IOR. Its maritime capability is only to ensure the safety of its national 
territories. India has the capability to respond to other navies, as compared 




Non-Traditional Maritime Security Threats in the EIOR. 
 
 
1. What are the non-traditional maritime security threats that may cause 





In discussing the area of cooperation, one major area of cooperation can be 
on the HADR. For instance, both countries can work on the common 
origin of equipment. Also drugs, arms and human trafficking can be some 
themes under the non-traditional aspect, which can be major concerns for 
both Malaysia and India. In today’s times, disasters have become so 
common and there is lack of collaboration among countries on disaster 
management. Malaysia, India and other neighboring countries should 
explore this further and develop strategies on this to join hands together. 
